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Lawful Response to Attacks on Space Systems 
 
James D. Rendleman 
Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Colorado Springs, Colorado 
 
What means may a nation lawfully employ to 
respond to and to defeat threats and attacks on 
its space systems? Treaties and customary law 
provide a strong incentive to limit space 
activities to non-aggressive “peaceful 
purposes.” They do not, however, proscribe 
space warfare or preparation for such conflict. 
Space system components are thus at risk, and 
can be attacked, degraded, or destroyed, 
simultaneously or each in detail. The use of 
force is allowed only in self-defense against 
an “armed attack” or in accord with 
authorization of the United Nations (UN). 
Kinetic, electromagnetic, or information 
operation attacks against space systems are 
each an “armed attack” to which the use of 
force is permitted. The right of self-defense is 
subject to the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
and other treaties and agreements. Even if 
lawful means and methods are employed and 
targets engaged, physical, technical, 
environmental, political realities, and their 
risks and benefits limit options to defend and 
fight space systems. Decades of senior policy-
makers have recognized the importance of the 
space domain, assessed the risks in their 
context, and provided measured and calm 
global leadership to preserve access to it. 
 
The United States (U.S.) utilizes space more 
than any other nation, not only for national 
security, but in the private sector as well. The 
complete mix of civil, military, national, and 
multinational commercial space capabilities 
are important enablers for successful 21st 
Century militaries, economies, information 
transfer, diplomatic communications, and 
collaboration. Space-based capabilities – 
precision-navigation-timing (PNT), battlefield 
and battlespace characterization, missile 
warning and defense, weather, 
communications, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance – enable the U.S. and its 
allies to reach out, shape, support, and control 
events in any part of the globe. 
 
Taking down space capabilities offers a means 
by which adversaries can degrade the 
significant asymmetric advantages offered. 
Consequently, the recent 11 January 2007 test 
of a Chinese ground-based, direct-ascent anti-
satellite (ASAT) interceptor against one of 
their own defunct Feng Yun-1C weather 
satellites generated considerable concern 
across the U.S. and international space and 
related defense communities. 
 
How should capabilities presented by space 
systems be protected? The U.S. approach to 
securing and protecting the space domain has 
been and will continue to be rooted in rational 
policy making and municipal (i.e., domestic, 
national) and international law. Long-standing 
treaties and policy support the peaceful uses of 
space for civil, commercial, and military 
purposes. Yet, these may fail in times of 
conflict. Accordingly, the U.S. cannot wholly 
depend on passive defensive capabilities, or 
diplomatic engagement and awareness, to 
secure itself. 
 
Recognizing the importance of protecting 
satellites as strategic assets, the U.S. has 
employed a comprehensive strategy to 
accomplish this objective since the inception 
of the Space Age. During the Cold War, 
hardening military satellites against potential 
destruction was commonplace, though 
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“development of specific weapons to target 
hostile satellites or threats to U.S. satellites 
was politically eschewed. The U.S. desire to 
protect its satellites was overridden by 
wanting to avoid what were considered 
potentially destabilizing efforts, and what 
seemed as an inevitable arms race in space.”1 
Contemporary and emerging capabilities 
posed by hostile states and non-state actors 
now serve as a catalyst for a reappraisal of 
tools one might employ to achieve deterrence 
and even defeat such threats. 
 
Considering the complexities of the threat 
environment, the strategy to assure the U.S. 
and its allies have access to space capabilities 
depends on four mutually supportive elements 
or pillars:2 
 
• Global Engagement. 
• Space Situational Awareness (SSA). 
• Responsive Infrastructure. 
• Deterrence and Defense. 
 
Global engagement leverages long-standing 
approaches to securing and protecting the 
space domain through recognized 
international law, policy, and diplomacy. SSA 
enables the monitoring of environmental 
factors and prediction of threats essential to 
decision-making to assure mission success. 
This allows a policy-maker or commander to 
differentiate between purposeful attacks and 
natural environmental hazards; to anticipate 
space events and clarify intentions; this, in 
turn, reduces the potential for misperception 
or miscalculation. SSA also enhances 
opportunities to avoid disruptive or destructive 
events. A robust and responsive infrastructure 
                                                 
1Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite 
(ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, INSS 
Occasional Paper 30, U.S. Air Force Institute for National 
Security Studies (INSS), January 2000, p. 1. 
2The four pillars of space assurance are more fully discussed 
in James Rendleman, “Space Assurance for the 21st Century,” 
High Frontier 5: 2 (February 2009): 46-53. 
enables a spacefaring nation with the abilities 
to present agile responses to changes and 
threats in the space environment to assure 
viability of systems. Deterrence strategies and 
approaches are important and inhibit potential 
attacks by adversaries; however, they do not 
fully assure access to space. A variety of 
defenses can complement deterrence by giving 
tools needed to respond to human-made and 
environmental threats. In sum, employing 
these four pillars have in the past and will in 
the future enable U.S. and friendly space 
systems to continue to perform their missions 
for the short and long terms. 
 
With the possibility of space conflict and 
combat, policy-makers and commanders must 
balance the benefits with the risks. Decisions 
to employ this conflict/combat aspect of the 
fourth pillar of space assurance, deterrence 
and defense, must not be taken lightly. Given 
their diversity, deterring, defeating, or 
eliminating human-made threats will be 
difficult to achieve. This is the case even 
though a myriad of combat tactics can be 
employed against those who attempt to deny 
access to space capabilities. 
 
When planning to employ space defense 
strategies and respond to attacks on space 
systems, decision-makers must consider a 
particularly important factor – the law. Some 
rail against any use of force to protect access 
to space, unmindful of the risk, suggesting 
such actions could somehow constitute 
violations of treaty, custom, domestic law, 
policy, or LOAC. Granted, those who argue 
against “any use of force” are in a minority, 
but many do make earnest arguments for 
significant limitations to space warfare. In 
contrast, in the military space field only a 
decade or so ago people talked about Space 
Control. In fact, Space Control is still one of 
the four space mission areas discussed in Joint 
Publication 3-14, Space Operations (6 January 
2009), and Counterspace Operations, Air 
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Force Doctrine Document 2-2 (2 August 
2004). Proponents have been arguing that the 
U.S. should prepare for winning in a contested 
space domain, a concept described as “space 
dominance;” this objective has been 
broadened by advocates to “full spectrum 
dominance.”3 The current 2006 U.S. National 
Space Policy precepts and space control 
doctrine suggest the U.S. should proactively 
control the environment – to assure access by 
U.S. and allied systems, defeat threats, and 
deny adversaries access to their own space 
capabilities if required.4 There must be a 
proper balance of all these divergent interests. 
 
Assuming the U.S. or any other nation 
believes it is compelled to use force to 
respond to threats or attacks on its space 
systems and/or those of its allies, the 
proposition to be surveyed and examined in 
this paper is: what means may a nation 
lawfully employ to respond to and defeat 
threats to and attacks on its space systems? 
 
This paper will examine how relevant treaties, 
customary law, LOAC, and other legal 
principles substantially restrict space warfare 
options, but also reduce the potential for 
conflict among law-abiding spacefaring 
nations. We will identify legal principles 
supporting the right to defend a national or 
allied space system. Following this, we will 
apply these principles with a dose of 
engineering and policy concerns to discuss 
lawful and unlawful means and methods to 
prosecute the right of self-defense and to 
defeat threats to space systems. 
                                                                                                 
3Dwayne Day, “Space Policy 101,” The Space Review 15 
June 2009, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1397/1 
(accessed January 2010). 
4Fact Sheet on U.S. National Space Policy, National Security 
Presidential Directive 49, 31 August 2006. 
Space Capabilities and Threats 
 
Because the complexities of space combat 
pose significant legal issues, the technical, 
historical, and policy taxonomies of potential 
threats and attacks on space systems that could 
initiate such conflict must be fully understood. 
A satellite system consists not only of 
spacecraft, but supporting infrastructure, 
including ground stations, tracking and control 
links – commonly referred to as the tracking, 
telemetry, and control (TT&C) – and data 
links; launch facilities, supporting 
infrastructures and the industrial base are also 
vital. These components are all at risk to 
threats of physical and cyber attack and 
sabotage, and can be attacked, disrupted, 
degraded, or destroyed, simultaneously or 
each in detail. 
 
Space-based threats to satellites are 
proliferating as a result of the ever-growing 
global availability of space technology; states 
can reach out to space and “touch” satellite 
payloads and their supporting buses through a 
variety of kinetic and non-kinetic means; even 
non-state actors could potentially access some 
of these technologies and space systems and 
cause problems. It takes little imagination to 
envision multiple means by which a satellite 
payload and/or its bus can be disrupted, 
degraded, destroyed, or otherwise disabled.5 
Spacecraft are vulnerable to direct ascent 
weapons as demonstrated by the Chinese 
ASAT test and also to a variety of other 
ground-based, airborne, and space-based 
ASAT systems. These require sophisticated 
boosters, launch facilities, and high-tech 
terminal guidance capabilities; this is not an 
easy system to generate and field without state 
sponsorship. Direct-ascent launched or orbit-
 
5Every satellite has a “payload” and a “bus.” The payload 
contains all the equipment a satellite needs to perform its 
mission functions. The bus supports the payload and provides 
electrical power, computers, and propulsion for the entire 
spacecraft. 
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based nuclear devices can be detonated, 
generating energetic electrons and other 
particles, radiation belts, and other effects that 
can fry unshielded satellite circuitry over a 
wide lethal range. Space mines can be 
deployed in close proximity to satellites or be 
employed to generate debris clouds that 
destructively engage whole classes of low 
Earth orbit (LEO) satellites in the same orbital 
plane or in crossing orbits, or to create 
problems among satellites in geosynchronous 
orbits (GEO). Ground, space-based, or 
airborne lasers could wreak havoc upon 
satellite components. Blinding operations 
could be employed and achieve a variety of 
effects from a temporary “dazzling” with a 
laser to permanent burnout of optical or other 
sensors with an otherwise intense energy 
burst. 
 
Vital command and control and 
communications stations, and their links to 
satellites and each other are also at risk.6 At a 
fundamental level, they are vulnerable to 
classically accepted terrestrial land, sea, or air 
kinetic attacks, including sabotage.7 Some 
unprotected stations, links, and user segments 
are susceptible to electronic attack that can 
degrade, neutralize, or destroy their 
capabilities. These threats and attacks 
encompass jamming and electromagnetic 
deception techniques. Jammers disable the 
means of command and control and data 
communications, and in this manner render 
                                                 
6Control stations track and control satellites to ensure they 
remain in proper orbits and properly perform their missions. 
Communications ground stations process satellite mission 
data and link that data to ground-based networks and users. 
TT&C links exchange commands and status information 
between control ground stations and satellites. Data links 
exchange mission data between communications ground 
stations and satellites. These links may pass through ground 
stations or satellites and relayed as appropriate. 
7Ground stations are often located in remote and hard to get to 
places. Orchestrating an attack on them is feasible, though 
perhaps impractical. Most sites are well protected and the 
logistics needed to achieve a successful attack could be 
difficult to assemble. 
satellites inoperable or unavailable. A variety 
of jammers emit signals that mask or prevent 
reception of desired signals; these methods 
can disrupt unprotected uplinks, downlinks, 
and even cross-links. Electromagnetic 
deception and spoofing techniques can be 
employed to confuse unprepared and 
unprotected systems; this could include 
sending false, but deceptively plausible, 
commands that cause spacecraft to perform 
damaging or wasteful maneuvers, modify 
databases or configuration changes, or 
otherwise destroy it. Similarly, supporting 
terrestrial ground stations, computer networks, 
and links are vulnerable to information 
operation attacks. This could involve 
executing denial of service tasks, injection of 
fake commands, malicious software and 
viruses, unauthorized monitoring and 
disclosure of sensitive information (data 
interception), and unauthorized modification 
or deliberate corruption of network 
information, services, and databases. 
 
While achieving success would be difficult to 
achieve and is unlikely, offensive information 
operations can be undertaken against on-orbit 
satellites seeking to effect shutdown 
operations, where an adversary gains access to 
a satellite’s control program and directs it to 
cease functioning for some length of time. 
This could be orchestrated to coincide during 
the initial critical moments of a simultaneous 
and parallel terrestrial attack, or involve a 
permanent command to never resume 
operations. While not physically damaging the 
satellite, the result would be the same. It 
would deprive the owner/operator of its use 
precisely when the system is most needed. 
Directing a permanent shutdown could cause 
total loss of for any owner not able to reaccess 
the platform and override the command. 
Similarly, an attitude movement could be 
directed by accessing the satellite’s control 
program, ordering the satellite platform to 
rotate on its axis, or pointing the mission 
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sensor, communications antennae, receiver, 
solar cells, or any other directionally-
dependant system in the wrong direction. Such 
an attack would be effective against a satellite 
whose effectiveness depends on payload and 
commucication systems pointing at precise 
transponder and receiver targets, or sensors 
aimed at a particular area of interest. 
 
A translation movement attack involves 
directing the activation of a satellite’s 
thrusters and sending the platform into a new 
orbit. This could also cause loss of the satellite 
or require the system to expend vital on-orbit 
resources to correct its position; the 
expenditure of resources to correct the 
satellite’s orbit or orientation could 
significantly limit the system’s life. The 
destruction of the satellite could be 
accomplished by issuing damaging commands 
to its control program, e.g., to mismanage 
propellant temperature controls to the point of 
tank or propellant line rupture. 
 
Lastly, an appropriation or impressment attack 
involves transfer of control of the satellite 
system to an adversary. The satellite’s control 
program is accessed and altered, denying the 
launching state use of its own platform. Worse 
than mere destruction, the satellite’s 
capabilities are then placed at the disposal of 
an attacking state.8 
 
Given these threats, the 2007 Chinese ASAT 
test stoked the fires of a long-running debate 
over whether and how the U.S. and its allies 
should prepare for space conflict. More 
terrifying: 
 
Some have argued that the test is 
evidence of a lack of communication 
                                                                                                 
8For a worthwhile overview of potential attacks on space 
systems, see Thomas C. Wingfield, Legal Aspects of Offensive 
Information Operations in Space, 23 March 2000, pp. 3-4 
[unpublished manuscript], http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ 
awcgate/dod-io-legal/wingfield.doc (accessed January 2010). 
among various parts of the Chinese 
government, with the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) carrying out 
the test without the knowledge of the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry or other 
parts of the governmnt. “Put bluntly, 
Beijing’s right hand may not have 
known what its left hand was doing,” 
writes Bates Gill and Martin 
Kleiber… “This may be a more 
troubling prospect than anything the 
test might have revealed about 
China’s military ambitions or arms 
control objectives.”9 
 
Moreover, Chinese military strategist, Wang 
Fa’an, has proposed the PLA set up its own 
space forces in the future to protect China’s 
growing space assets.10 However, Chinese 
capabilities do not pose the only concerns. 
There have been attacks on space systems by 
other actors and the U.S. and the global space 
community have had good reason to take 
notice. Given the proliferation and diversity of 
other global threats, China’s ASAT test only 
served to provide an important exclamation 
point on the specter of space conflict. As 
observed by retired Congressman Terry 
Everett in his Fall 2007 article written for 
Strategic Studies Quarterly: 
 
…In the past few years, we have seen 
a handful of global positioning 
system (GPS) and increasing numbers 
of satellite communications 
(SATCOM) jamming incidents. In 
the early stages of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, U.S. forces encountered a 
GPS jamming situation. In this case, 
precision munitions were used to hit 
these jamming sources, which 
allowed our forces to quickly resume 
operations. We have seen several 
SATCOM jamming incidents, 
including Iranian jamming of a U.S. 
 
9Jeff Foust, “The Chinese ASAT enigma, The Space Review 7 
May 2007, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/864/1 
(accessed June 2009). 
10Peng Kuang and Cui Xiaohuo, “PLA Should Play Role in 
Space: Strategist,” China Daily, 16 June 2009. 
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satellite from Cuba in July 2003; 
ongoing jamming by Iran against 
PanAmSat Corporation, Asia Satellite 
Telecommunications Co. Ltd., Arab 
Satellite Communications 
Organization, and Eutelsat S.A. from 
June 1997 to July 2005; and Libyan 
jamming of two international 
SATCOM systems in December 
2005. Last fall it was reported that a 
Chinese ground-based laser 
illuminated a National 
Reconnaissance Office intelligence-
gathering satellite. What is most 
troubling is that these attacks are 
coming during a period of widespread 
use of GPS, satellite communications, 
and space-based imagery. 
…There is a spectrum of 
potential threat capabilities looming 
on the horizon to include electronic 
jamming, low-power laser blinding, 
high-energy lasers, microsatellites, 
direct-ascent ASATs, cyber attacks, 
physical attacks to ground stations, 
and possibly even a nuclear 
explosion. These threats can target 
satellites in orbit; their 
communications links to and from the 
ground; and their ground-based 
command, control, and receive 
stations. All produce the same general 
result – they render our space 
capabilities temporarily or 
permanently useless. Many of these 
anti-satellite technologies exist today, 
and many are dual-use in nature, 
including a microsatellite that could 
be used as an experimental spacecraft 
or, with a simple command, could 
shadow or collide with another 
satellite. 
Space is no longer a sanctuary. 
Those who wish to challenge 
America’s role in the world 
increasingly recognized the strategic 
importance of space and are more 
willing to deny us freedom of action 
in space by employing a wide range 
of methods.11 
                                                 
 
                                                
11Terry Everett, “Arguing for a Comprehensive Space 
Protection Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2007): 
23-24, citing Jim Garamone, “CENTCOM Charts Operation 
Iraqi Freedom Progress,” American Forces Press Service, 25 
In sum, the contemporary, emerging threats to 
space systems posed by hostile states and non-
state actors are fundamentally different from 
that experienced during the Cold War. 
Vulnerabilities span the whole of the space 
community, and these weaknesses have been 
studied by adversaries to the U.S. and its 
allies. These adversaries are now much more 
diverse, sophisticated, and technologically 
competent; they are equipped and able to 
disrupt space activities. Defending space 
assets demands new tools as deterring or 
eliminating evolving threats will be difficult. 
 
 
Securing the High Frontier of Space 
 
U.S. law and policy place great emphasis on 
diplomacy and international engagement; it is 
a centuries-old practice that has secured 
borders, enhanced commerce, and brokered 
and resolved disputes. Assuming adversaries, 
and friends, pay heed to customary and treaty-
based provisions of international law, the 
global engagement pillar of space assurance 
affords the space community a respectable 
measure of confidence they can all have 
assured access to space. Even so, given the 
present minimal international law restrictions 
on space activities, smart decision-making is 
also vital to operate safely and securely. The 
complete span of international legal, policy, 
diplomacy, and engagement implications 
should therefore be fully considered when 
planning for and executing space assurance 
activities. The U.S. has done this for decades; 
it has applied significant experience and 
 
 
March 2003; Major General William L. Shelton, commander, 
14th Air Force, “Update on Space Operations,” Air Force 
Association National Symposium on Space, Beverly Hills, 
California, 17 November 2006; Warren Ferster and Colin 
Clark, “NRO Confirms Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S. 
Spacecraft,” Space News 2 October 2006; and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2007, Annual Report to Congress 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007). 
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wisdom to prepare for and take care of threats 
posed by ASAT and other systems for the 
entirety of the Space Age. 
 
What are the applicable foundations of 
international law? First, treaties and other 
bilateral agreements to which sovereign states 
are signatories, and which govern issues of 
interest; and second, multinational agreements 
among sovereigns. International agreements 
are governed, not by contract law, but by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.12 
Under the Vienna Convention, states can do 
anything they want and agree to, unless what 
is contemplated violates a peremptory norm 
(i.e., a fundamental principle of international 
law that is accepted by the international 
community of states as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted). While the U.S. has 
not ratified the Vienna Convention, it treats 
the bulk of its rules as compelling under 
customary international law, which is a third 
foundation of international law. The fourth 
foundation deals with general principles 
common to mature legal systems. And the 
fifth, deals with the subsidiary “municipal” 
determinations of law (e.g., national decisions, 
such as those rendered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court).13 
 
International law is an integral part of the U.S. 
legal system. Its founding fathers convened at 
the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional 
Convention to revise the unwieldy and 
moribund Articles of Confederation; the 
impetuses for their meeting were intractable 
commercial, trade and defense issues, also 
important in the international arena. The 
framers knew international law existed, its 
                                                 
                                                
12See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 
1969. 
13Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
defines its sources. See Nathaniel Burney, “International Law: 
A brief primer for information purposes only,” 
http://www.burneylawfirm.com/international_law_primer.htm 
(accessed January 2010). 
importance, and the document reflects this. 
The Constitution, Article I § 8, Clause 10 sets 
out in pertinent part: Congress has the power 
“to define and punish offenses… against the 
Law of Nations.” Treaties are concluded under 
the authority of the Constitution, Article II § 
2, Clause 2 , which declares the President 
“shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, 
provided that two-thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”14 Article VI, Clause 2 
provides: “…all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the U.S. the 
name of the U.S., shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land.”15 Generally, treaty terms take 
precedence over conflicting U.S. statute 
terms.16 
 
With relatively few treaty restrictions 
governing activities in space for military or 
other purposes, some might think the U.S. is 
faced with a dilemma – should it only abide 
by a permissive “letter of the law” standard or 
the “spirit of the law”? If only the letter of the 
law, what approach should it want to see 
adopted by current or fledging space nations? 
Actually, the choice is not between the letter 
and spirit of the law; on the whole, the U.S. 
abides by both standards. Decades of senior 
policy-makers within the Executive and 
Congressional branches of the U.S. 
Government have recognized the importance 
 
14Under international law, the terms “treaty” and 
“international agreement” are synonymous, although the 
terms do have different meanings within the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DOD). DOD Document 5530.3, International 
Agreements, 11 June 1987, Enclosure 2, defines “international 
agreement” more broadly, to include agreements between 
lower levels of nations’ governments (e.g., the U.S. 
Departments of Defense) that are under the umbrella of a 
treaty, but have not themselves been ratified (“advice and 
consent”) by the U.S. Senate. 
15Customary law is not part of the “supreme Law of the 
Land” though some U.S. Supreme Court Justices are now 
making some rather disconcerting noises about incorporating 
portions of such law into the U.S. constitutional system. 
16The major exception to this is when Congress intends for a 
later statute to override the conflicting treaty provision. 
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of the domain; assessed risks associated with 
not providing measured and calm global 
leadership to preserve access to it; and made 
decisions in accord with those assessments.17 
In turn, the U.S. encourages comparable 
policy-making by other states of the global 
community. 
 
As it executes global engagement activities, 
the U.S. has been and will be on the receiving 
end of criticisms and exhortations that it does 
not follow the spirit of the law when refusing 
to accede to new agreements, standards, rules, 
and practices affecting space activities. But 
this refusal involves instruments whose terms 
lack precision, are unverifiable, fail to 
comprehensively address issues, or place the 
U.S. and its allies’ defense and economic 
security interests at risk. These critiques must 
be expected in the rough and tumble of the 
global stage, where each state jockeys for its 
own national or regional advantage. 
 
Treaties, conventions, and agreements already 
in force regularize space activities despite 
their minimalist nature. As such, they help 
protect capabilities of systems that have been 
or are about to be placed on orbit. Bilateral 
and multilateral arms control treaties also 
preserve some of the sanctuary aspects of 
space by prohibiting “interference” with 
“national technical means” (NTMs), which 
can include missile warning and 
reconnaissance satellites used to verify treaty 
compliance. Confidence-building procedures 
                                                 
17While diplomatic engagement has been helpful, there is an 
element of risk in relying solely on it to assure access to space 
capabilities. Enforcement mechanisms for violating treaties 
and agreements relating to space are rather limited. There are 
no specific enforcement mechanisms in place to address 
violations of space related treaties, and this increases the risk 
of depending on such documents and handshakes to protect or 
assure access to space. Violations of treaties and other 
agreements should nominally be responded to through 
economic means and diplomatic consultation, and if 
necessary, other sanctions, assuming a nation or some part of 
the global community agree to them. 
have been agreed to and these have improved 
opportunities for transparency between 
potential adversaries, perhaps improving 
dialogue to prevent any dispute from 
devolving or escalating into armed conflict or 
to a nuclear catastrophe. Other treaties and 
conventions, such as those involving the 
International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) address vexing spectrum management 
issues, which have profound impacts on 
military, civil, and commercial space systems. 
The ITU presently attempts to equitably 
reconcile the explosion of information 
technologies, exponential user growth and 
needs, all within nature’s limited useable 
bandwidth in the electromagnetic spectrum. 
 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies of 1967, or the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST) as the treaty is informally 
known, forms the basis for much of 
international space law, including its 
important legal principles and prohibitions. 
Under the treaty, all nations share the global 
space commons; notably, it is also an 
important foundation of the entire U.S. 
military, civil, and commercial space 
programs. The treaty was consummated at a 
time when U.S. policy-makers concluded 
space offered unique benefits for the military 
and political dimensions of the Cold War 
national security strategy. They hoped to 
fashion an agreement to preserve access to the 
domain, and these motivations and the 
document have endured and continue to serve 
the U.S. and its allies’ national interests. 
Assuming the mantel of the world’s leading 
spacefaring nation, the U.S. helped lead the 
way on discussions relating to the treaty’s 
formation, crafting the treaty instruments, and 
forging a global consensus to set a tone and 
worldview that space activities should be 
prosecuted for peace and the benefit of 
mankind. 
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As a signatory to the OST, the U.S. supports 
freedom of access to space by all spacefaring 
powers, agreeing to treaty language that 
provides: “Outer space …shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States without 
discrimination of any kind…”18 The treaty 
also declares nations should have “freedom of 
scientific investigation in outer space.” 
Addressing topics that affect the potential for 
space conflict, the OST provides that 
international law applies. “…Article III [of the 
OST] incorporates the application of 
international law, and specifically the Charter 
of the UN, in outer space, making it a vital 
part of the corpus juris spatialis.”19 This 
incorporation of international law, not just the 
UN Charter, is important and guiding. 
 
Every major spacefaring nation is a signatory 
to the OST. Rights and obligations of non-
                                                 
                                                
18See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). 
Article I – “The exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
free for exploration and use by all States without 
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law, and there shall be free 
access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom 
of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and 
encourage international co-operation in such investigation.” 
Article III – “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on 
activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with 
international law, including the Charter of the UN, in the 
interest of maintaining international peace and security and 
promoting international co-operation and understanding.” 
Article IV – “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to 
place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, 
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner…” 
19P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008. 
signatories can be found in international 
customary law. Customary international law 
“...consists of rules of law derived from the 
consistent conduct of States acting out of the 
belief that the law required them to act that 
way.”20 OST signatories 
can look to both treaty 
and customary law 
sources, as customary 
law may be applied 
whether or not a state is 
a treaty party. The vast 
majority of the world, 
including the U.S., 
accepts in principle the 
existence of customary 
international law even though there are often 
differing opinions as to what rules are 
contained in it. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
acknowledges the existence of customary 
international law, and the ICJ rules are 
incorporated into the UN Charter by Article 
92, which sets out in pertinent part: “The 
Court, whose function is to decide in 
accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply...international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law.”21 
…the U.S. 
supports 
freedom of 
access to 
space by all 
spacefaring 
powers…
 
Customary international law is something 
done as a general practice – not because it is 
expedient or convenient, but because it is 
considered law, arising out of a sense of legal 
requirement. According to Shabtai Rosenne, 
there are three elements that must be satisfied 
before one can conclude a rule is part of 
customary international law. First, a rule can 
be discerned by a widespread repetition by 
states of similar international acts over time 
(state practice); second, the acts by states 
related to the rule must occur out of a sense of 
 
20Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International 
Law (Oceana Publications, July 1984), p. 55. 
21UN Charter, Article 92. 
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legal obligation; and third, these acts must be 
taken by a significant number of states and not 
be rejected by a significant number of states. 
A marker of customary international law is 
consensus among states exhibited by 
widespread conduct together with a 
discernible sense of obligation.22 
 
Under customary international law, what is 
done, written, or said can establish legal 
precedent. But not always as such matters do 
not usually undergo examination in a 
courtroom setting. This 
presents an opportunity 
for mischief, even if 
only in a diplomatic 
drama. This explains 
why U.S. policy-makers 
feel compelled from 
time-to-time to rein-in 
senior officers and 
officials who speak out 
on topics or matters 
related to space 
security, space conflict, or other important 
issues before a decision has been made by the 
entire U.S. national security policy 
community. Uncoordinated speeches, 
doctrine, concepts of operations, and other 
instruments can have a corrosive effect on the 
formation of space policy. They can, 
unwittingly, establish policy and potentially 
legal precedent in advance of a comprehensive 
interagency consensus. While fundamental 
principles of good faith and equity apply in 
international law, no seemingly innocuous 
comment goes unpunished. Actions and words 
can have a legal, policy, and diplomatic effect 
– even where no specific legal document or 
other agreement memorializes them. 
 
                                                 
                                                
22Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International 
Law (Oceana Publications, July 1984). 
Three concepts apply to the formulation of 
customary law – recognition, acquiescence, 
and estoppel. According to Malcolm Shaw: 
 
Recognition is a positive act by a 
state accepting a particular situation, 
and even though it may be implied 
from all the relevant circumstances, it 
is nevertheless an affirmation of the 
existence of a specific factual state of 
affairs even if that accepted situation 
is inconsistent with the term in a 
treaty. Acquiescence, on the other 
hand, occurs in circumstances where 
a protest is called for and does not 
happen, or does not happen in time in 
the circumstances. In other words, a 
situation arises, which would seem to 
require a response denoting 
disagreement, and since this does not 
transpire, the state making no 
objection is understood to have 
accepted the new situation. The idea 
of estoppel in general is that a party, 
which has made or consented to a 
particular statement upon which 
another relies in subsequent activity 
to its detriment or the other’s benefit, 
cannot thereupon change its 
position.23 
Under 
customary 
international 
law, what is 
done, written, 
or said can 
establish 
legal 
precedent. 
 
Provocative or unintentional jamming or 
dazzling incidents involving space systems 
may require immediate response and even 
protest, or a state may risk a determination in 
customary law that it has acquiesced to the 
events. 
 
Estoppel involves a legal concept “whereby 
states deemed to have consented to a state of 
affairs cannot afterwards alter their 
position.”24 As an example, State Party A 
states something to induce an expectation, 
stating: “Party A will monitor the space 
environment and warn all spacefaring nations 
of potential space collision threats.” Though 
 
23Malcolm Nathan Shaw, International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 5th Edition, 2003), p. 437. 
24Ibid., p. 439. 
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no specific agreement is made with Party A 
for the provision of such services, State Party 
B justifiably believes Party A’s statements 
that Party A will employ its SSA capabilities 
as stated. Party B refrains from securing such 
tools, and relies on Party A in operating its 
space systems. Assuming a Party B satellite is 
damaged by a collision to which Party A had 
the sufficient resources and specific 
information to warn of the problem, then the 
doctrine of estoppel could offer Party B some 
possible legal or diplomatic recourse. 
 
The classic example of actions having legal 
effect or precedent in the space context is the 
launch of the Sputnik satellite system over a 
half-century ago. This launch established the 
legal precedence and customary international 
law for free passage of space systems and 
over-flight rights while on-orbit. Some 
suggest that President Dwight Eisenhower 
directed a slowing of pending U.S. space 
launch activities so the Soviets could 
successfully launch first, allowing their 
actions to establish customary over-flight 
rights. According to Nancy Gallagher and 
John D. Steinbruner: 
 
A 1950 RAND report that has been 
called “the birth certificate of 
American space policy” underscored 
the practical importance of legal 
justification. The report emphasized 
the “vital necessity” of improved 
intelligence about the closed Soviet 
Union, but cautioned that because the 
existence of spy satellites could not 
and should not be kept secret for 
long, creating a favorable context in 
which to use the new technology 
would be just as important as 
developing the capability itself. The 
authors recognized that 
reconnaissance satellites would pose 
a dilemma for Soviet leaders, who 
would see the loss of secrecy as a 
major violation of sovereignty and a 
quasi-permanent threat to security. 
But U.S. satellites would be too high 
to shoot down, at least initially, so 
Soviet response options would be 
limited to legal and diplomatic 
protests, attacks on ground stations, 
or total war. If the U.S. paid careful 
attention to political and 
psychological issues associated with 
space technology, the RAND report 
argued, it could constrain the Soviet 
counter reaction, strengthen 
deterrence, reduce Politburo 
resistance to international inspections 
of atomic installations, and possibly 
elicit a radical reorientation of Soviet 
behavior along more cooperative 
lines. 
To establish a favorable political 
context and set a precedent that could 
be used to legitimize future 
reconnaissance satellites, the 
Eisenhower administration decided to 
start by launching a scientific satellite 
even though military alternatives 
would have been ready sooner. The 
launch coincided with the 
International Geophysical Year, and 
the satellite, launched using a 
modified research rocket, was placed 
in an orbit that would not traverse the 
Soviet Union. The U.S. decision to 
wait until it could launch a scientific 
satellite allowed the USSR to create a 
public sensation by being the first 
country to launch a man-made 
satellite, but one of Eisenhower’s 
military advisors remarked that the 
Soviets “had done us a good turn, 
unintentionally, in establishing the 
concept of freedom of international 
space.” That judgment reflected an 
appreciation that space could not be 
physically controlled by military 
force in the manner that territory on 
Earth or the airspace over it is 
controlled. 
Some accommodation in space for 
mutual benefit would be necessary 
even in the context of global 
confrontation. Khrushchev appeared 
to have recognized this logic, as well. 
After the Soviets shot down an 
American U-2 reconnaissance plane 
in May 1960, Charles de Gaulle 
asked about cameras in the Sputnik 
orbiting over France, and Khrushchev 
said that he objected to airplane 
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overflights, not satellite-based 
surveillance.25 
 
The Eisenhower Administration’s objective to 
obtain universal acceptance of the concept of 
satellite free passage and overflight rights was 
more fully achieved years later when these 
customary law principles were included in the 
OST. In the meantime, statements of such 
principles were presented and discussed 
within various global community and UN 
forums, and can be found in a number of 
disparate documents including the 1958 
National Aeronautics and Space Act, and UN 
General Assembly resolutions. 
 
Free passage and overflight rights continue to 
be matters that warrant interest. This is an 
important issue as air space is subject to 
sovereignty rules; in contrast, signatories to 
the OST make no such claims on outer space. 
If violated, this may justify self-defense or 
reprisal responses by objecting states, 
especially with regard to spacecraft and 
related equipment transiting what would 
traditionally be considered air space during 
spacelift or de-orbit mission phases. Current 
international community treaty and customary 
law treatments of free passage and overflight 
rights have been pushed to the limits by the 
rogue North Korea bogeyman. North Korea 
arguably exploits the rules to facilitate and 
prosecute provocative ballistic missile 
                                                 
                                                
25Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering 
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, pp. 7-8. The adviser was 
Donald Quarles, Eisenhower’s assistant secretary of defense 
for research and development. See A. J. Goodpaster, 
“Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 8 October 
1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Also, see 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Doubleday, 1965), p. 
556; and George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White 
House (Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 334. “In other 
settings, the Soviets did not initially distinguish between 
satellite and aerial overflights and denounced both as an 
illegal infringement on national sovereignty.” See Gerald 
Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal 
Bargaining (Praeger, 1983), pp. 26–29.  
development activities. It has launched long-
range ballistic missiles over the Japanese 
Islands, but claims its launches are part of 
developing a new satellite system. The North 
Korean April 2009 launch has contributed to 
the controversy. 
 
North Korea claims that the mission 
was a peaceful attempt to launch a 
communications satellite into orbit, 
but the image suggests otherwise, 
according to Geoffrey Forden, a 
physicist and arms-control analyst at 
the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Forden triangulated the 
trajectory of the rocket using the 
contrail in the image, the position of 
the satellite taking the picture, and 
North Korea’s declared ’splashdown 
zones’ for the first and second stages. 
Based on his analysis, the TD-2’s 
[Taepodong 2] course appears to be 
too shallow to be a space launch. To 
reach orbit, Forden says, the rocket 
should have been travelling almost 
vertically in an attempt to gain 
altitude early on in its flight. Instead, 
it appears to be pitching horizontally, 
sacrificing height for distance in a 
trajectory that would allow it to sling 
a warhead as far as possible. Such a 
trajectory could be consistent with 
that of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM).26 
 
Presenting a threat to peace, the North Korean 
ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation 
activities have been deemed violations of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1718, which 
demands the country not conduct new nuclear 
tests nor launch a ballistic missile.27 
Nevertheless, North Korea, who only recently 
acceded to the OST on 3 May 2009, insists its 
April 2009 rocket launch is part of an effort to 
 
26Geoff Brumfiel, “Analysts spar over launch image”, 
Naturenews 8 April 2009. 
27Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “Satellite spots activity at North 
Korean missile site, officials say,” Res Communis 29 March 
2009, http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed March 
2009). 
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put a satellite in orbit; it argues this activity 
falls under the treaty’s allowances that outer 
space “shall be free for exploration and use by 
all states without discrimination of any 
kind.”28 The argument has gained traction in 
parts of the global community. China has 
refused to condemn the launches asserting 
North Korea has the right to peaceful use of 
space.29 Even Japan agrees North Korea has a 
right to a space program, “but only after it 
denuclearized and no longer posed a threat.”30 
 
“The Korean communist regime has been 
careful to follow the spirit of the treaty, 
keeping the world appraised of its plans, 
unlike its unannounced missile launches in 
1998 and 2006.”31  In asserting its rights to 
launch a satellite, North Korea notified the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and 
International Maritime Organization that it 
intended to launch an “experimental 
communication satellite.”32 It also made a 
notification of the launch in accord with the 
Registration Convention.33 Despite these 
efforts, and underscoring the potential for an 
underlying deception, North Korea did not 
                                                 
                                                
28Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea launch a test for 
international law”, Res Communis 2 April 2009, 
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed April 2009). 
29“China says North Korea has right to peaceful use of 
space,” The China Post 8 April 2009. 
30“Japan Says North Korea Space Program OK after 
Denuclearization,” Space War 7 April 2009, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Japan_Says_NKorea_Spac
e_Program_OK_After_Denuclearisation_999.html (accessed 
April 2009). 
31Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea launch a test for 
international law” Res Communis 2 April 2009, 
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed April 2009). 
32Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Koreans have notified 
several UN agencies that they plan on launching”, Res 
Communis 12 March 2009, http://rescommunis. 
wordpress.com, quoting, Robert Wood, U.S. Department of 
State, Daily Press Briefing – March 12 (accessed March 
2009). 
33Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea Accedes to 
Registration Convention”, Res Communis 11 March 2009, 
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com (accessed March 2009). 
follow all necessary international procedures 
for launching a satellite: 
 
The Radio Regulations of the 
International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), to which North Korea 
also belongs, stipulates that the 
launch of a communications satellite 
needs to be announced in advance. 
The regulations also require member 
states to give prior notice of a 
satellite’s operating frequency, its 
orbital location and other information 
to the ITU two to seven years before 
a satellite goes into use. However, 
North Korea did not give such prior 
notice to the ITU, the sources said.34 
 
The North Koreans protest that they are only 
engaged in peaceful space activities. Yet they 
make bellicose threats of dire consequences 
for any one attempting to interfere with them 
or other state activities. These mixed signals 
complicate planning for potential missile 
defense intercepts of these launched systems, 
since the U.S., its allies, and most nations 
subscribe to the free passage rules for space. 
The U.S. does not want to be seen as denying 
that right even if the complaining nation is 
involved in a ruse. 
 
Beside the North Korean launches, other 
proposals related to free passage remain in 
controversy, and could also be sources of 
conflict involving space systems. For 
example, some argue for a new legal 
definition for the demarcation between a 
country’s air space (Earth’s atmosphere) and 
outer space. The U.S. does not officially 
accept a specific “boundary;” instead, it 
employs a functional approach to assert space-
related free passage and transit rights. 
Unfortunately, if boundaries for the definition 
of space are strictly defined sometime in the 
 
34Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “North Korea ‘ignored satellite 
procedures’”, Res Communis 8 April 2009, 
http://rescommunis.wordpress.com, citing The Daily 
Yomiyuri (accessed April 2009). 
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future by action of treaty or through 
customary international law development, this 
could dangerously affect necessary space-
related rights. The development of customary 
law on the subject of free passage and transit 
rights has been described by Isabella 
Diederiks-Verschoor: 
 
Some seem to accept silent 
acquiescence as sufficient ground for 
the existence of a rule of custom, 
others feel that explicit recognition is 
an essential requirement… Clearly, 
the crux of the matter centers around 
the element of ‘recognition’ as 
evidence of acceptance of a specific 
practice, and the form such 
recognition can take. 
…Van Bogaert considers it an 
essential necessity that states show 
‘by diplomatic intercourse’ that they 
recognize a certain norm as legally 
binding. Custom inevitably implies a 
certain period of time, but Van 
Bogaert feels that there is no need for 
a practice to be long-lasting, provided 
recognition is properly signaled. He 
also notes that it might be logical to 
consider approval by the UN General 
Assembly as an expression of such 
recognition. 
As regard to the time factor, Judge 
Lachs of the International Court of 
Justice agrees that that a short period 
of time is not in itself a bar to the 
formation of a new rule of customary 
law. He suggests that a kind of ‘right 
of innocent passage’ has evolved on 
the basis of reciprocity, pointing out 
that on a number of occasions states 
engaged in space activities, which did 
not inform other states of their plans 
to launch space objects or ask 
permission to pass through the 
airspace of other states, did not meet 
objections from the states concerned, 
nor did those states reserve for 
themselves the right to object to such 
flights. 
The debate on this matter has 
hitherto remained entirely academic: 
both the USA and the former USSR, 
responsible as they are for most space 
object launchings, have always been 
careful to carry them out from their 
own territories, and no protests have 
ever been recorded in respect of any 
launchings, wherever they took place. 
However, as Wassenbergh observes, 
‘There is not a right of instant 
customary international law that 
space objects can “freely” transit 
through foreign airspace. The fact 
that in practice so far no objections 
have been raised against foreign 
space objects transiting a State’s 
airspace is no reason to refer to a 
customary right of transit, as too few 
States are considered to be confronted 
with such transit (and none have 
been), and no opinion juris with 
respect to such practice has been 
pronounced as yet. 
Even if a right of transit for space 
objects through the airspace of 
foreign countries is universally 
agreed upon it will always have to be 
subject to guarantees of safety and 
security. 
All this leads you to conclude that 
customary law is already playing a 
significant role in space law, and that 
states have evidently found it 
necessary, if not expedient, to abide 
by its rules.35 
 
Some proponents argue space should be 
defined as beginning at 100 kilometers (km) 
above sea level. This is known as the Kármán 
Line, calculated by and named for Theodore 
von Kármán. This demarcation has been 
accepted by the Fédération Aéronautique 
Internationale (FAI).36 However, if adopted by 
action of treaty or customary law, returns of 
U.S. and allied spacecraft could be threatened. 
The threat would not be limited to just purely 
military systems, as civil and commercial 
systems would be put at risk. The Soviet 
                                                 
35See Isabella Henrietta Philepina Diederiks-Verschoor, An 
Introduction to Space Law (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
pp. 11-12. 
36See “The 100 km Boundary for Astronautics,” Fédération 
Aéronautique Internationale Press Release, 24 June 2004, 
http://www.fai.org/press_releases/2004/documents/1204_100
km_astronautics.doc (accessed June 2009). 
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Union reserved the right to shoot or bring 
down aircraft in its airspace, and did so with 
alarming and tragic deadly effect for Korean 
Air Lines 007 during the early 1980s, and with 
other highly publicized commercial aircraft 
incidents. Given the risks, the U.S. and its 
allies might be forced to employ deterrence 
strategies and/or prepare for conflict if a state 
wanting adoption of the Kármán Line also 
threatens spacecraft that cross below it above 
their territory. Given these complications, the 
U.S. has not agreed to the definition. 
 
Another important legal concept, the 
peremptory norm (also called jus cogens, 
Latin for “compelling law”), affects state and 
non-state actor obligations with regard to 
space conflict. The concept is related to, but 
differs, from customary law. The peremptory 
norm is a principle of law from which no 
violation is permitted, even by treaty. “Unlike 
ordinary customary law that has traditionally 
required consent and allows the alteration of 
its obligations between states through treaties, 
peremptory norms cannot be violated by any 
state.”37 Under the Vienna Convention, any 
treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm is 
void.38 New peremptory norms can develop 
under the Convention,39 but the document 
does not itself specify any specific norms or 
how they are developed or created. 
                                                
 
Peremptory norms have not been fully 
itemized, but they include injunctions against 
waging aggressive war, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, maritime piracy, 
genocide, apartheid, slavery, and torture. 
 
                                                
37U.S. Legal Definitions, “Peremptory Law & Legal 
Definition,” http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/peremptory 
(accessed January 2010). 
38Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53. 
39“Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general 
international law (jus cogens): If a new peremptory norm of 
general international law emerges, any existing treaty which 
is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.” 
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 64. 
These norms have arisen out of case law and 
changing political policy-making attitudes, 
and can be found where there is a clear 
international disapproval of specific practices 
or acts. 
 
There is some disagreement over how 
peremptory norms should be acknowledged 
and put into force. The relatively new concept 
conflicts with the traditional consensual nature 
of treaty and customary international law that 
ensures state sovereignty. According to Rafael 
Nieto-Navia, there are three pre-requisites 
(some a bit tautological in nature) for a norm 
to be “elevated” to the status of a norm of jus 
cogens.40 First, the peremptory norm must be 
a norm of general international law. General 
international law is international law binding 
on most, if not all, states; however, not all 
facets of general international law have the 
character of jus cogens. The rules do not exist 
“to satisfy the need of the individual states, 
but the higher interest of the whole 
international community…”41 This need can 
be seen in rules created to achieve 
humanitarian purposes. 
 
Second, the norm must be “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole.”42 Accepting and 
recognizing a norm within the international 
community can be either express or implied. 
Ascertaining the minimum breadth necessary 
for acceptance is subject to debate; the 
international community tries to avoid 
situations whereby one or a few rogue states 
can effectively negate any decision to 
designate a norm as peremptory. Thus, a norm 
can be considered as jus cogens if it is 
accepted and recognized by the international 
 
40Rafael Nieto-Navia, “International Peremptory Norms (Jus 
Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law,” 2003, 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf, 
(accessed June 2009), p. 10. 
41Ibid. 
42Ibid. 
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community of States as a whole; consent of all 
states is not required (similar in the way in 
which principles of general customary 
international law are formed). In this way, 
norms of jus cogens can be drawn from the 
traditional sources of international law – 
treaties, international custom, and the like.43 
 
It is a well-accepted principle that treaties do 
not bind non-parties without their consent. 
Nieto-Navia contends that exceptions to this 
principle are those conventions or treaties 
whose objects and purposes render them more 
important. Ultimately, 
if provisions of treaties 
or conventions satisfy 
the more important 
criteria to be recognized 
as jus cogens, states not 
party to them will also 
be bound by their 
provisions. Of course, a 
large portion of 
international law 
remains customary in 
nature and treaties often only codify the 
existing customary law rules, and do not 
establish peremptory norms.44 
 
As a third prerequisite, the norm must be one 
from which no derogation is permitted. It can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law of the same 
character. This “is in fact the main identifying 
feature and “essence” of a norm of jus 
cogens.”45 
 
Nieto-Navia suggests it is possible to classify 
norms that are not subject to derogation by 
treaties or otherwise. These are: norms that 
have a fundamental bearing on the behavior of 
the international community of states as a 
                                                 
                                                
43Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
44Ibid., p. 11. 
45Ibid., p. 12. 
whole and from which no derogation is 
permitted at all; norms which are necessary 
for the stability of the international juridical 
order; norms having humanitarian objects and 
purposes including certain principles of 
human rights and international humanitarian 
law; norms of general interest to the 
international community as a whole or to 
international public order; and norms, which 
are binding on all new states even without 
their consent as being established rules of the 
international community.46 
 
Without question, international law undergoes 
continuous change and is constantly evolving. 
This means new norms of jus cogens should at 
least in theory continue to develop with 
respect to the law of space systems, their 
operations, and space warfare. Examples of 
acts being contrary to the norms of jus cogens 
would appear to include interfering with some 
important space systems, especially those 
presenting NTM, missile warning, emergency 
communications, and even PNT capabilities. 
Without 
question, 
international 
law 
undergoes 
continuous 
change and 
is constantly 
evolving. 
 
Space-borne NTMs serve an important role: 
assuring adversaries that they have complied 
with arms control treaty terms; providing 
transparency, enhancing confidence in actions 
of others, and diffusing tensions; and helping 
stem the potential of a nuclear holocaust, 
which would produce a catastrophe whose 
damaging effects would be global in nature. 
Reserving access to such NTM systems by 
antagonists would therefore appear to be a 
peremptory norm; hence, this would proscribe 
any attacks on such systems to destroy, 
disable, or otherwise interfere with them. 
Proscribing such attacks would satisfy the 
higher needs and general interest of the whole 
international community. 
 
Interestingly, the term “National Technical 
Means” (NTMs) was not specifically defined 
 
46Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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and detailed in the original Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty, nor in subsequent arms 
control treaties. Some argue this could lead to 
a finding that if satellite systems were not 
specified and described fully in the treaty they 
should somehow not warrant the treaty’s 
protection.47 While not specific, the “NTM” 
term references the variety of land, air, sea, 
and space technologies and systems that can 
be used to monitor and verify treaty 
compliance. If the treaty’s language could be 
interpreted to disallow classifying of any 
system as an NTM, even a space system, then 
the provision barring interference would 
appear to have no meaning or effect. Nothing 
in the record supports such a result as the 
intent of the signatories. The Vienna 
Convention holds that treaties are to be 
interpreted “in good faith”48 and “ordinary 
meaning given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”49 Consent may be implied if the 
other parties fail to explicitly disavow an 
initial unilateral interpretation, particularly if 
that state has acted upon its view of the treaty 
without complaint. For the purposes of this 
discussion, satellite systems can be employed 
to monitor treaty compliance and thus can be 
classified as NTMs. 
 
                                                 
                                                
47Peter L. Hays suggests that the language of the ABM Treaty 
“clearly stops well short of being a blanket anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons ban or even a clear approval of all spying 
from space.” He argues: “it is questionable just how much 
protection or legitimization it provides for NTM or satellites 
more generally.” See Peter L. Hays, “U.S. Military Space: 
Into the Twenty-First Century,” INSS Occasional Paper 42 
(U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) 
and Air University Press, 2002), p. 58. 
48“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.” See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 26. 
49“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.” See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Article 31.1. 
Indeed, this point was raised in a formerly 
classified document, where the late Secretary 
of Defense Melvin R. Laird argued the U.S. 
should acknowledge: 
 
…the fact that national technical 
means of verification for the U.S. and 
the USSR include satellite based 
reconnaissance. We should further 
state that all our legitimate national 
technical means, including satellite 
based reconnaissance, taken together, 
give us confidence that we can verify 
compliance with the provisions of 
these agreements within satisfactory 
limits… the fact of U.S. satellite 
reconnaissance is widely known. I 
believe that acknowledging this fact 
in connection with the strategic arms 
limitation agreements has the 
important advantage of muting 
possible adverse reaction…50 
 
The Russian and the U.S. positions on limiting 
interference with NTMs have been set out in 
treaty and agreement. China, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, and other significant 
spacefaring powers have made 
pronouncements condemning interference 
with such systems, and supporting the 
transparency efforts. A norm that favors 
protection of spaceborne NTMs should be 
supported at least by global spacefaring 
nations, if not the international community of 
states as a whole; no overarching alternate 
norm, stripping these protections, has been 
proposed. 
 
Similar arguments can be made with regard to 
spaceborne missile warning and emergency 
communication capabilities that these should 
not be attacked or interfered with. These 
systems would help adversaries to understand, 
 
50See Melvin R. Laird, “Memorandum for Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, Subject: Revelation of 
the Fact of Satellite Reconnaissance in Connection with the 
Submission of Arms Limitation Agreements to Congress,” 8 
June 1972, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB231/doc02.pdf (accessed January 2010). 
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manage, and limit the extent of damage 
associated with exchanges of weapons of mass 
destruction, all to the benefit of the global 
community. Arguments that peremptory 
norms proscribe attacks on space-based PNT 
capabilities could also be made. Proponents 
for this position would be bolstered by 
demonstrating the dimensions of the effects 
and global chaos that could occur in the 
commercial and civil communities as a result 
of the destruction of these capabilities. While 
these arguments are less compelling from ones 
tied to preventing conflict with weapons of 
mass destruction, they could be made just the 
same and, perhaps, accepted. 
 
No matter their importance, it would seem 
NTMs and/or other systems would warrant 
less protection if their mission payloads 
become blended with other more active, non-
protected warfighting functions (e.g., 
supporting integrated fire control and targeting 
functions for missile defense, or deploying 
spacecraft platforms or collocating command 
and control stations that involve a myriad of 
payloads, not just protected missions and 
payloads, but other militarily important 
payloads). If a peremptory norm applies, this 
could complicate national security space 
system acquisition and operational strategies, 
limiting how systems could be configured, in 
order to preserve any jus cogens protection 
rights. Since NTMs and other systems are 
usually employed to support a wide variety of 
warfighting missions, this reality could 
swallow whole the concept of a peremptory 
norm protecting them, unless their mission 
attributes and operations are carefully 
restricted. Protections for such blended 
systems would need to be found elsewhere in 
treaty or customary law. 
 
Peter Hays spotted this problem when he 
posed the following questions and suggested 
the ABM Treaty might not provide protected 
status to some spy satellite activities: 
How are the parties to judge whether 
space-based NTM are engaged in 
legitimate treaty compliance 
verification or in general espionage 
and how much noninterference 
should they be given in either case? 
An ASAT attack on space-based 
NTM attempting to verify compliance 
with the treaty would surely 
constitute “interference,” but how 
about lesser levels of nondestructive 
interference such as laser “dazzling?” 
What about interference that takes 
place in portions of the orbit that do 
not pass over the territory of the 
treaty signatories? Based on these 
questions and despite the NTM 
protection these provisions were often 
alleged to provide in the heyday of 
détente, the provisions in the ABMT 
[ABM Treaty] should not be seen as 
constituting an ASAT prohibition or 
as granting a strong and specific level 
of legal protection for NTM at all 
times. Even more importantly, the 
amount of “protection” this language 
provides for all other civil, 
commercial, and military space 
systems – including commercial 
remote sensing systems that might or 
might not be performing NTM 
missions – would seem to be even 
more tenuous.51 
 
 
Treaties and Customary Law 
 
Article III of the OST declares that states 
parties must conduct their space activities “in 
the interest of maintaining international peace 
and security.” The treaty’s preamble also 
recognizes “the common interest of all 
mankind in the progress of exploration and 
use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”52 
                                                 
 
51Peter L. Hays, “U.S. Military Space: Into the Twenty-First 
Century,” INSS Occasional Paper 42 (U.S. Air Force Institute 
for National Security Studies (INSS) Air University Press, 
2002), pp. 58-59. 
52Article IV places the “peaceful purposes” restriction on the 
Moon and other bodies; it suggests that States may engage in 
non-peaceful activity in space as long as it does not occur on a 
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Though crafted before the space era, a careful 
reading of the UN Charter shows its terms are 
fully consistent with and encourage peaceful 
space activities. The first purpose of the UN is 
to “maintain international peace and security, 
and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace.”53 
 
The UN and its 1945 Charter arose out of the 
ashes of the League of Nations and failures of 
the international community that led to World 
War II. Despite its inadequacies, the League 
helped establish the groundbreaking Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928, also known as the Pact 
of Paris – this treaty is continues in force 
today. In Kellogg-Briand, the signatories 
condemned recourse to war as a solution to 
international controversies, and renounced it 
as an instrument of national policy in their 
relations among each other. It proscribed the 
threat and use of force in contravention of 
international law, and territorial acquisitions 
resulting from such actions.54 
 
The UN Charter’s language expands on the 
terms set out in Kellogg-Briand Pact. Article 
2(3) provides: “All members shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and 
                                                 
 
                                                
celestial body. Indeed, some argue this is how the U.S. 
officially interprets this article. 
53UN Charter, Article 1(1). 
54The Pact was concluded outside the League of Nations and 
remains a binding treaty. Importantly, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact was used as a foundation for the post World War II 
prosecutions at Nuremburg. 
security, and justice, are not endangered.”55 
Article 2(4) of the Charter presents another 
significant rule: “States shall refrain from the 
threat of or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any 
state.56 The phrase “international peace and 
security” contained in Article 2(3) is echoed in 
the later agreed-to OST. The repetition of the 
words “international peace and security” in 
the OST links “peaceful purposes” back to 
norms of “peaceful means” enunciated in the 
UN Charter.57 
 
Some believe that under the UN Charter, war 
was outlawed.58 While not entirely correct, the 
Charter firmly establishes the general 
principle that armed conflict is neither proper 
nor inevitable, irrespective of the political 
purposes or merits. This new view replaced 
the ancient Augustinian “just war” 
formulation.59 Still, despite its imperative for 
preserving international peace and security, 
the Charter does not ban all use of force. The 
document outlaws the aggressive use of force, 
and the aggressive use of force has become an 
international crime.60 
 
“Acts of aggression” are not defined within 
the Charter. Indeed, the definition for “act of 
aggression” has been debated over the 
decades. Some argue the term was left 
undefined on purpose, that if a list of acts 
were specifically set out as “aggression.” then 
anything not making the list might not count; 
 
55UN Charter, Article 2(3). 
56UN Charter, Article 2(4). 
57J.P. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008, p.3. 
58Oscar Schachter, “The Right of States to Use Armed 
Force,” Michigan Law Review 1620 (1984). 
59Saint Augustine believes that a war was just when it was 
waged in order to redress a wrong or unjust enrichment. 
60See UN Charter 1(1), and, generally, Antonio Cassesse, 
International Criminal Law (2003), pp. 110-125. 
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the signatories did not want to leave an 
opening for unseemly argument by 
aggressors.61 Even so, insight into the term’s 
meaning can be found in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974).62 “This 
resolution defines aggression as ‘the use of 
force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence 
of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the UN.’ 
Since one of the UN Charter’s purposes is to 
maintain international peace and security, 
States may not use force in a way that disturbs 
international peace and security.”63 
 
Given the over-half century of rule-making 
and statecraft just discussed, P.J. Blount 
argues the OST’s principles of peaceful 
purposes for outer space can now be found in 
international customary law. According to 
Blount: 
 
The principle of the peaceful uses of 
outer space can be found throughout 
the literature on space law; however, 
the Outer Space Treaty only uses the 
term “peaceful purposes” to refer to 
outer space in the preamble of the 
treaty. It is used in the body of the 
treaty to refer to the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, but not to outer space 
in general. There is, however, strong 
support for the term applying to outer 
space via customary international law 
from the term’s use in the preambles 
to both the Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space and in the Outer Space 
Treaty to its use in laws, policies, and 
                                                                                                 
61“Indirect aggression,” however, has not found favor as an 
“act of aggression.” 
62See Definition of Aggression, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3314, UN GAOR, 29th Session, Supplement No. 
31, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
63 P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008. 
official statements of numerous States 
dealing with their respective space 
programs.64 
 
While the principle of “peaceful purposes” has 
most likely entered customary international 
law and now applies to space activities, the 
meaning of that term is even now a bit 
uncertain – uncertain in part because the 
phrase is undefined and because nations apply 
it in different ways.65 Some argue the phrase 
means any military use of space violates the 
treaty.66 This is a decided minority view. 
Though there are limits, the alternate U.S. 
view is military space activities are presumed 
to be allowed unless specifically prohibited by 
law. Naturally, the permissive U.S. position 
generates consternation within peace elements 
of the international community, who argue the 
U.S. seeks to preserve its hegemony in and 
dominance of the space domain. Nevertheless, 
the U.S. view is compelling, convincing, and 
clarifying – longstanding customary practice 
and law permits military use of space. As 
noted by Adam Frey: 
 
Military use of space in support of 
operations – such as communications, 
intelligence gathering, and precision 
targeting – is commonly considered 
peaceful if it does not violate other 
international law. In other words, 
space operations are considered 
peaceful, provided they are not 
“aggressive.” Space may still be used 
as a medium of warfare: the treaty 
does not prohibit anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons or even nuclear 
weapons that merely transit space. 
Other weapons may be deployed in 
 
64Ibid., p. 2. 
65Ibid., p. 2. 
66Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal 
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008), 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). Also, see Joan 
Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) 
Policy: Moving Toward Space Control,” INSS Occasional 
Paper 30 (U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security 
Studies (INSS), January 2000), p. 10. 
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space so long as they are neither 
nuclear weapons nor weapons of 
mass destruction. Furthermore, self-
defensive acts in space are also 
permissible, provided they do not 
violate other treaty restrictions.67 
 
As touched on above, the “U.S. employs a 
permissive interpretation of the OST and the 
other rules regulating military activities in 
space.”68 The traditional U.S. interpretation, 
shared by most other spacefaring countries, is 
“nonaggressive” military support activities are 
not inconsistent with the peaceful-use 
principle.69 But what are “aggressive acts” in 
space? How should they be defined? Should 
such acts be defined and limited to effects 
produced on just spacecraft, or should effects 
to the entirety of space systems be considered 
(e.g., spacecraft, their constellations, links, 
footprints for sensor and communications 
activity, ground control stations, or even 
sustainment and acquisition activities)? Some 
suggest the definition of “aggressive acts” 
should encompass actions, such as the use of 
force from space or in space when not 
consistent with exceptions found within the 
UN Charter. Others argue the “peaceful 
purposes” clause should be interpreted to 
mean states cannot use outer space for full-
scale warfare, particularly nuclear war.70 
 
Those who continue to argue any military use 
of space violates peaceful use principles 
ignore reality of the long-standing 
                                                 
                                                
67Ibid. 
68Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering 
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 42. 
69Ivan Vlasic, “The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-
peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” in Peaceful and Non-peaceful 
Uses of Space, Bhupendra Jasani, ed., (Taylor and Francis, 
1991), pp. 37–55. 
70Christopher M. Petras, “Space Force Alpha: Military Use of 
the International Space Station and the Concept of ‘Peaceful 
Purposes,’” Air Force Law Review 53 (2002): 157-61. 
militarization of space by the global powers.71 
The intent of the OST’s framers and an 
interpretation of its terms allowing military 
activities in space can readily be ascertained 
by looking to the practices of major 
spacefaring powers. They continue to use 
space for military purposes following 
endorsement of the OST. 
 
When U.S defense officials’ writings mention 
the OST, they typically insist U.S. policy and 
military uses of space not explicitly prohibited 
in Article IV (i.e., no weapons of mass 
destruction in orbit and military activities on 
celestial bodies) are permitted.72 Some suggest 
this posture ignores Article III’s declaration 
that space activities must be performed in 
accord with international law, including the 
UN Charter’s rules about the threat or use of 
force.73 Nonetheless, and consistent with its 
views, the U.S. has steadily expanded the 
scope of its “peaceful” non-aggressive 
 
71According to Thomas C. Wingfield, “Legal Aspects of 
Offensive Information Operations in Space,” 23 March 2000, 
p. 6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/ 
wingfield.doc (accessed January 2010): “Nowhere in the 
Outer Space Treaty is the term [“Peaceful purposes”] defined, 
and two opposing views have developed. The majority 
opinion, certainly among spacefaring nations, is that 
“peaceful” means “nonaggressive,” a relatively high standard 
allowing for considerable military operations in space. The 
minority view, more common among the less advanced, non-
spacefaring nations, is that “peaceful” means “nonmilitary,” 
setting such a low threshold that even routine, peacetime 
military business, such as communications and weather 
observation, would be prohibited.” 
72Interestingly, during hearings on the ratification of the Outer 
Space Treaty, it was noted that “Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
asserted that while the U.S. was confident in its ability to 
adequately verify the OST prohibition on nuclear weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction, that ‘the treaty does not 
inhibit, of course, the development of an anti-satellite 
capability in the event that should become necessary.” See 
Peter L. Hays, “U.S. Military Space: Into the Twenty-First 
Century,” INSS Occasional Paper 42 (U.S. Air Force Institute 
for National Security Studies (INSS), Air University Press, 
2002), p. 70. 
73Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering 
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008. 
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military space activities, often for the 
betterment of the global community and 
benefiting potential adversaries. GPS (Global 
Positioning System) PNT, SSA, missile 
warning, and communication services 
operated by U.S. military systems have been 
used and exploited by global military, civil, 
and commercial communities. 
 
A tacit acceptance of the U.S. behavior has 
emerged; indeed, all of the major spacefaring 
nations have expanded their military activities 
in space. Also, performing military activities 
in space may have inherently humane ends, 
even in support of destructive or deadly 
military operations. Elizabeth Waldrop 
correctly notes LOAC principles of 
discrimination and proportionality are 
enhanced by the use of space assets “to 
successfully carry out near-surgical strike with 
minimum civilian casualties.”74 In the end, 
however, the “various unopposed military 
uses of space may as a practical matter enlarge 
the unofficial definition of ‘peaceful purposes’ 
to the point that specific arms control 
agreements may be the only effective 
limitation on development and deployment of 
various weapons in space.”75 
 
 
Space Warfare 
 
Despite the histrionics of the peace and 
disarmament community, the conduct of 
military space activities is an accepted 
practice and consistent with the OST and other 
agreements. Plainly, the OST, conventions, 
and international agreements do not foreclose 
space warfare or preparation for such conflict. 
There are caveats to this point, however. The 
OST expressly limits placement of nuclear 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction on 
                                                 
 its use. 
                                                
74Elizabeth Waldrop, “Weaponization of Outer Space: U.S. 
National Policy,” High Frontier (Winter 2005): 40–41. 
75Ibid., 36–37. 
orbit, and restricts such weapons and military 
bases on celestial objects. In parallel, the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty restricts nuclear 
explosions in space.76 Even so, the UN 
Charter and OST do “not prohibit States from 
placing weapons of a defensive nature in 
space (unless some further meaning can be 
attributed to the term peaceful purposes) or 
from placing weapons required by order of the 
UN Security Council in order to maintain 
international peace and security. Probably the 
difference between an aggressive weapon and 
a defensive weapon can almost always be 
found in its use.”77 Or, the difference can be 
found in the politics or diplomacy of
 
What is a “space weapon?” The devil is in the 
details, especially given the variety of ways 
we discussed above in which space systems 
can be attacked and degraded. Should the 
definition of space weapon include systems or 
combat operations that attack terrestrial 
components of space systems, or jam or 
interfere with system command and control? 
Should it encompass seemingly innocuous 
civil satellites or microsatellites that can be 
vectored to kinetically engage adversary 
systems; or systems left dead in orbits, 
without executing end-of-life super-sync or 
other operations to reduce chances of 
collisions with other satellites. Perhaps, the 
definition of “space weapon” should be broad: 
an instrument or instrumentality of attack or 
defense used to fight space systems or from 
the space domain. 
 
76Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty restricts military 
activity and prohibits placing “nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction” into orbit or 
permanently affixing them to a celestial body. Also, the Moon 
and other celestial bodies may be used only for “peaceful 
purposes,” and they cannot be used for military bases or 
weapons testing. 
77P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008, p.4. 
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U.S. Congressman Terry Everett argues: 
 
Some believe a space weapon is 
purely a weapons system based in 
space that collides with another space 
object or intercepts a missile traveling 
through space. However, I would 
argue, the damage caused by a 
ground-based high energy laser is just 
as severe for a target satellite as the 
damage caused by a physical on-orbit 
collision. The key difference is the 
latter may create unacceptable debris 
field, posing further risks to satellites. 
It is the ambiguity in definition 
that makes arms-control measures, 
which ban space weapons difficult to 
implement and nearly impossible to 
enforce. This is compounded by the 
fact that satellites have tremendous 
dual-use value, making it very 
difficult to distinguish a non-weapon 
space system from a weapon space 
system. Any satellite could be 
maneuvered in such a way as to 
collide with a target satellite. Any 
ballistic missile, with sufficient 
orbital ephemeris data and software 
changes, could be used to target a 
satellite.78 
 
Dr. Michael Rance, a United Kingdom missile 
defense and space policy expert and leader 
proffers: 
 
There is no formal definition of 
“weaponization of space” or “space 
weapons,” but some have tried. 
Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-
Hyman propose this (citation 
omitted): “terrestrially based devices 
specifically designed and flight-tested 
to physically attack, impair, or 
destroy objects in space, or space-
based devices designed and flight-
tested to attack, impair, or destroy 
objects in space or on Earth.” Bruce 
DeBlois suggests something similar: 
“A space weapon is that which is 
                                                                                                 
78Terry Everett, “Arguing for a Comprehensive Space 
Protection Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall 2007): 
32-33. 
built with destructive intent to be 
used in a terrestrial-to-space, space-
to-space, or space-to-terrestrial 
capacity” …I recognize that 
alternatives exist, usually depending 
on which side of the debate the 
definer sits. Contention focuses on 
whether ground-based weapons 
should be included… Some 
definitions include as a space weapon 
a defensive interceptor such as 
THAAD or Aegis SM-3 when the 
planned interception is OUTSIDE the 
atmosphere, but exclude the use of 
Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD when the 
planned interception is WITHIN the 
atmosphere. This is a particular issue 
for THAAD which has both an exo- 
and an endo-atmospheric capability. 
There is no consensus [on the 
definition].79 
 
Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman 
believe their definition: 
 
…respects the distinction between 
capability and actuality. It excludes 
residual or latent space warfare 
capabilities, such as ballistic missiles. 
Also excluded in this working 
definition are satellites that provide 
essential military functions, but do 
not serve as weapon platforms. In 
other words, the definition used here 
clarifies the essential distinction 
between the current military uses of 
space and the flight-testing and 
deployment of space weapons that 
some wish to pursue in the future. 
This definition also excludes 
activities that are specifically 
designed to interfere with the uplinks 
or downlinks of satellites. Jamming is 
treated separately from direct, 
physical attacks against satellites 
because jamming has long been 
considered a part of warfare, whereas 
direct attacks in or from space would 
 
79Michael Katz-Hyman and Michael Krepon, “Viewpoint: 
Space Weapons and Proliferation,” Non Proliferation Review 
12: 2 (July 2005): 325-326. 
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be consequential firsts in the history 
of warfare.80 
 
The challenge of identifying space weapons in 
terms of just exactly where and under what 
conditions they exist is highly complex. 
Robert A. Ramey opines: 
 
(The) basic term space weapon lacks 
definition in international law. As a 
result, the concept it represents, 
which broadly speaking includes any 
implements of warfare in space, is 
difficult to isolate. Without this 
foundational definition, one cannot 
define phrases on which it might rely. 
The difficulty comes into particular 
focus by observing that any 
comprehensive definition of space 
weapons will include space systems 
equally used for nonmilitary, 
nondestructive, and nonaggressive 
purposes. Though space weapons 
may seem to include only a discrete 
class of armaments with easily 
definable characteristics, a closer 
examination “reveals a less obvious 
and more inclusive set of systems.”81 
 
Despite the challenges in the definition, no 
treaty bans conventional space weapon 
systems, so it can be concluded that 
“nonnuclear ASAT weaponry is… legal.”82 
Yet a conclusion that ASAT weapons are legal 
does not give state parties license or authority 
to use or station conventional weapons in 
outer space (on orbit or otherwise); such 
activities must be conducted within the 
framework offered under treaties and 
customary international law, which encourage 
the non-aggressive “peaceful use” of space. In 
the end, these activities and interests must be 
balanced against the other. 
                                                 
                                                
80Ibid. 
81Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space 
Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report 
(Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 28 August 2006), p. 73. 
82See Bruce A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization 
(North-Holland, 1986), p. 127. 
Bruce Hurwitz argues in The Legality of Space 
Militarization, “Considering the spirit of the 
law, the conclusion appears to be that anti-
satellite weapons are legal, de lege late, but 
should be illegal, de lege ferenda.”83 The 
principle of non-aggression places an 
affirmative duty on States not to station 
weapons of an aggressive nature in outer 
space; examples of such provocative 
aggressive acts could be the deployment of a 
co-orbital mine in the vicinity of a 
competitor’s military space asset, performing 
“intercepts,” or creating conditions for or 
causing conjunctions between satellites and 
objects on orbit. 
 
Despite the steady expansion in military use of 
space by global space powers, considerable 
mutual restraint has been exercised with 
respect to deployment of space-based 
weapons. No space-based weapon, that is, an 
instrument or instrumentality of attack or 
defense used to fight space systems or from 
the space domain, is deployed on-orbit today. 
This reality has occurred because global 
policy-makers have come to appreciate the 
terrifying practical consequences of space 
weaponization and resulting conflict: the 
debilitating problems and physics of resulting 
space debris if the weapon systems are used; 
the indiscriminate nature and consequences of 
employing nuclear weapons in space as borne 
out by the Starfish Prime experiment 
conducted by the U.S. in the early 1960s; the 
stakes space-dependent nations risk if they 
plan for such conflict; and the loss of stability 
in the space domain, which is increasingly 
globalized in an interdependent world. 
Keeping in line with this thinking, proscribing 
interference with NTM monitoring 
capabilities was a rather pragmatic choice to 
enable the super powers to advance nuclear 
weapons reductions over the past four 
decades. 
 
83Ibid., p. 128. 
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Some states protest the continuing expansion 
of some U.S. military space activities, believe 
more should be done to limit them, and have 
pushed for adoption of proposed treaties, such 
as the Treaty on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space 
Objects (PPWT), presented as part of the UN 
Conference on Disarmament’s (CD) 
discussion on the Prevention of an Arms Race 
in Outer Space (PAROS). The proponents 
suggest the progress of science and 
technology make it necessary to strengthen 
international principles relating to reducing 
potential threats. The Chinese argued that a 
peaceful and tranquil outer space free from 
weaponization and arms race serves the 
common interests of all countries, and the 
Russians argued that the security of outer 
space is facing serious challenges.”84 The 
PPWT seeks to ban two interrelated conducts: 
the placement of weapons in outer space; and 
the threat or use of force against outer space 
objects. 
 
The proposed PPWT treaty defines “weapon 
in outer space” as: 
 
Any device placed in outer space, 
based on any physical principle, 
which has been specifically produced 
or converted to destroy, damage, or 
disrupt the normal functioning of 
objects in outer space, on the Earth or 
in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to 
eliminate a population or components 
of the biosphere, which are important 
to human existence or to inflict 
damage on them.85 
 
                                                                                                 
84“China and Russia jointly submitted the draft Treaty on 
PPWT to the UN Conference on Disarmament,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 12 
February 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/ 
jkxw/t408634.htm (accessed January 2010). 
85Proposed Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against 
Outer Space Objects, Article 1C. 
The “threat of the use of force” is defined as: 
 
Any hostile actions against outer 
space objects including, inter alia, 
actions aimed at destroying them, 
damaging them, temporarily or 
permanently disrupting their normal 
functioning or deliberately changing 
their orbit parameters or the threat of 
such actions.86 
 
However, as conceded by Russians and 
Chinese, verification of such a PPWT treaty 
would be extremely difficult. Also, the PPWT 
does not ban development and testing of 
Earth-based ASATs. Even disarmament 
groups, like Project Ploughshares, concede the 
“the PPWT lacks precision, has potential 
loopholes, or is subject to interpretation.”87 
This is a sad state of affairs for a major arms 
control proposal. Given these defects, the 
Russians and others suggest agreements on 
Transparency and Confidence Building 
Measures could be implemented to 
compensate for them and move the process 
along. 
 
For its part, the U.S. has pushed back, first 
abstaining, then voting “no” to reject the 
PAROS proposals. Under the George W. Bush 
administration, it argued the existing 
multilateral arms control agreement regime is 
“sufficient,” there is no present “problem in 
outer space for arms control to solve, and the 
proposed treaty does adequately dispose of 
threats posed by ground based systems.”88 
 
Despite its own issues associated with 
complying with space-related treaty 
obligations, especially with its 2007 ASAT 
 
86Ibid, Article 1E. 
87Cesar Jaramillo, “In defense of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a 
space weapons ban,” The Ploughshares Monitor 30: 4 
(Winter 2009): 4. 
88See Government space arms control proposals, Secure 
World Foundation, http://www.secureworldfoundation.org/ 
index.php?id=151&page=Governmental_Proposals (accessed 
June 2009). 
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test, China’s representatives disingenuously 
charge recent U.S. space activities “run 
counter to the fundamental principle of 
peaceful use of outer space” and contend the 
U.S. goal in outer space is to “defy the 
obligations of international legal instruments 
and seek unilateral and absolute military and 
strategic superiority.”89 These specious claims 
do not reflect the 
totality and reality 
of U.S. space 
efforts, which span 
a spectrum of civil, 
commercial, and 
military activities 
and missions. No 
doubt the Chinese 
actions and attendant diplomatic overtures are 
part of a strategic messaging campaign to 
champion the internal, regional, and global 
interests of its government. Some could 
characterize the Chinese actions as a form of 
“lawfare.” “The term lawfare describes the 
growing use of international law claims, 
usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool 
of war. The goal is to gain a moral advantage 
over your enemy in the court of world 
opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in 
national and international tribunals.”90 
 
                                                 
                                                
89Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, Reconsidering 
the Rules for Space Security, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Reconsidering the Rules of Space Project, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2008, p. 42, citing the “Statement 
by H.E. [His Excellency] Mr. Li Changhe – Chinese 
Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, Head of the Chinese 
Delegation for the Conference on Disarmament – at the 
Plenary Meeting of the CD,” 12 March 1998, 
www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ lich0398.htm (accessed June 
2009); Fu Zhigang, “A Chinese View of Star Wars,” The 
Spokesman 72 (2000): 17–18; and “Statement by Ambassador 
Hu Xiaodi for Disarmament Affairs of China at the Plenary of 
the Conference on Disarmament,” 7 June 2001, 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/cd060701.htm (accessed 
June 2009). 
90David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, “Lawfare,” Wall 
Street Journal 23 February 2007, A11, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117220137149816987.html 
(accessed December 2009). 
For years, the U.S. has acknowledged the 
diplomatic posturing relating to space 
weaponization, summarizing only the points 
made, but not conceding them. Furthermore, 
though it has tinkered with the technologies 
and possibilities from time-to-time, the U.S. 
has yet to deploy any space-based weapon 
system. The Obama Administration and its 
domestic allies propose to negotiate a ban on 
space weapons, however defined, and even 
though there is uncertainty about exactly what 
would be considered acceptable or workable. 
Interestingly, but not lost on the arms control 
and space policy community, while references 
to negotiating such a ban were first posted in 
January 2009 on the White House website, 
they were removed only a few months later.91 
This more than likely transpired due to the 
realities of interagency process, which require 
measured and thoughtful policy making. Still, 
the Obama Administration has now endorsed 
the PAROS-based discussions within the UN 
CD. 
…”peaceful 
purposes” in 
space should 
be construed to 
mean “non-
aggressive;”… 
 
Despite the difficulties, the U.S. should strive 
to sort through the intractable issues presented 
by space weapons and weaponization and help 
establish normative space community 
behaviors relating to them. It has assumed 
similar leadership roles for the entirety of the 
Space Age, serving as a rule-setter and guide 
to achieve best space practices. It has 
leveraged its position as the preeminent space 
 
91After Obama was sworn into office, the official White 
House Web site was updated with a set of policy guidelines 
including one on restoring U.S. leadership in space. Under the 
heading “Ensure Freedom of Space,” the statement said the 
White House would seek a ban on weapons that “interfere 
with military and commercial satellites.” See Turner Brinton, 
“Obama’s Proposed Space Weapon Ban Draws Mixed 
Response,” Space.com, 4 February 2009, 
http://www.space.com/news/090204-obama-space-weapons-
response.html (accessed January 2010). According to John 
Logsdon, former director of the George Washington 
University Space Policy Institute, the text originated from an 
Obama campaign white paper that was transferred verbatim to 
the White House website without input from any of the 
government bodies that manage national policy.. 
Space and Defense, Winter 2010 29 
 
power and used its bully pulpit to influence 
the global space-airing community. The U.S. 
assumed such a leadership role on space 
debris and end-of-life operations back in the 
1980s when analysis showed an alarming 
expansion in space debris arising from space 
operations.92 
 
 
Self-Defense and International 
Peace and Security 
 
As noted above, “peaceful purposes” in space 
should be construed to mean “nonaggressive;” 
hence, any use of a weapon in space or any 
attack on a space system would have to 
conform to the exceptions to the ban on the 
use of force found in the UN Charter.93 The 
first exception applies if the use of force is 
authorized by the Security Council in order to 
maintain international peace and security. As a 
second exception, Article 51 reaffirms that 
nothing in the Charter should be construed to 
impair the inherent right of self defense 
against armed attack. This right of self-
defense has always been recognized, whether 
in municipal or international law, and existed 
well before the advent of the UN Charter. 
 
Thus, under Article 51, if a state is subject to 
an armed attack, it may use force to repel the 
attackers and stop the attack. Alternatively, if 
it is unclear whether an action constitutes such 
an attack, Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives 
the UN Security Council the authority and 
                                                 
                                                92See Fact Sheet on Presidential Directive on National Space 
Policy, 11 February 1988, which provides in pertinent part: 
“The directive further states that all space sectors will seek to 
minimize the creation of space debris. Design and operations 
of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to 
minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent 
with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.” 
93P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008, p.3. 
responsibility to determine the existence of 
any “threat to the peace” or acts of aggression. 
The Council can then recommend and lead an 
appropriate response; however, because 
Security Council actions are subject to 
international political negotiation, any 
response would not likely be quick or a 
significant deterrent to an aggressor.94 
 
In Nicaragua v. U.S. (1986), the ICJ offered 
insight into the meaning of the Article 51 right 
of self defense against armed attack.95 In that 
case, the Soviet Union and Cuba were accused 
of assisting the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, who 
were alleged to have committed acts of 
destruction and atrocities against Honduras 
and Costa Rica. On the other side, the 
Nicaraguan Contras were fighting the 
Sandinistas, and the U.S. was assisting in their 
counter-revolution against the Soviet-
sponsored Marxist regime. The U.S. was 
accused by the Sandinistas of unauthorized 
overflights, mining a harbor, and training 
rebels at an alleged CIA training camp. 
 
In its ruling, the ICJ held it is no longer 
acceptable to settle disputes with force, what 
had been customary law for millenniums. 
Importantly, the court held the use of force 
could now only be justified in one of three 
ways: (1) self-defense activities recognized as 
rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter; (2) 
enforcement actions under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter; and (3) possibly through 
application of pre-UN anticipatory defense 
rules of necessity and proportionality.96 The 
 
 
94Jia Huang, “New Challenges to the Traditional Principles of 
the Law of War Presented by Information Operations in Outer 
Space,” Journal of Politics and Law 2: 1 (2009): 40. 
95As was its right, the U.S. did not agree to subject itself to 
jurisdiction by the ICJ, which then proceeded and based its 
finding of fact based on the presentations made by the 
Sandinistas. The U.S. still disputes facts in the case, as well as 
the actual outcome, but it does endorse substantial portions of 
the ruling and cites it in other cases. 
96The U.S. and a few other countries assert this third principle 
of anticipatory defense from time to time; they are the rules 
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court held states have a right of collective self-
defense only if they are under armed attack. 
Finally, in making an armed response in self-
defense under Article 51, a state must also 
immediately report the fact of the armed 
attack to the UN Security Council, and the 
state must also promptly report its own actions 
in response. 
 
According to the ICJ, the sole justification for 
U.S. actions in Nicaragua v. U.S. was 
collective self-defense under Article 51. 
However, the court found none of the states 
involved the purported collective self-defense 
reported to the UN that they were subject to 
armed attacks. In addition, nobody reportedly 
asked the U.S. to help, nor did the U.S. report 
an attack to the UN. Hence, the ICJ 
concluded, the right of collective self-defense 
could not be invoked. 
 
The ICJ ruled self-defense rights could not be 
invoked if the threshold of actual armed attack 
was not reached.97  The UN’ definition of 
aggression provided the court a foundation to 
establish the threshold for an armed attack. 
According to the Court, an “armed attack” is 
not the same as an act of aggression. A mere 
threat of force is not an armed attack, nor 
would all acts of aggression count. Hence, an 
opposing state may engage in an illegal use of 
force, yet that may not constitute an armed 
attack allowing for the use of force in self-
                                                 
 
from The Caroline Affair discussed later. In Nicaragua v. 
U.S., the ICJ held that the UN Charter did not supersede 
custom, but exists alongside it. The U.S. position is that 
anticipatory self-defense is inherent in the right of self-
defense. The ICJ, however, expressly held that it did not 
address the legality of anticipatory self-defense because the 
issue had not been raised. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, “The 
Use of Conventional International Law in Combating 
Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization 
Employing the Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense and 
Preemption,” Air Force Law Review 55 (Spring 2004): 114. 
97The ICJ also held there is no such thing as a right of 
“collective” armed response to acts, which do not constitute 
an “armed attack.” 
defense. According to the ICJ, even though 
Nicaragua may have been guilty of odious 
violations of international law, absent an 
armed attack there was no right of collective 
self-defense that could be invoked by U.S. or 
its allies and friends. According to the court, 
the words “an armed attack occurs” speak of 
the actual commencement of physical violence 
by armed forces. As we will see, the ICJ 
ruling on this point is somewhat unrealistic if 
applied to attacks on space systems. 
 
 
Use of Force and Self-Defense 
 
Must space systems be subject to some sort of 
physical violence before a response, armed or 
otherwise, can be initiated? Should non-
kinetic types of attacks against space systems 
qualify as armed attacks? In short, the answers 
are “No” and “Yes,” respectively. 
 
Threats are no longer presented just in the 
terrestrial ground, sea, and air environment, or 
just with classically recognized kinetic 
weapons. They are now manifested in space, 
through new and exotic electromagnetic 
means or information operations. Since the 
venues and mechanisms for attack are 
evolving, so too must the vague definition of 
“armed attack” at least with respect to space 
systems. 
 
According to Jia Hueng: 
 
…the current international laws have 
not given any definite definition of 
the term “use of force” and the 
information operations in outer space 
have brand-new features, which are 
apparently different from those of 
traditional armed conflicts 
characterized by the mass of troops 
and armaments and the invasion of 
territory. So, we have to consider 
what actions by or against objects in 
space will be considered to be uses of 
force. The international community 
would probably not hesitate to regard 
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as a use of force the destruction of a 
satellite by a missile or a laser. It 
would probably react similarly if it 
could be proven that one nation took 
over control of another nation’s 
satellite by electronic means and 
caused it to fire its retro rockets and 
fall out of orbit. In such a case, the 
consequences will probably matter 
more than the mechanism used. The 
reaction of the international 
community to lesser kinds of 
interference is hard to predict. For 
example, if one nation were able by 
electronic means to suspend the 
operations of another nation’s 
satellite for a brief period, after which 
it returned to service undamaged, it is 
likely that the international 
community would consider such an 
action as a breach of the launching 
nation’s sovereign rights, but not as a 
use of armed force.98 
 
To hold intentional dazzling, electromagnetic, 
or information operation activities that target, 
seek to damage, and actually disable, destroy, 
degrade, or interfere with space systems as not 
“armed attacks” would render the word 
“attack” meaningless. International law must 
preserve peace and security and, by extension, 
protect space systems from a wide variety of 
threats and in venues not contemplated within 
the UN when it was founded in 1945. In our 
modern world, a state secures and defends its 
territory, political independence, and elements 
of national power (diplomatic, information, 
military, and economic) with space and space-
enabled information systems. They provide 
the state a myriad of essential services – 
communications, warning, intelligence, 
weather, PNT, and missile and space defense. 
A state must assure itself of the right to 
exercise jurisdiction and control over these 
                                                                                                 
98Jia Huang, “New Challenges to the Traditional Principles of 
the Law of War Presented by Information Operations in Outer 
Space,” Journal of Politics and Law 2: 1 (2009): 40, citing 
DOD General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal 
Issues in Information Operations (May 1999), p. 27. 
systems free from interference; to do so a state 
must have the right to defend them against 
attack. Limiting the right of self-defense in 
response to attacks on these capabilities would 
be illogical, especially since they can be 
essential to the survival of a state. Such a 
holding – that there is no such right – would 
mean the rights of free passage of space 
systems codified in the OST and found 
elsewhere within customary law and treaty 
would be just empty words and mean little. 
“The maintenance of the right of self-defense 
is critical for protection of the space network, 
but recent attempts by international bodies to 
limit this right signal an apparent trend toward 
the devolution of the inherent right of self-
defense.”99 
 
Defining intentional and also damaging 
electromagnetic and information operations as 
armed attacks are consistent with a necessary 
expansive reading of Article 51’s right of self-
defense. Two divergent views have developed 
concerning Article 51’s right of self-defense. 
The expansive view maintains the word 
“inherent” in Article 51’s right of self-defense 
provides the customary international law 
rights of self-defense remained intact and 
Article 51 simply confirmed the right of self-
defense in the particular situation of an armed 
attack, but did not deny it in others. This is the 
U.S. view – states retain their rights under 
international law, especially self-defense 
principles of necessity and proportionality, 
except those specifically surrendered under 
the UN Charter. 
 
The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy is in 
accord with the expansive interpretation. It 
frames the primary objective of the Policy as 
preserving a relative national U.S. advantage, 
 
99See Gregory E. Maggs, “The Campaign to Restrict the 
Right to Respond to Terrorist Attacks in Self-Defense Under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter and What the U.S. Can Do 
About It,” Regent Journal of International Law 4:149 (2006): 
155-167. 
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rather than establishing a mutual benefit, by 
declaring that freedom of action in space is as 
important to the U.S. as air power and sea 
power. The 2006 National Space Policy 
asserts a broad array of U.S. rights and vital 
interests in space. It rejects any limitations on 
the fundamental right of the U.S. to operate in 
and acquire data from space. The policy also 
emphasizes that the U.S. is prepared to take 
unilateral action to dissuade, deter, defeat, 
and, if necessary, deny space-related activities 
hostile to its interests. 
 
The alternate restrictive view asserts that the 
UN Charter allows only for a narrow right of 
self-defense – a right to respond only in the 
specific situation of a prior armed attack. 
 
[The restrictive] view has 
considerable support and is consistent 
with a number of resolutions passed 
by the Security Council. Proponents 
of this view see Article 51 as a 
partner to Article 2(3), which requires 
peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
Article 2(4), which outlaws the use of 
force. They consider “the permission 
in Article 51 [to be] exceptional in 
the context of the UN Charter and 
exclusive of any customary right of 
self-defense.” This restrictive 
approach addresses the fear that 
expansive interpretations of Article 
51 create a loophole through various 
countries could rationalize military 
adventurism.100 
 
Aggression not formally amounting to “armed 
attack” can also be just as threatening to the 
sovereignty and the existence of a state as full 
military hostilities. Spacefaring states defend 
their political independence within the 
confines of the UN Charter. They exercise 
jurisdiction and control over their space 
systems, and by preventing and defeating 
                                                 
                                                
100Norman Menachem Feder, “Reading the UN Charter 
Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack,” 
NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 395 (1987): 404. 
attacks on those activities. The jurisdiction 
and control element is quasi-territorial 
according to Bin Cheng, and this provides 
accord for a state asserting rights of self 
defense for space systems as a defense of 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or 
political independence.101 
 
Those that argue for narrow, and limiting 
interpretation, only provoke resort to self-help 
by states outside the bounds of the Charter. “A 
legal system which merely prohibits the use of 
force and does not make adequate provision 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes invites 
failure.”102 Though a bit counter-intuitive, the 
use of force in self-defense, in turn, enables 
attainment of the overarching objectives of 
international peace and security. 
 
Some suggest the restrictive view of self-
defense is more analytically sound and widely 
accepted than the other view. They argue an 
expansive reading of Article 51 conflicts with 
the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. 
Scholars arguing for a restrictive interpretation 
fail to adequately address the practicalities of 
modern warfare; a narrow interpretation and 
definition of attacks and permissible self-
defense is simply unworkable as there does 
not appear to be a happy medium, which 
actually preserves and protects the spacefaring 
rights of nations. The covert nature of modern 
forms of diplomatic, information, military, 
and economic conflict and the potential for 
crippling destruction and damage continues to 
evolve with a potential for catastrophic 
 
101“…since territorial sovereignty has been banned from outer 
space and, with it, territorial jurisdiction, the overriding 
jurisdiction in outer space is quasi-territorial jurisdiction. Bin 
Cheng, “The Commercial Development of Space: The Need 
for New Treaties,” Journal of Space Law 19: 1 (1997). 
102Norman Menachem Feder, “Reading the UN Charter 
Connotatively: Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack,” 
NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 395 (1987), 
citing Waldcock, “The Regulation of the Use of Force by 
Individual States in International Law,” Recueil Des Cours 81 
(1952): 455-456. 
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consequences.103 Kinetic, electromagnetic, and 
cyber attacks intentionally targeting, 
damaging, and interfering with satellites and 
their supporting terrestrial systems would 
appear logically and realistically to satisfy 
conceptions of armed attack that would 
warrant and allow a proportionate response (as 
provided in the LOAC, described in more 
detail below) in accord with the UN Charter 
and customary law of self-defense exceptions. 
Such attacks should therefore trigger a right of 
self-defense. 
 
Concluding there is a right of self-defense for 
attacks on space systems requires an analysis 
to assess whether an actual attack has taken 
place. As will be discussed later in this paper’s 
discussion of the ICJ Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms, there are considerable challenges to 
U.S. abilities to identify, classify, characterize, 
and attribute space threats and events. Within 
the hostile physical environment, varied 
energetic and kinetic events affecting space 
systems occur on a recurring basis; moreover, 
satellite electronic, sensor, or other glitches 
could exhibit attributes of an attack until 
analysis has resolved the issue. Ultimately, 
even if one concludes there has been an attack, 
attributing the source of the event to a 
particular state or non-state actor could prove 
to be extremely difficult. 
 
The challenge to resolving information attacks 
would be similar. According to Jia Huang: 
 
…if an aggressor uses information 
techniques to conduct the operation 
and inflicts little or no physical 
destruction, whether this kind of 
attack can be regarded as “armed 
attack” is disputable. If an 
information attack cannot be 
                                                 
                                                
103The increasingly covert nature of modern form of 
aggression and their greater potential for devastation have 
made both scholars and states dissatisfied with the limited 
legal availability of the justification of self-defense. Ibid., p. 
418. 
characterized as an “armed attack,” 
then a conventional response may not 
be warranted. A conventional 
response, in this case, may in fact be 
considered the “armed attack” under 
Article 51. A response alike would 
not constitute an “armed attack,” but 
there are still at least three obstacles 
for the retaliation side as follows. 
Firstly, it is difficult to identify the 
attacker. Information attack in outer 
space has the characteristics of long-
range and anonymity and the attacker 
can conduct information attack 
against space assets in or through 
foreign countries. Information can 
flow across international borders 
while a nation’s military, judicial, and 
security agencies cannot carry out 
investigations in a foreign country at 
will and this kind of investigation 
may be considered as spy so it cannot 
gain cooperation from related 
countries. Secondly, it is difficult to 
produce evidence. Space assets are in 
an abominable environment 
characterized by intensive radiation, 
extreme temperature, and micro-
gravity. Occasionally, they may be 
stricken by small meteors or space 
debris, which runs at high speed. So 
they may be damaged by the natural 
cause. A space asset usually consists 
of many complex systems and there 
are frequent malfunctions and 
program errors. Because of these 
factors, the offended state cannot 
produce sufficient evidence that it has 
suffered from intentional attack. 
Finally, even though the attacker can 
be identified and proven to be 
supported by a foreign government, 
this foreign country may lack the 
space information infrastructure that 
would make it vulnerable to a 
response alike.104 
 
104Jia Huang, “New Challenges to the Traditional Principles 
of the Law of War Presented by Information Operations in 
Outer Space,” Journal of Politics and Law 2: 1 (2009). 
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Anticipatory Self-defense 
for Space Systems 
 
Some states maintain that within the right of 
self-defense is a right to prevent an armed 
attack from occurring by using anticipatory 
self-defense.105 The U.S. is one such state. The 
Caroline Affair dispute with the United 
Kingdom in 1837 gave rise to a formal 
interpretation in international law setting out 
the elements of lawful anticipatory self-
defense. The case stands for the proposition 
that the use of force in anticipatory defense 
may be justified and employed only in matters 
in which the “necessity of that self-defense is 
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation.” 
The use of such force must also be 
proportional. The criterion of immediacy and 
necessity must be based upon the very fact 
that there is no other course available to 
prevent the threatened attack from being 
executed. By nature, this excludes execution 
of pre-planned attacks. 
 
Can an anticipatory defense be presented in 
response to an imminent threat to U.S. space 
systems? Physics and engineering realities 
make the immediacy criterion rather difficult 
to achieve. There will always be time lag and 
latency associated with detecting and 
analyzing an event, ascertaining the source 
and potential for damage, determining that a 
party intended to cause the damage, and then 
mobilizing weapons in response to perform 
space or terrestrial-based combat. 
Complicating these problems, U.S. SSA assets 
are underfunded and overtaxed though they 
have been described repeatedly by U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Air 
Force space officials as a top priority; the 
                                                 
                                                105Some argue the drafters of the UN Charter intended to 
restrict the right of self-defense under the Charter and 
customary international law and state practice involving 
anticipatory defense measures was not accepted. 
shortfalls exacerbate the time lag and analysis 
challenges. 
 
Assuming they have been identified as a 
lawful target, terrestrial components of space 
and ASAT systems can be struck within days, 
hours, or minutes depending upon the 
proximity of military forces to the target. The 
U.S. Strategic Command and Air Force Space 
Command have toyed with the idea of a 
conventional strike missile from time to time, 
though that system is subject to a number of 
limitations, and developing workable rules of 
engagement for its employment should prove 
difficult. As to potential space-based targets, 
systems could be deployed to engage such 
targets, but the delay could be hours, days, 
weeks, months, or even more; the timing for 
strikes with kinetic or particle beams, or other 
systems would be dependent on the 
prospective target’s orbit, intercept physics, 
and readiness of the sensor, shooter, and 
command and control systems employed. 
 
The case for using force for anticipatory 
defense of space systems can be compared to 
performing anticipatory defense in the event 
of a potential nuclear strike. The signs of 
preparedness for employing nuclear weapons 
would have to be so overwhelming that only a 
definite intention to use them would logically 
explain the actions being undertaken. Since 
the risks of inaction could be catastrophic, 
they would demand immediate action. 
However, Louis-Philippe Rouillard suggests 
the fueling of one missile or even of a region’s 
missiles might not be enough to justify an 
attack based on anticipatory self-defense, 
since some might think no country would use 
a limited amount of nuclear weapons on a first 
strike as this would leave it open to utter 
destruction upon a retaliatory strike.106 Would 
 
106See Louis-Philippe Rouillard, “The Caroline Case: 
Anticipatory Self-Defense in Contemporary International 
Law,” Miskolc Journal of International Law 1: 2 (2004): 117. 
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an analogous circumstance apply to a potential 
attack on a space system? Probably not. The 
loss or potential loss of a single satellite or 
redundant ground node of a space system 
should not present a serious enough threat that 
a state should not first attempt to resolve the 
developing dispute through diplomatic, 
economic, or global engagement means. Law 
on the use of force only “allows States to 
respond with force when a peaceful settlement 
of the dispute cannot be negotiated.”107 
 
 
Law of Armed Conflict 
 
“States may use force to defend themselves or 
to defend others, however, there are accepted 
limitations to this exception.”108 Before using 
force, one must evaluate not only space law, 
but also assess use of force and LOAC 
humanitarian law considerations. The LOAC 
is a body of international law that sets 
boundaries on the use of force during armed 
conflicts through application of fundamental 
principles or rules.109 LOAC principles and 
rules combine elements of treaty and 
customary international and municipal law. 
The LOAC sets limits on when and to what 
degree force may be used, targeting, and 
treatment of noncombatants, civilians, and 
                                                 
                                                
107 P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008, p. 4. 
108Ibid. 
109DOD policy is to comply with the Law of War “in the 
conduct of military operations and related activities in armed 
conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.” See DOD 
Law of War Program, DOD Directive 5100.77, 9 December 
1998. Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
provides that the U.S. “will apply law of war principles during 
all operations that are categorized as Military Operations 
Other Than War.” See Implementation of the DOD Law of 
War Program, CJCSI 5810.01, 27 August 1999. Under the 
U.S. military’s Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), “U.S. 
forces will comply with the Law of War during military 
operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the 
conflict may be characterized under international law.” 
prisoners of war. Its fundamental targeting 
rules are very relevant to concepts of space 
warfare. The overarching LOAC 
considerations are: necessity, distinction or 
discrimination, proportionality, humanity, and 
chivalry. 
 
Space warfare possibilities present policy and 
law challenges, but rules for them can be 
derived and applied through analogy from 
terrestrial venues. As one might expect, the 
traditions, principles, and rules that might 
apply in space arenas were initially developed 
to apply in traditional terrestrial venues – land, 
sea, and air. Important components of space 
systems are terrestrially based; LOAC 
targeting considerations for targeting and also 
defending terrestrial components are better 
understood and established. Even so, not all 
rules are directly translatable to the space 
environment. Some even believe LOAC 
principles are inapplicable to unmanned 
space-based components of satellite systems, 
but that is, however, a rather limited 
viewpoint. In the end, each LOAC 
considerations must be considered before 
prosecuting military conflict in space or 
against terrestrially-based space system 
support, command and control, and user 
components. 
 
The first LOAC principle to consider, 
“military necessity,” provides “a person or 
object should not be targeted unless doing so 
gives an attacker some real advantage.”110 
Military necessity requires combat forces 
engage in only those acts necessary to 
 
110Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal 
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008), 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). According to Frey, 
“The principle has four elements: the user of force must be 
capable of regulating it; force must be necessary to achieve, 
as quickly as possible, the enemy’s partial or complete 
submission; it must be no greater in effect on the enemy’s 
personnel or property than needed to achieve victor; and it 
must not otherwise be illegal.” 
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accomplish a legitimate military objective. 
“The U.S. formally acknowledged this 
principle when it signed the 1907 Hague 
Convention, which prohibits any action to 
destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless 
such destruction or seizure is imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war. The 
Nuremberg trials also explained that 
destruction as an end-in-itself is a violation of 
international law. There must be some 
reasonable connection between the destruction 
of property and the overcoming of the enemy 
forces.”111 
 
Military necessity only allows that degree of 
force required to defeat an enemy. In addition, 
attacks must be limited to military objectives 
whose “nature, purpose, or use makes an 
effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture, or 
neutralization at the time offers a definite 
military advantage.”112 In applying military 
necessity to targeting, the rule generally 
allows targeting those facilities, equipment, 
and forces which, if destroyed, would lead as 
quickly as possible to the enemy’s partial or 
complete submission. 
 
Applying the rule of necessity in engaging 
space systems, warfighters must take into 
account the nexus between the adversaries’ 
war effort and the space system. Importantly, 
targeting on-orbit spaceborne assets may be 
unnecessary if the same military necessary 
result can be obtained by targeting 
terrestrially-based components, or jamming up 
and down links. 
                                                 
                                                
111See “Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague, 18 October 
1907,” Article 23(g), International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) International Humanitarian Law Database, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e
636d/1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6 (accessed June 
2009). 
112See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 12 
October 1949, Articles 51-54. 
Related to necessity, the central idea of 
distinction is one may only engage valid 
military targets. Military objectives must be 
separated and distinguished from protected 
civilian objects to the maximum extent 
possible. An indiscriminate attack is one that 
strikes military objectives and civilians or 
civilian objects without an attempt to 
distinguish between military and nonmilitary 
targets. Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions limits targets “strictly to …those 
objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose, or use make an effective contribution 
to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage.”113 Civilians and 
civilian property are prohibited targets.114 
 
Distinction also requires defenders to separate 
military objects from civilian objects to the 
maximum extent feasible.115 If system is to be 
civilian in nature, it needs to be separated 
from military systems. This is difficult and 
complex to achieve with some spaceborne 
systems – communications, PNT, weather, or 
classically constituted imagery systems have 
dual civilian and military applications. For 
example, the global PNT resource, GPS, is 
operated by the U.S. Air Force, and it 
produces vital effects for the civil and 
commercial communities. Important weather 
satellites relied on by the U.S. military and its 
allies, but also global civil and commercial 
communities, are operated by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce; the U.S. Air Force 
provides a back-up command and control 
center for the Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program (DMSP). The U.S. obtains large 
portions of its satellite communications 
 
113See Ibid., Article 52(2). 
114See Ibid., Articles 51-54. 
115In a space context, it would be inappropriate to locate a 
civil space habitat for spacecraft personnel next to an 
adjoining space weapon or military system. 
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capability by leasing international commercial 
transponders, as do other militaries, civil, and 
commercial users. Similarly, significant 
portions of remote sensing and supporting 
launch capabilities are produced by 
commercial providers, consistent with U.S. 
remote sensing and commercial space launch 
policies that encourage such relationships. 
Attacking such objects may hinder an enemy, 
but civilians would suffer tremendously as an 
outgrowth of this mixed civil and military use 
of space systems. 
 
Under Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
Conventions, limits are imposed on attacks on 
civilian objects116 and attacks that cause 
“widespread, long-term, and severe damage” 
to the environment.117 Consequently, a 
weapon must be targeted with discrimination. 
What then should be done to address the 
tricky issue of space debris? The creation of 
space debris must be expected and considered 
if kinetic or otherwise destructive weapons are 
about to be employed. Substantial debris fields 
should be reasonably foreseen to cause 
damage to other civilian space assets. Since 
kinetic or otherwise destructive engagements 
could break the threshold of “widespread, 
long-term, and severe damage” to the 
environment, the focus should be on assessing 
the number and size of pieces of expected 
space debris, their orbits, the length of time on 
orbit, the ability to track the debris, and 
potential damage. The 2007 Chinese ASAT 
left thousands of pieces of space debris on 
orbit, at altitudes where they will remain on 
orbit for hundreds to thousands of years, 
presenting long-term threats to imagery, 
environmental, and communication systems. 
                                                
 
 
nflict. 
                                                
116See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 
Article 52. 
117See Ibid., Article 55. Protocol Additional restrictions’ 
apply to land, sea, and air combat and these limitations are 
echoed elsewhere in other treaties and in customary 
international law. 
Given the prevalent global understanding of 
the problems of space debris and their physics, 
a spacefaring state cannot reasonably contend 
it could not foresee the damage that would 
occur as a consequence of initiating a kinetic 
or other destructive ASAT event. If so 
employed, it could be reasonable to conclude 
the attacking state executed an indiscriminate 
attack, one where the means of attack 
“employs a method or means of combat the 
effects of which cannot be limited as 
required.”118 For this reason, employing 
ASAT weapons would appear to be unlawful 
if they create space debris that damages 
civilian space systems, regardless of whether 
or not the damage occurs during or after the 
time of co
 
Would deploying or exploding space mines be 
lawful? Probably not, but this assumes the 
mine is designed to explode, fragment, and 
riddle space with debris.119 What if the mine is 
kept on orbit for an extended period? In such 
event, P.J. Blount opines we should look by 
analogy to the restrictions placed on 
unsecured naval mines:120 
 
According to the Hague Convention 
VIII, these mines must be disabled 
within an hour of release due to the 
way in which they might move and 
destroy nonmilitary objectives. While 
the ban is not directly translatable to 
space due to physics, the principle 
behind this ban is. So placing a 
weapon in space that engages targets 
at random would also be unlawful. 
The principle could be extended by 
an analogy to torpedoes, which must 
be disabled if they miss their targets. 
 
118Ibid. and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977, 
Article 51(4). 
119It might be possible to develop and field space mines 
designed to minimize space debris or other long-term 
problems. 
120“These would be contact mines that are not secured by a 
mooring or anchor and have the ability to be swept away in a 
current.” 
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A weapon in space that misses its 
target and continues to poses a threat 
due to its capabilities might also be 
illegal (e.g., a warhead being used as 
an ASAT that misses its mark).121 
 
Another distinction relates to a potential for 
causing damage or injury to humans in space. 
Civilians may not be made the object of a 
direct attack; however, the LOAC recognizes 
a military target need not be spared because its 
destruction may cause collateral damage that 
results in unintended death or injury to 
civilians or damage to their property. 
Commanders and their planners must take into 
consideration the extent of unintended indirect 
civilian collateral destruction and probable 
casualties that will result from a direct attack 
on a military objective and, to an extent 
consistent with military necessity, seek to 
avoid or minimize civilian casualties and 
destruction. Anticipated civilian losses must 
be proportionate to the military advantages 
sought. In the end, it could be difficult to 
justify some losses without compelling 
“survival of the State” rationales. It would 
appear to be illegal to conduct activities that 
might cause damage to the International Space 
Station, or other manned civil space systems, 
or injury to their space personnel, whether on 
orbit, or during lift and return operations. 
 
Proportionality prohibits the use of any kind 
or degree of force exceeding that needed to 
accomplish a military objective. An attacker 
must therefore balance the expected damage 
against the military advantage to be gained.122 
                                                 
 
                                                
121P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008. Kinetic ASATs are typically launched on 
sub-orbital trajectories so if they miss they come right back 
down, like an ICBM warhead. Co-orbital ASATs generally 
require larger boosters to achieve their mission objectives. 
122Robert A. Ramey, “Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: 
The Law of War in Space,” Air Force Law Review 48 (2000): 
79-82. “The proportionality test is the U.S.’ preferred method 
This requires a balancing test between the 
substantial, actual, and direct military 
advantage anticipated by attacking a 
legitimate military target and the expected 
incidental and unfortunate civilian injury or 
damage. Under this test, excessive incidental 
losses are prohibited. This principle 
encourages combat forces to minimize 
collateral damage – the incidental, unintended 
destruction that occurs as a result of a lawful 
attack against a legitimate military target, and 
leverages the rules relating to necessity and 
discrimination. This principle is also reflected 
in Additional Protocol 1, which prohibits “an 
attack, which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”123 
 
An action causing excessive or catastrophic 
damage to civilians or property should be 
illegal. Since Additional Protocol 1’s test is 
subjective, commanders could reasonably 
disagree on whether attacking these objects 
truly “offers a definite military advantage.”124 
The principle of proportionality offers some 
guidance with regard to using force against 
space systems: since collateral damage to 
civilians is considered a natural consequence 
of combat, the proportionality test should be 
applied to determine if an attack on a dual-use 
object warrants the consequences to the 
 
 
of determining whether a target is a permissible one. The U.S. 
has declined to sign certain treaties, or portions thereof, that 
prohibit certain targets without any balancing test.” 
123Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol 1), Article 51(5)(b), ICRC International 
Humanitarian Law Database, http://www.icrc.org/ih1.nsf/ 
FULL/470 (accessed June 2009). 
124J. Ricou Heaton, “Civilians at War: Reexamining the 
Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces,” Air 
Force Law Review 57 (2005): 182-183. 
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innocent.125 Hence, attacking and destroying 
vital PNT systems, such as GPS, may be held 
illegal since global society at large relies upon 
the use of these systems.126 The same 
conclusion may apply to attacks on 
environmental monitoring systems, especially 
if used to protect civilians from weather, 
natural disaster or other environmental threats. 
If necessary to engage these systems, then it 
may be more acceptable, and lawful, if the 
damaging effects are reversible or temporary 
during specific periods of military activity. 
 
What of nuclear weapons? The OST bans the 
stationing of nuclear weapons and weapons of 
mass destruction in space. Also, “the Nuclear 
Test Ban treaty prohibits states from causing 
nuclear explosions in outer space.”127 Such 
weapons present significant 
distinction/discrimination challenges. As 
noted, the space and defense communities 
learned of these issues during the 1960s 
Starfish Prime and other upper atmospheric 
nuclear weapons experiments. So the use of 
nuclear weapons in space, aside from transit 
of a nuclear warhead that most concede can be 
legally executed in certain conflicts, should, 
                                                 
                                                
125The expression “definite military advantage” is derived 
from the Hague Rules of Air Warfare. The idea conveyed is 
that of “a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather 
than a hypothetical and speculative one. The advantage must 
be military and not purely political, and involve an evaluation 
of the long-term military benefits of any action contemplated. 
See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the 
Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), pp. 83-86. 
126The U.S. GPS system is a free global utility, but until 
recently the U.S. reserved the right to control and degrade its 
signal. Current U.S. policy is to distribute the system’s PNT 
signal without any control or degradation. In September 2007, 
the U.S. announced its decision to procure the future 
generation of GPS satellites, GPS III, without the selective 
availability (signal degradation) technical feature. “DOD 
Permanently Discontinues Procurement of Global Positioning 
System Selective Availability,” DOD News Release 1126-07, 
18 September 2007. Russia, China, Europe, Japan, and India 
have deployed, or plan to deploy, their own spaceborne PNT 
systems. 
127Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Under Water, 10 October 1963, Article 1. 
on first blush, be completely foreclosed. 
However, according to Blount: 
 
…the International Court of Justice’s 
(ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons might have created an 
exception to this rule. The ICJ ruled 
that in general the use of nuclear 
weapons would be “contrary to the 
rules of international law applicable 
in armed conflict, and in particular 
the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law.” However, the 
court states that a State may use a 
nuclear weapon when the “very 
survival of a State would be at stake.” 
Since the court treats this as a 
moment of necessity in which both 
customary and treaty law can be 
suspended, it is feasible that the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty could also be suspended 
and that a State may, during “an 
extreme circumstance of self-
defense” use a nuclear weapon in 
space.128 
 
Under what circumstances employment of a 
nuclear weapon in space could be legally 
envisioned? Perhaps to defeat on-orbit 
weapons of mass destruction or nuclear 
weapon system posing a serious violation of 
the Outer Space and Limited Test Ban treaties 
or an otherwise serious provocation. Such use 
would require balancing the risks to the space 
environment and other space systems, and 
considering peace and security options 
associated with failure against possibilities of 
defeating the threat. Could using the same 
argument allow use of nuclear weapons 
against pure space assets presenting 
communications, PNT, warning and other 
capabilities that enable 21st Century militaries 
operations by adversaries? Probably not, but 
 
128P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008, p. 8. 
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approving that argument would create an 
exception that would negate arms-control and 
peacekeeping aspects and limitations imposed 
by the Outer Space and Limited Test Ban 
treaties, the UN Charter, and other bilateral 
agreements. 
 
A state must do “everything feasible to verify 
that the objectives to be attacked are military 
objectives.”129 However, operations in this 
context, requires use of the panoply of space 
capabilities – satellite imagery, satellite PNT 
systems, satellite communication systems, and 
even meteorological data. Denying an 
adversary access to space systems may relieve 
him of some portion of this important 
obligation to mitigate civilian casualties by 
employing such techniques and 
technologies.130 Furthermore, a weapon that 
could be used in a nondiscriminatory manner 
or in such a way it would cause unnecessary 
suffering is only banned if it can also be used 
in a discriminatory manner and cause limited 
suffering. “In such a case it is the illicit use of 
the weapon that is outlawed and not the 
weapon itself.”131  
 
War must be waged in accordance with widely 
accepted formalities, and avoid unlawful 
treachery. These principles impose an 
obligation to reduce noncombatant civilian 
casualties and damage, but this can be difficult 
to achieve as military and civilian space 
systems become more and more intertwined. 
The concept of “neutrality” may also limit 
military space conflict activities. Belligerents 
should have no right to attack neutral satellite 
                                                 
                                                
129Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Article 
57(2)(a)(i). 
130Of course, denying an adversary access to space assets 
might save lives if the adversary is using them to target 
innocent civilians. 
131P.J. Blount, “Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the 
Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis,” IAC-08-E8.3.5, 
Presented to the International Institute of Space Law 
Colloquium, International Astronautics Congress, Glasgow, 
UK, October 2008, p. 6. 
communications systems, even in self-
defense. Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague 
Convention V, which was concluded in 1907, 
decades before satellite communications 
systems were even envisioned, provide a 
neutral state is not required to restrict a 
belligerent’s use of “telegraph or telephone 
cables or of wireless telegraph apparatus 
belonging to it or to companies or private 
individuals” as long as these facilities are 
provided impartially to both belligerents. It 
appears these Articles would apply to modern 
day satellite communications, though some 
think this remains an open question. 
 
Another issue that must be addressed is how 
to treat neutrality rights in time of conflict. 
Since space law accords states the 
responsibility over their private entities 
involved in space operations, an argument can 
be made to hold a neutral state responsible for 
the actions of its private entities. According to 
Elizabeth Waldrop: 
 
…when a State issues a license 
authorizing a private entity to provide 
certain services, there can be little 
argument that the State should be 
held responsible for subsequent 
conduct of the private entity. 
Accordingly, if a neutral State 
permits its space systems to be used 
by a belligerent military, the opposing 
belligerent would have the right to 
demand that the neutral State stop 
doing so. If the neutral State is 
unwilling or unable to prevent such 
use by one belligerent, it would seem 
reasonable to authorize the other 
belligerent to prevent the offending 
use. In the context of space systems 
used in time of conflict, before 
resorting to force a belligerent could 
(or should) demand a neutral nation 
not to provide satellite imagery, 
navigation services, or weather 
information to its adversary.132 
 
 
132Elizabeth S. Waldrop, “Integration of military and civilian 
space assets: legal and national security implications”, Air 
Space and Defense, Winter 2010 41 
 
Law on the Use of Force 
 
Given the realities of operating in space, its 
global nature, and the fact threats are 
manifested nearly always outside the territory 
of a state, self-defense measures invariably 
require military activities conducted outside 
the confines of that state. Some suggest the 
ICJ objected to such extra-territorial self-
defense measures in its 6 November 2003 
ruling in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America), a dispute involved issues arising out 
of the Tanker War of 1984-1988 and 
analogous to space conflict. 
 
The term Tanker War was first 
applied to a series of naval battles and 
incidents in the Persian Gulf from 
1984-1988 that was part of the larger 
Iran-Iraq War that spanned most of 
the decade. For two years, the U.S. 
was involved in the Tanker War to 
counter the hostile actions of military 
and paramilitary forces of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. These forces 
engaged in a broad pattern of low-
level, yet unlawful, uses of force, 
targeting not only U.S. forces, but 
also U.S.-owned and flagged 
commercial shipping, foreign 
commercial activities, and the 
strategically important Persian Gulf 
waterway itself in the form of mine-
laying in international waters.133 
 
In arriving at its ruling, the ICJ addressed 
issues associated with the “inherent right of 
self-defense.” It held the facts presented with 
regard to missile attacks on U.S.-flagged 
tankers and mining incidents and attacks on 
U.S. warships in the Gulf were not sufficient 
to support an invocation of an inherent right to 
                                                 
 
                                                
Force Law Review, Spring 2004, 157-231, citing DOD 
General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues 
in Information Operations (May 1999). 
133Darren Huskisson, “Protecting the Space Network and the 
Future of Self-Defense,” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 123-143. 
exercise self-defense under international law. 
In disposing of the U.S. position, the Court 
expressed interest and concern with where the 
vessels were attacked, especially since they 
were not located in U.S. territorial waters. The 
ICJ concluded the U.S. could not assert a right 
of self-defense in defense of third parties 
unless those parties requested “collective self 
defense,” and mere ownership of a vessel was 
not sufficient to assert the right. The ICJ 
placed the burden on the U.S. to show the 
attacks on its vessels were of such a nature as 
to be qualified as armed attacks within the 
meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, and as understood in customary 
law on the use of force.134 The ICJ concluded 
the right of self-defense can be asserted only if 
it can detect, and attribute, and conclusively 
prove, an attack by the hostile actor.135 
 
Confirming the applicability of the 
international law criteria of necessity and 
proportionality in relation to the use of force 
in self-defense, the ICJ ruled it was not 
satisfied the U.S. attacks were necessary to 
respond to the shipping incidents in the Gulf 
and constituted a proportionate use of force in 
self-defense. Some suggest this formulation 
could have strict and adverse implications for 
future claims of a right of anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defense insofar as it holds that an 
armed attack is a prerequisite to the right of 
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and under customary international 
law.136 Darren Huskisson has written a critique 
of the ICJ Oil Platforms decision and its 
potential importance.137 The case presents 
 
134Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran 
v. United States of America). 
135Ibid. 
136The Court was not faced with an issue of anticipatory or 
pre-emptive self-defense since the alleged attacks against U.S. 
flagged and owned shipping had already occurred. 
137See Darren Huskisson, “Protecting the Space Network and 
the Future of Self-Defense,” Astropolitics 5 (2007): 123-143. 
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substantial implications for space conflict 
issues: 
 
A Space War would have factual 
similarities to the 1987-1988 phase of 
the Tanker War. One could envision a 
regional conflict, even one in which 
the U.S. is not directly involved, that 
would have spill-over effects on the 
U.S. space networks as the 
belligerents attempted to deny the 
other the use of space services, just as 
Iran and Iraq tried to deny each other 
the commercial use of the Persian 
Gulf during the Tanker War. The 
U.S. would likely use force in 
response to any severe instances of 
harmful interference, such as attacks 
against U.S.-owned and registered 
space systems and foreign 
commercial systems and even 
potentially in response to the 
emplacement of space mines. Due to 
limited space situational awareness 
(SSA), the U.S. could expect a space 
adversary to conduct its operations 
under an even stealthier cloak of 
deniability than existed in the Tanker 
War. 
The specter of a Space War raises 
many questions… May the U.S. 
defend portions of the space network 
located outside the U.S. territory? 
Would it be permissible to use force 
to defend non-U.S. territory? Would 
it be permissible to use force to 
defend non-U.S. registered space 
assets? What is the standard of proof 
for establishing an “armed attack” on 
the space network, thus triggering the 
right of self-defense? Must the U.S. 
ascertain the intent of the attacker 
before initiating an armed response? 
Is the gravity of the attack on the 
space network relevant to the 
triggering of the right of self-
defense?138 
 
No doubt, the ICJ was unwilling at any level 
to conclude the myriad of actions taken by the 
Iranians arose to any level constituting an 
                                                 
                                                
138Ibid. 
“armed attack.” At best, the ICJ ruling can be 
viewed as a political verdict,139 perhaps 
mischaracterizing the evidence on a shooting 
war that took place nearly two decades earlier 
during the Reagan Administration, then 
shaping its decision to telegraph displeasure 
with the George W. Bush Administration’s 
campaign to develop and employ a coalition to 
remove the murderous Sadaam Hussein 
regime from power in Iraq, and battle Al 
Qaeda proxies in Afghanistan and globally. 
Despite these faults, the Court’s reasoning 
cannot be dismissed as wholly in error. Yet 
careful analysis shows the ruling does not 
impose new or unreasonable burdens on those, 
such as the U.S. and its allies, who seek to 
defend their space systems. 
 
The Court was clearly troubled the U.S. had 
reflagged U.S. and non-U.S. owned vessels 
and inserted itself into the controversy and 
shooting war between Iran and Iraq and 
between other states in the region of the 
Persian Gulf/Gulf of Arabia. The ICJ looked 
for and apparently required a stronger nexus 
and compelling interest for self-defense 
between the Tankers being attacked and their 
relationship with the U.S. The ICJ was 
looking to see if sovereigns having significant 
local territorial interests in protecting the 
tankers invoked collective self-defense 
obligations with the U.S. That had not 
happened, nor was there any general 
invocation by the parties of the right of 
collective defense. 
 
Given the foundational defects in the Oil 
Platforms ruling, Huskisson’s analogy 
between the tankers and space systems being 
attacked is incomplete. Contrary to the 
situation involving tankers in Oil Platforms, 
 
139The Court found no evidence of intent by Iran to 
specifically target U.S. ships with either a missile strike or 
mining operations, even if they were fired; thus the court 
concluded no “armed attack” occurred which could give rise 
to self-defense measures. 
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U.S. space systems present clear and 
compelling capabilities vital to insuring the 
extensive and instant U.S. global diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic 
interests. This is in accord with the OST, 
which provides spacefaring powers retain 
jurisdiction and control over their space 
objects and operations even if no signatory 
shall assert rights of sovereignty to portions of 
outer space. A state must be able to defend 
such jurisdiction and control rights. 
 
By his complaint, Huskisson presents the very 
solution necessary to perfect the right of self-
defense for a U.S. owned space asset, or 
defending a foreign registered system. U.S.-
owned space systems need only be registered 
by the U.S. If the U.S. proposes to invoke self-
defense rights for a foreign registered space 
system that must involve and be performed in 
accord with an invocation of collective 
defense rights by the registering State. 
Although the current version of the 
Registration Convention does not direct re-
registration of space objects launched into 
space upon transfers of ownership, control, 
and operation (this is a subject for a future 
modification of the Convention or a treaty 
affecting the use of force and LOAC).140 
Pending such changes, perfecting self-defense 
rights for transferred systems could be 
achieved by invocating the rights with an 
Article 51 submission to the UN Security 
Council. 
 
Huskisson worries the Court’s opinion 
establishes a burdensome requirement to 
identify the hostile actor attacking a U.S. 
space system. He rightly concedes an 
important point of international law relating to 
the use of force that a nation asserting a right 
of self-defense must attribute an attack to a 
                                                 
140Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space, 15 September 1979, also known as the 
Registration Convention, at Article II. 
specified hostile actor. With regard to LOAC 
issues, a military action must be necessary and 
distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants. Huskisson dismisses these 
evidentiary requirements of ascertaining the 
hostile actor as unreasonably difficult to 
achieve given the current state of SSA 
capabilities; he correctly spots SSA challenges 
as its capabilities are best equipped to provide 
a forensic understanding of recent events 
rather than real-time feedback on on-going 
events. Huskisson wrongly infers the 
evidentiary requirement should be partly 
ignored or accommodated because it could be 
overly difficult to satisfy. 
 
Current SSA tools and overall capabilities 
need to be improved given the ICJ’s opinion 
in the Oil Platforms. This is a correct result, 
and encourages appropriate planning and 
resource development. It would be far more 
destabilizing to encourage commanders or 
national leaders to authorize or engage in 
military actions based on “hunches” that an 
attack has or is about to happen, and 
“hunches” as to who made the attack. 
 
Huskisson also complains about the Court’s 
requirement that a state ascertain the intent of 
the attacker before initiating an armed 
response. Again, Huskisson misses the Court’s 
important point. Not all events causing 
damage to space systems are the result of an 
attack. To find otherwise would ignore a half 
century of space physics, engineering, and 
operational experiences. This would risk 
peace and security over accidents or other 
non-hostile events. Space systems are 
continually battered with a variety of 
environmental events – space debris, electrical 
charging, cosmic rays and energetic particles, 
and others. Assuming an event can be traced 
to some state or actor, a strong factual 
determination must nonetheless be made as to 
whether the interference or damage occurred 
inappropriately or by accident. For example, 
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jamming incidents affecting space systems 
occur in many venues, most inadvertent, some 
not. An assessment and inquiries must be 
made to determine the true context of the 
event to satisfy LOAC requirements of 
necessity, distinction, and proportionality. 
 
Finally, Huskisson complains about whether 
the gravity of an attack on a space system is 
relevant to the triggering of the right of self-
defense. Huskisson again missed the ICJ’s 
point. The ICJ ruling encourages application 
of classic necessity and proportionality rules 
when executing purported self-defense 
actions. Peace and security interests can best 
be achieved and preserved if necessary and 
proportionate responses are presented in 
response to armed attacks. 
 
 
Attacks on Space Systems 
 
Conflict in outer space or affecting the domain 
is also limited by a myriad of space 
governance, environmental, disarmament, and 
arms control agreements. There are 
boundaries on these limits. For example, 
under the Vienna Convention during time of 
conflict, treaty terms inconsistent with a state 
of armed conflict may not apply between 
belligerents, unless the terms of the treaty 
itself are specifically intended to apply during 
conflict. 
 
The Liability Convention141 expands on a 
topic noted in the Outer Space Treaty that 
“launching states” are liable to other states for 
damage caused by space objects, including 
debris. States are liable only for direct damage 
caused by a space object (i.e., loss of life, 
personal injury or other impairment of health, 
or loss of or damage to property). If damage is 
                                                 
141See Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, September 1972, known as the 
Liability Convention. 
caused to another space object in outer space, 
liability is based on fault. On the other hand, if 
damage is caused by a space object on earth or 
to an aircraft in flight, liability is absolute. 
 
Notably, there can be more than one launching 
State – a launching state is any state that 
launches an object, procures the launch of an 
object, or from whose territory or facility an 
object is launched. If there is more than one 
launching State, joint and several liability 
rules would apply. States may make 
indemnification agreements and apportion 
liability among themselves. Since allied 
nations supporting space conflict activities 
could be construed as launching states, 
liability issues and allocation of liability issues 
should be resolved before engaging in such 
activities. 
 
Does the Liability Convention offer an 
exclusive remedy for rights of a state in event 
of an attack on its space systems? No – the 
Liability Convention does not exclude or limit 
the right of self-defense affirmed in Article 51 
and such a reading cannot be found in its 
negotiation or record of the U.S. Senate 
ratification. The Liability Convention presents 
other challenges, however, and does not offer 
a satisfactory disposition to attacks. According 
to Adam Frey: 
 
Although it clarifies some of the 
Outer Space Treaty’s ambiguity, the 
Liability Convention still faces 
criticism. First, its definition of an 
“object” as including “component 
parts” does not specify whether this 
includes debris, so some suggest a 
launching state might not be liable for 
debris-based damage. Second, 
although the convention imposes a 
“fault” standard for damages, it does 
not define how much care should be 
exercised during a launch. In other 
words, if two space objects collide, 
one state could argue that it took all 
reasonable precautions, while the 
injured state could argue that it did 
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not. Third, fault may be difficult to 
prove since specific pieces of debris 
can be difficult to identify and track, 
and the cause of a collision can prove 
equally elusive… the mere fact of a 
collision does not automatically put 
the state that created the debris at 
fault. Finally, there is no established 
system for processing claims or for 
interpreting or enforcing the 
convention’s terms. The convention’s 
litigation mechanisms have never 
been used, so their effectiveness 
remains unknown.142 
 
Similar to the Liability Convention, the OST 
does not set out substantive remedies for a 
state that has had its space assets attacked by 
another state or non-state party. Nonetheless, 
some, including Frey, suggest the OST may 
provide “an appropriate response” if a state 
interferes with another’s space activities. It is 
based on consultation: 
 
Articles [VI] and [VII] hold states 
liable for damage caused by their 
space activities and launches, whether 
such activity is conducted “by 
governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities” within the 
state. Further, Article [IX] requires 
states to avoid the “harmful 
contamination” of outer space and 
celestial bodies. If a state believes 
that its activities could cause such 
                                                 
                                                
142Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal 
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008), 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). The statement by Frey 
that “fault may be difficult to prove since specific pieces of 
debris can be difficult to identify and track, and the cause of a 
collision can prove equally elusive… the mere fact of a 
collision does not automatically put the state that created the 
debris at fault” has been forced to the forefront by the 10 
February 2009 collision between the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 
2251 communications satellites. The impact between the 
Iridium Satellite LLC-owned satellite and the 16-year-old 
defunct Russian military satellite occurred at 780 kilometers, 
a low Earth orbit (LEO) altitude used by satellites that 
monitor weather and carry telephone communications. It is 
considered the most crowded area of space. See “When 
Satellites Collide: Iridium 33 Strikes Defunct Russian Sat in 
Unprecedented Accident,” GPS World, 12 February 2009. 
harm, it must undertake “appropriate 
international consultations” before 
proceeding. Conversely, if a state 
believes it could be harmed by 
another’s actions, it “may request 
consultation concerning the activity 
or experiment.” Article [X] further 
allows states to request observation of 
each other’s launches, and Article 
[XII] requires any space facilities and 
equipment to be open for observation. 
However, the treaty provides no right 
of appeal if two states cannot resolve 
these issues themselves.143  
 
In the end, the Liability Convention’s real 
limitations on space conflict activities arise 
out of its provision for liability associated with 
causing damage to third-parties. These 
liability issues must be evaluated, addressed, 
and/or mitigated by law-abiding states before 
performing self-defense military activities that 
could cause damage to third-party space 
systems. Planners must account for payment 
of damages or plan to limit such problems. 
 
The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 
Under Water, also known as the Partial (or 
Limited) Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), prohibited 
“any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any 
 
143Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal 
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008), 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicales/apj/apj08/
win08/frey.html (accessed June 2009). On the matter of 
consultation, while it appears the Chinese did not offer to 
engage in such discussions, it appears from news reports of 
the incident the U.S. knew the ASAT test was pending. “The 
events show that the [U.S.] Administration felt constrained in 
its dealings with China because of its view that it had little 
leverage to stop an important Chinese military program, and 
because it did not want to let Beijing know how much the 
U.S. knew about its space launching activities.” Further, the 
U.S. did not request consultation even though the Outer Space 
Treaty states this was its right. Had the U.S. been willing to 
discuss the military use of space with the Chinese that might 
have been enough to dissuade them from going through with 
it. See Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew 
of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent,” The New York 
Times 23 April 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/ 
washington/23satellite.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=print&
oref=slogin (accessed June 2009). 
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other nuclear explosion” in the atmosphere, 
underwater, or in outer space.144 PTBT is 
superseded by the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CBTB) that bans all nuclear testing in 
all mediums, though the CTBT has not as of 
yet entered in force.145 The OST does not 
specifically prohibit testing weapons in outer 
space itself, as opposed to on celestial bodies, 
instead it proscribes the stationing of nuclear 
weapons on orbit. With PTBT and CBTB, 
testing and subsequent use of nuclear weapons 
in response to attacks on space systems appear 
to be banned, unless employed in a possible 
narrow exception that allows such devices to 
be employed to preserve the “survival of a 
State.” Employing nuclear weapon systems 
against conventional space systems probably 
could not be shown to support such a survival 
objective. 
 
A series of bilateral agreements between the 
U.S. and the former Soviet Union, now held to 
be binding on Russia by protocol, prohibit 
interference with early warning systems and 
NTMs. As noted earlier, NTMs include a 
variety of technologies and systems. The 
definition should include space (e.g., photo-
reconnaissance satellites) and terrestrial assets 
(e.g., land-based radars, seismographs, radar 
and intelligence systems on ships and aircraft, 
etc.) that can verify arms control treaty 
                                                 
                                                
144Nuclear powers France and China did not sign or ratify the 
PTBT. Also, the PTBT did not ban underground nuclear 
testing. 
145Nuclear powers China, Israel, and the U.S. signed, but have 
not ratified the CTBT. As of October 2009, 151 States have 
ratified the CTBT. Thus, one could argue that the norms of 
the Treaty to ban all nuclear testing in all mediums is 
emerging as a universal norm binding upon states that have 
not ratified the Treaty. Entry into force of the CTBT is an 
achievable goal. The CTBT is entering “the most defining 
period of its existence,” as there has been a “paradigm shift” 
in support for the Treaty since U.S. President Obama set out 
the U.S. agenda for non-proliferation and arms control in 
April 2009 followed by his agreement with Russian President 
Medvedev in London in 2009 to seek entry into force of 
CTBT, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2009/ 
after-ten-year-hiatus-entry-into-forceof-comprehensive-test-
ban-treaty-an-achievable-goal (accessed January 2010). 
compliance. Since they provide transparency, 
NTM systems are thought to help reduce the 
risk of nuclear war. The earliest of these 
provisions was contained in the 1972 ABM 
Treaty between the Soviet Union and the 
U.S.146 
 
While the U.S. has withdrawn from the ABM 
Treaty, other treaties in force today contain 
this same prohibition, including the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF), 1992 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I), and 1990 Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Recognition 
of the important role played by NTMs has 
been made evident. Given the importance of 
spaceborne NTMs role in stemming the 
potential of a nuclear holocaust, non-
interference rules that preserve and allow 
adversary access to their systems would 
appear to be taking on the trappings of a 
peremptory norm that nations may want 
treaties to perfect. 
 
The Environmental Modification Convention 
of 1978147 prohibits all military or hostile 
environmental modification techniques that 
might cause long-lasting, severe, or 
widespread environmental changes in Earth’s 
atmosphere or outer space. “Each State Party 
to this Convention undertakes not to engage in 
military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as 
the means of destruction, damage, or injury to 
any other State Party.”148 “Widespread” is 
defined as “encompassing an area on the scale 
of several hundred square kilometers;” “long-
 
146See Treaty between the U.S. of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Systems, 3 October 1972, but no longer in effect as of 
13 June 2002 due to U.S. withdrawal. 
147Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 5 
October 1978, known as the Environmental Modification 
Convention. 
148Ibid., Article I(1). 
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lasting” is defined as “lasting for a period of 
months, or approximately a season;” and 
“severe” is defined as “involving serious or 
significant disruption or harm to human life, 
natural and economic resources, or other 
assets.”149 The Environmental Modification 
Convention focuses on proscribing military 
weapons, tactics, and techniques that 
deliberately change natural processes.150 
 
Would the use of nuclear weapons in space 
violate the Environmental Modification 
Convention? Perhaps, yes, but only if used 
with hostile intent, to deliberately manipulate 
space environmental processes, with 
widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects, 
causing damage or destruction to space-based 
systems, and directed against another party to 
the treaty. 
 
Would employing systems attacks that create 
widespread, long-lasting, or severe space-
based debris fields, be unlawful? Again, yes, 
if the essential elements of the Convention are 
violated. A state that creates debris 
intentionally in order to ruin the environment 
for use by its adversary would violate the 
Convention. 
 
                                                 
                                                
149Ibid. 
150The U.S. Delegation Statement provides: “The 
Environmental Modification Convention is not an 
Environmental Protection Treaty; it is not a treaty to prohibit 
damage to the environment resulting from armed conflict. 
Rather, the Environmental Modification Convention fills a 
special, but important niche reflecting the international 
community's consensus that the environment itself should not 
be used as an instrument of war.” The U.S. position on 
“criteria that have been established for determining what 
constitutes a prohibited action under the convention: first, the 
convention specifies military or any other hostile use. The 
U.S. understanding is that hostile intent is a precondition for a 
violation; second, it must meet the definition of an 
environmental modification technique, that is the deliberate 
manipulation of a natural process; third, effects must be 
widespread, long-lasting or severe as defined in Article II and 
related understandings; fourth, these effects must be the 
means of destruction, damage or injury; and fifth, it must be 
directed against another state party. Only if all of these 
criteria are met is an action prohibited by the convention.” 
What should be concluded if a party protests 
the effects and damage were unintended? 
Some suggest a state that creates orbital debris 
while targeting specific adversary targets 
would not violate the Convention, but that act 
would instead only constitute a violation of 
the Geneva Additional Protocol 1. However, 
as to the space environment, the science and 
danger of orbital debris is now very much 
acknowledged, notwithstanding denials and 
protests of any potential offending state. 
Perhaps the requisite hostile intent and 
deliberate manipulation elements could be 
deduced from the willful and wanton 
disregard for the damage that occurs and the 
recklessness of the act. This same reasoning 
could also be made to prohibit the use of 
nuclear weapons in defense of space systems. 
 
Agreements, such as the 1971 Accidental 
Measures Agreement (updated in 2004), the 
1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification 
Agreement, and the 1990 Dangerous Military 
Activities Agreement address dangerous laser 
use and dangerous interference with nuclear 
weapons command and control systems, and 
so potentially limit possible space warfare 
activities.151 They are intended to prevent 
outbreak of nuclear war due to 
misunderstanding, accidental launch, or 
misinterpretation of unidentified objects 
detected by early warning systems, and are 
primarily focused on the topic of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 
These agreements basically seek to prevent 
miscalculation by requiring parties to provide 
notice whenever there is an accidental launch 
of a ballistic missile in the direction of the 
 
151See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of 
Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the U.S. of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, 30 September 1971; 
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, 31 May 
1988; and Agreement between the Government of the U.S. of 
American and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, 
12 June 1989. 
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other party, or when a party’s early warning 
system detects an unidentified object. 
 
These agreements affect the prosecution of 
self-defense in response to attacks on space 
systems. For example, the Accidentals 
Measures Agreement with Russia requires the 
parties to take measures to guard against an 
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear 
weapons. It requires a party to notify the other 
immediately if an accidental or unauthorized 
incident occurs, if an early warning system 
detects an unidentified object, or if there is 
any other unexplained event involving 
possible detonation of nuclear weapons. 
 
Importantly, the Accidental Measures 
Agreement requires a party to provide 
advance notice of any planned missile 
launches beyond the territory of the launching 
party and in the direction of the other party. 
The Launch Notification Agreement requires a 
party to provide at least 24-hour advance 
notice of the date, launch location, and 
estimated impact area for any ballistic missile 
launch. These notification requirements could 
require potentially disruptive or compromising 
information exchanges with Russia before 
prosecuting military space activities, 
especially if space launches are required. Such 
exchanges could limit the ability of the U.S. to 
prosecute space-related military/conflict-
related activities. 
 
Although not traditional space “arms control” 
agreements, the U.S. is party to numerous 
bilateral or multilateral agreements that may 
restrict and limit “space activities” from being 
performed in or from the territory of another 
state party. For example, in the U.S. pursuit of 
a global ballistic missile defense system, it is 
entirely foreseeable that states where key 
components are located could impose 
restrictions on U.S. space or other activities in 
exchange for the U.S. right to base ground- or 
link- segments in that state. In the recent past, 
several long-standing allies limited their 
cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense 
related activities, not wishing to participate, 
support, or cause a potential violation of the 
ABM Treaty, even though they were not 
signatories to that agreement. These positions 
have evolved as perceptions of threats to 
national interests changed and the U.S 
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The 
existence of such agreements and potential 
limitations on space activities should not be 
ignored in a discussion of the law relating to 
space conflict activities. 
 
Citing a changed global environment, the U.S. 
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. 
Assuming a new ABM Treaty is negotiated on 
the same or similar terms, where would such a 
treaty leave ASATs from a legal perspective? 
There is, not surprisingly, more than one 
answer. Some analysts suggest that it may be 
impossible to distinguish between ABM 
directed-energy space vehicles and those 
deployed exclusively for anti-satellite 
purposes.152 
 
Hurwitz argues that “all extraterrestrial 
autonomous weapons are illegal. However, 
non-nuclear weapons, which are not 
autonomous, may be stationed and, in 
accordance with generally accepted principles 
of international law, used in Earth orbit.”153 In 
short, while the ABM Treaty appears to 
prohibit the use of directed-energy weapons in 
an ABM mode, “the same technology when 
used in the development/testing/deployment 
of ASATs is not prohibited. 
 
Given the overlap of technologies, careful 
consideration must be given to whether 
                                                 
152Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Viability of U.S. Anti-Satellite 
(ASAT) Policy: Moving Toward Space Control, INSS 
Occasional Paper 30, U.S. Air Force Institute for National 
Security Studies (INSS), January 2000, p. 16. 
153Bruce A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization 
(North-Holland, 1986), p. 135. 
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systems might be favored in one case as an 
ABM system, but not as an ASAT, or vice 
versa. This issue generated considerable 
political debates in the 1980s, when debates 
involving the SDI were also fought over 
ASAT technologies, options, opportunities, 
and related programs.154 U.S. ASAT 
technology development efforts have 
continued on and off for decades. Peace and 
disarmament advocates now attack U.S. 
missile defense systems as fledgling ASAT 
systems, a topic brought to the forefront by the 
2008 interception of the disabled USA 193 
intelligence satellite by a modified Aegis 
cruiser and missile defense missile over the 
Pacific. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
“Arming the heavens” might seem a most 
tempting option to respond to threats to U.S. 
space systems. 
Regardless of the 
wisdom of such 
action, the facts 
remain that the U.S. 
is dependent on use 
of space systems for 
military operations 
and security; that 
these systems are 
vulnerable to disruption, attack, and even 
destruction; and that at stake are the 
                                                 
154Once the Strategic Defense Initiative was politicized during 
the 1980s, debates ran the gamut of the defense and policy 
communities. Opponents posed objections, most technical, to 
missile defense claiming – the Soviet ABM radars complexes 
were not violations of the ABM treaty; propulsion, sensor, 
and targeting systems could not be miniaturized for a kinetic 
kill vehicle; kinetic kill technologies could not be integrated 
on the battlefield; command and control systems could not be 
developed to engage ballistic missiles; software programs 
needed to manage an effective ABM system requires too 
many lines of code; lasers cannot engage and defeat missile 
targets; withdrawal from the ABM treaty would lead the U.S. 
straight into World War III; and the like. Each of the technical 
objections has been defeated by “smart” technical programs. 
asymmetric advantages space capabilities 
provide the U.S. and its allies. Adversaries can 
easily see the tremendous leverage they can 
obtain by disrupting space systems. Given 
these pressures, space presents a feasible arena 
for conflict activities. 
 
Policy, law, and resulting strategy formulation 
for defense of space systems requires more 
sophistication. Provocateurs advocating and 
planning for unconstrained space warfare have 
been marginalized over the decades as 
seasoned and knowledgeable leaders in the 
executive and military departments, 
congressional delegations, and international 
community approach such options with 
extreme caution. If performing self-defense 
activities, lawful options must be considered 
and selected by a state in event an adversary 
or entity threatens or attacks its space 
systems? Employing space systems in accord 
with international law is vital to ensure 
continued access to space capabilities and that 
the space domain remains a peaceful 
environment as envisioned by the OST 
Regime. By doing this, the U.S. will maintain 
not only an ultimate strategic high ground, but 
also a moral one. 
“Arming the 
heavens” might 
seem a most 
tempting option 
to respond to 
threats to U.S. 
space systems. 
 
We know that under treaty and customary law, 
the U.S., as well as member states of the UN 
and states that have ratified OST, must use 
space for peaceful purposes, refrain from 
using space aggressively, take care to preserve 
the space environment, and be prepared to 
indemnify if it damages another non-
belligerent state’s assets. Applicable 
international treaties, conventions, customary 
law, and LOAC principles do not specifically 
describe what the U.S. should or can do in 
preparation for or in response to an attack on 
space systems. Rather, as some contend, they 
highlight what cannot be done. 
 
The right to respond to attacks against space 
systems is limited. Relevant treaties, 
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customary law, the LOAC, and other legal 
principles substantially restrict space warfare 
options and the potential for such conflict 
among law-abiding nations. The use of force 
is allowed only in self-defense or in accord 
with authorization of 
the UN to maintain 
international peace 
and security. Kinetic, 
electromagnetic or 
information operation 
attacks against space 
systems are each an 
“armed attack” to 
which the use of force is permitted in accord 
with the self-defense exception. The right to 
conduct conflict and space warfare activities 
involving space systems is constrained by the 
LOAC, and the right of anticipatory self-
defense may lawfully be employed in defense 
of space systems only in limited 
circumstances. 
 
If engaged in space-based warfare, a state 
must comply with the legal obligations set out 
in the OST, Registration Convention, Liability 
Convention, PTBT/CTBT, Environment 
Modification Convention, and other treaties. 
Certain satellite systems and their supporting 
ground-based, and command and control 
systems should not be attacked; this could 
include spaceborne components of NTMs, 
especially if they are necessary and important 
to reduce chances of a full-fledge nuclear 
conflagration, or resolution of such a conflict. 
Even if lawful means and methods are 
employed and targets engaged, physical, 
technical, environmental, and political 
realities, and their risks and benefits, still limit 
options to defend and fight space systems; 
specifically, they limit the when, where, and 
how adversary space systems can, or should 
not, be engaged. 
 
The U.S. can lawfully take a passive approach 
to defend its space systems, allowing it to treat 
some attacks and threats as a mere distraction. 
Satellite vulnerabilities can be reduced by 
using anti-jamming measures; hardening to 
protect against electromagnetic pulses, 
radiation, or explosions; improving 
maneuverability to actively avoid attacks. Yet 
as we have seen with developments in North 
Korea, developing states and terrorist groups 
can gain access to space system and propose 
to engage in serious mischief. Attacks could 
range the span of space systems – terrestrial, 
link, and on-orbit assets. There is no assurance 
a self-restraint option will protect orbital 
assets. 
The right to 
respond to 
attacks 
against space 
systems is 
limited. 
 
If deterrence fails, a lawful self-defense 
“punishment strategy” can be employed. 
Absolute flexibility should be maintained by 
the U.S. and its allies in the way they wield 
such deterrence, if they choose to wield it at 
all. The lawful range of diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic 
instruments of national power should be 
considered and employed. These instruments 
are not limited to just offensive or defensive 
counterspace or space control activities, 
though preparing for destructive space-based 
combat activities must be carefully considered 
and generally deferred given the risks such 
conflict presents to the very space 
environment the U.S. wishes to protect. 
Nevertheless, preparing to employ a complete 
suite of these instruments “would signal to any 
adversary considering U.S. space systems as a 
legitimate target that the U.S. has the means 
and resolve to respond if it so chooses.”155 
Preparing for the lawful use of U.S. and allied 
retaliatory measures can encourage or, if 
necessary, compel offender reconsideration of 
its course of action and compliance to 
international morays or legal obligations if 
engagement cannot succeed. 
                                                 
155See John B. Sheldon, “Space Power and Deterrence: Are 
We Serious,” Marshall Institute Policy Outlook (November 
2008): 3-4. 
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Important, but lost on many who seek to 
contest the space domain, a retaliatory 
deterrence strategy for the U.S. has little 
credibility if directed at adversary space assets 
since the U.S. “…is the most space-reliant 
country today. Threatening to attack adversary 
satellites in response to attacks on U.S. 
systems may prove fruitless if the adversary in 
question does not leverage significant 
military, diplomatic, and economic power 
through such systems…”156 Presently, the U.S. 
is the only globally space-enabled power, so 
adversary spaceborne components probably 
should not be engaged tit-for-tat.157 Such 
would only be a pyrrhic act. This may change 
as other nations gain the wherewithal, 
experience, and access to space capabilities 
and fully exploit them for military purposes. 
 
Non-aggressive weaponization of space is 
legal as is the use of force in self-defense 
against space systems components whether in 
space or the terrestrial environment. Treaty 
and U.S. policy allows developing and 
deploying systems designed to protect 
satellites, or defeat ASAT and strategic threats 
(e.g., ICBMs). Employing a weapon system in 
self-defense to engage targets, whether 
ground, air, or space-based, if accomplished in 
such a way the combat event does not create 
space debris, and is targeted in accord with 
LOAC principles, appear to be lawful under 
current treaty and customary law. Jamming 
technologies can be employed to deny 
adversary access to space and protect 
spacecraft, and their effects may be reversible 
                                                 
                                                
156Ibid. 
157Joint Publication 3-14, 6 January 2009, p. II-5. Negation 
includes “Active and offensive measures to deceive, disrupt, 
deny, degrade, or destroy an adversary’s space capabilities. 
Negation includes actions against ground, data link, user, 
and/or space segment(s) of an adversary’s space systems and 
services, or any other space system or service used by an 
adversary that is hostile to U.S. national interests.” Also, see 
the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy which states: “…the 
U.S. will …deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space 
capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” 
and not contaminate the environment. SSA 
and other sensor systems, command and 
control, and shooter capabilities may not be 
powerful and nuanced enough over the near-
term to achieve all the results needed and 
desired. That may change as space control 
technologies evolve. 
 
In the event of war, the U.S. and its allies may 
defend components of their space systems that 
are subject to jamming and cyber attack since 
such attacks can be considered armed attacks 
in a modern context. In doing so, they must 
accurately determine the source of the attack 
and confirm adversary state or non-state actors 
intended to target the system at issue and 
cause destructive effects. The U.S. should be 
able to treat certain adversary satellites and 
supporting systems as legitimate targets only 
after ensuring that satellite’s loss would not 
excessively harm civilians or the space 
environment, or violate other peremptory 
norms. The U.S. response must be necessary 
and proportional; not more than that amount 
necessary to accomplish military objectives to 
defeat adversary forces and to achieve the 
enemy’s partial or complete submission. 
 
Attacks against adversary NTMs capabilities 
should be avoided as attacking them could 
violate peremptory norms to take all actions 
necessary to prevent nuclear war, ensure 
compliance with nuclear weapons arms 
control agreements, and prevent attacks by 
weapons of mass destruction. On the other 
hand, the U.S may lawfully respond to attacks 
against its own national NTMs and nuclear 
command and control capabilities under rules 
relating to self-defense and, if necessary, 
reprisal.158 
 
 
158Reprisals are acts taken in response to LOAC violations. 
Such an act of reprisal would be otherwise forbidden if it was 
not for the prior unlawful act of the enemy. A lawful act of 
reprisal cannot be the basis for a counter-reprisal. To be 
lawful, a reprisal must: timely respond to grave and 
manifestly (clearly) unlawful acts; be for the purpose of 
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Conflict involving space systems need not be 
space-based. In defending its systems, the 
U.S. could lawfully use existing terrestrially-
based military systems to defeat and/or 
prevent adversary weapons from entering 
space, or from being successfully operated 
there. Adversary ground control stations could 
be engaged and command and control 
linkages interrupted, reduced, or destroyed. 
 
If facts establishing conditions of immediacy 
and necessity to U.S and allied systems are 
satisfied, anticipatory self-defense actions 
could be undertaken. The goal of such 
anticipatory self-defense actions could involve 
targeting the enemy’s systems before and 
during launch. Jammers could also be located, 
degraded, and destroyed; e.g., GPS jammers 
were engaged and destroyed during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom by GPS-aided Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions described as precision 
guided munitions or “smart bombs.” Spacelift 
facilities could also be engaged to disable 
adversary launch capabilities. 
 
The U.S. is obligated to protect the space 
environment. Obligations imposed by the 
Outer Space and Environment Modification 
treaties, Liability Convention, and other 
agreements, and physical reality, make it 
politically wise, and immensely practical to 
keep space safe and usable. As the nation that 
exploits space capabilities to their maximum 
extent, the U.S. has the most to lose if the 
domain is compromised and lost to unwise 
operations or conflict. Self-defense acts that 
seek to or actually damage the space 
 
 
                                                
compelling the adversary to observe the LOAC and not for 
revenge, spite, or punishment; give reasonable notice that 
reprisals will be taken; have had other reasonable means 
attempted to secure compliance; be directed against the 
personnel or property of an adversary; be proportional to the 
original violation; be publicized; be authorized by national 
authorities at the highest political level. Only the President of 
the U.S., as Commander-in-Chief, may authorize U.S. forces 
to take such actions. 
environment for extended periods may be 
impermissible; hence, the U.S. must observe 
the obligation to avoid and minimize the 
creation of debris when operating defensive 
space weapons. “Soft-kill weapons that 
disable are clearly acceptable and favored if 
weapons need to be employed against space 
based components. Explosive weapons, such 
as space mines surrounding satellites, are not, 
especially since they can create significant 
space debris.”159 Given the potential for 
resulting debris, taking action to destroy or 
damage adversary space systems “may violate 
the duty to avoid the harmful contamination of 
space” except in the most pressing 
circumstance.160 
 
The U.S. is the global leader in space and has 
filled this role for half a century. Its systems 
work and have been revolutionary in 
presenting new capabilities in the civil, 
commercial, and military arenas. As it has 
done for decades, the U.S. enjoys a unique 
position to shape the direction of global space 
activities for this new century. With this 
position comes great responsibility – to forge 
behaviors to mitigate space debris, prevent 
armed conflict, and enhance the peace, 
security, and prosperity of spacefaring nations 
and the rest of the world. Space capabilities 
are at risk to a myriad of threats, but continued 
efforts to improve space governance by 
international treaties, customary law, best 
practices, policy, strategy, and overarching 
global behaviors will secure the high frontier. 
 
159Adam E. Frey, “Defense of U.S. Space Assets: A Legal 
Perspective,” Air & Space Power Journal (Winter 2008). 
160Ibid. 
 The New Space Order: Why Space Power Matters for Europe 
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More than fifty years since the dawn of the 
Space Age and twenty years since the end of 
the Cold War, space affairs and politics 
remain interlinked. Space activities are 
increasingly tied to national power for major 
world powers, and political objectives are still 
the driving force for most space activities. Yet 
in an ever more globalized and competitive 
multipolar world, status and power that arise 
from the employment and access to the most 
advanced technologies are now widely 
perceived as key to the powers and standings 
of states. The importance of space activities is 
increasing, transitioning in terms of perception 
by today’s world leaders from a “nice to have” 
to a “need to have” status. A sound 
understanding of the nature and exploitation 
of space power is critical for Europe as it 
provides tangible and intangible benefits back 
on Earth that allow Europe to maintain its 
position in the global “space hierarchy” in the 
21st Century. 
 
The world, since the end of the Cold War, is 
increasingly interlinked and interdependent at 
many levels. At the same time, the balance of 
powers across the world is changing and 
shifting with emerging world powers rising, 
particularly in Asia. This is complicated by 
the fact that there exists a renewed emphasis 
and importance accorded by states on spheres 
of influence based on geography or on topical 
issues. In particular, a greater importance is 
placed on a country’s ability to innovate as a 
source of competitive advantage. The world is 
becoming at the same time both “flat” and 
“spiky.”1 Science and Technology (S&T) 
                                                 
 
                                                
1A “flat” world implies that the world is more globalized and 
interconnected. See Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A 
prowess is one of the key elements of this 
emerging flat/spiky system of competitive 
multipolarity. Governments are fully engaged 
in improving their national economies and 
overall competitiveness, but also because they 
realize that it represents for them a means, 
among others, for achieving national 
objectives, including foreign policy motives, 
especially in the domain of “S&T politics,” 
such as nuclear energy, but also in the area of 
space affairs. 
 
In the early years of the Space Age, the 
performances of the United States (U.S) and 
Soviet Union in space activities came to be 
interpreted as a 
measure of their 
relative military, 
economic, and 
scientific strength 
on the world 
stage. During the 
Cold War, human 
and robotic space accomplishments became on 
the geopolitical level an element of a 
country’s power and influence. Space, since 
the 1950s, is a key attribute of a state’s power. 
However, since the 1990s, the space context is 
dramatically evolving. Similar to the process 
of internationalization of innovation, space 
activities are expanding beyond the traditional 
The world is 
becoming at 
the same time 
both “flat” and 
“spiky.” 
 
 
Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2005). A “spiky” world suggests that by almost any 
measure the international landscape is not at all flat. On the 
contrary, the world is spiky with concentrated centers of 
power, influence, economic horsepower and cutting-edge 
innovation. See Richard Florida, “The World is Spiky,” The 
Atlantic Monthly, October 2005. 
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spacefaring countries2 to new global players, 
such as China and India, as well as other 
emerging countries, with changing patterns of 
international space relations leading to a new 
space order. 
 
In this evolving geopolitical context, the 
importance of space power is increasing as 
space remains a proxy demonstrating power 
and because more actors are using space. 
Although there is a great deal of rhetoric about 
the impact of S&T on international affairs, 
there is relatively little analytical work on the 
link between space and national power, as 
well as between space power and international 
affairs. This paper aims to provide a 
preliminary overview of a complex and wide-
ranging subject that brings together the 
important issue of space power and European 
influence in international relations. 
 
 
Towards a New Space Order 
 
Since the pioneering of space activities, the 
geopolitical context of space affairs changed 
dramatically.3 The history of space activities 
can be structured into three phases, each 
having distinct features and characteristics: (1) 
“proto-space age” (pre-World War II); (2) 
“Space 1.0” (Cold War); and (3) “Space 2.0” 
(post-Cold War).4 
 
Space 1.0 took place from the late 1950s to 
the late 1980s. For more than three decades, 
space was viewed as one of the emblematic 
                                                 
                                                
2The term spacefaring country defines a country capable of 
developing, launching, and operating satellites in space 
autonomously. This implies the state possesses a fairly robust 
launch infrastructure and indigenous capabilities to 
manufacture and operate space systems. 
3Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space 
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109. 
4Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
elements of the Cold War rivalry between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union, principally as a 
substitute for armed conflict.5 During this 
phase, space activities were limited to a small 
number of other countries, primarily in Europe 
and Asia, but with 
more limited 
capabilities than the 
two superpowers. 
Indeed, the technical 
difficulties and 
financial burdens 
associated with the 
full range of space 
activities remained 
prohibitive for most 
countries; only a limited number of countries 
were able to benefit from the use of space 
technologies and activities due to the inherent 
technical complexity, high costs associated 
with space activities, and the necessity for a 
high-skilled workforce. 
…the 
importance of 
space power is 
increasing as 
space remains 
a proxy 
demonstrating 
power...
 
The current space phase, Space 2.0, which 
started at the beginning of the 1990s as a 
result of the changing geopolitical context 
linked to the end of the Cold War, is 
characterized by a multipolar world and the 
rise of many new actors with increasing 
technical capabilities, advancing an 
internationalization of space.6 In particular, a 
technological revolution linked to the 
development of small satellite technology, the 
increasing reliability and accessibility of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, 
and the multiplication of commercial services 
leading to a reduction of the price of access to 
space facilitate the involvement of non-
traditional actors in the space arena.7 
Countries previously unable to pursue space 
activities now have a greater opportunity to 
 
5Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space 
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid. 
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enter the space arena; the space environment 
is no longer the exclusive province of a 
handful number of countries as it was during 
the Cold War. 
 
Spacefaring powers are joined by other 
countries that have some degree of space 
involvement. An increasing number of 
countries have acquired over the years space 
capabilities for national reasons (e.g., support 
national economy and overall 
competitiveness, public services, and ensure 
national security), as well as international 
reasons (e.g., regional influence and prestige). 
They recognize the advantages of space 
activities from the tangible aspects of 
positioning-navigation-timing (PNT), remote 
sensing, and telecommunications to the more 
abstract aspects of political influence and 
prestige. There are tangible benefits that result 
from investing in space, such as job creation; 
stimulation of national interest in Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
(STEM); and spin-off technologies resulting 
from research and development (R&D). There 
are intangible benefits as well – a successful 
space program brings heightened global 
prestige and increased domestic credibility 
and prowess. 
 
While few countries have independent launch 
capability (nine total), and even less have 
human spaceflight capabilities (three total), 
the number of players controlling their own 
communications systems have doubled since 
the end of the 1980s.8 There are, as of 
December 2009, 27 countries with satellite-
based Earth observation resources compared 
with three in 1980, not to mention the 
numerous countries that have their own image 
receiving stations for remote sensing systems.9 
                                                 
                                                
8Bertrand de Montluc, “The New International Political and 
Strategic Context for Space Policies,” Space Policy 25 
(2009): 20-28. 
9Ibid. 
The multiplication of actors in the post Cold 
War context is accompanied by an emerging 
globalization of space activities with actors 
now scattered all over the world and no longer 
limited to the “North.”10 The multipolar space 
environment and the resulting new space order 
is characterized by the rapid integration of 
China and India as new space powers, and the 
entry of countries 
particularly from the 
“South,” like 
Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Indonesia.11 
New ambitions to 
create dedicated 
space agencies are 
surfacing on all 
continents and more 
countries are 
formulating space 
policy to guide their domestic and 
international space activities with the principal 
aim being to improve their capabilities and 
competitiveness.12 
…a successful 
space program 
brings 
heightened 
global prestige 
and increased 
domestic 
credibility and 
prowess. 
 
10It is important to note that national organization of space 
activities and the weight of national budgets differ greatly 
among countries around the world. Not all countries involved 
in space activities do posses a national space agency, and the 
national authorities responsible for space matters vary widely. 
A first category is composed of countries with their own 
agencies devoted more or less exclusively to space. In a 
second category, space affairs are directly handled by a 
ministry (education, research and technology, industry or 
trade, defense, etc.) or by an inter-ministerial entity. See 
Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space 
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109. 
11The use of the term “South” refers to all developing 
countries, as well as all Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It 
rests on the fact that the entire world’s industrially developed 
countries (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand) 
lie to the North of developing countries. However, the 
diversity of countries in the South must be kept in mind. 
Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea have enviable records 
of technical and scientific achievements compared to others in 
the South and even the North. 
12Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
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As a reflection of the international system, the 
current space environment is characterized by 
a growing number of countries with varying 
ranges of space capabilities (e.g., technical 
and scientific). This, in turn, is leading to 
more options for international cooperation in 
the second space 
phase as there is a 
growing pool of 
potential partners to 
take part in space 
activities.13 States 
around the world are 
now looking to a variety of partners as they 
plan their future endeavors since partnerships 
are helpful to transfer technologies and 
explicit and tacit knowledge. Those 
partnerships are driven by scientific and 
technical motives, often with “high politics” 
as objectives. There is a mushrooming of 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 
including regional cooperation, and there is 
the development of a complex and 
multidimensional web of relations in the space 
arena.14 
 
A bipolar space world has been replaced by a 
pluralistic space context marked by a plethora 
of complex relationships. The early years of 
international space cooperation were 
characterized by power asymmetries in the 
two superpower’s favor vis-à-vis their partners 
as illustrated with U.S.-European space 
relations. However, the traditional asymmetry 
in space activities, while still existing in term 
of resources, tends to disappear in regard to 
capabilities with the emergence of spacefaring 
countries with similar capabilities to the 
historical two space powers, the U.S. and 
                                                 
                                                
13International cooperation in space can be defined as any 
sharing of knowledge or technology between two, or more, 
states within the context of mutually acceptable conventions 
for the exchange of that knowledge or technology. It can take 
many forms, but in general both parties can derive benefits. 
14Nicolas Peter, “The Changing Geopolitics of Space 
Activities,” Space Policy 22 (2006): 100-109. 
Soviet Union/Russia. Roles and relationships 
in space are being redefined in the new space 
order. The U.S. and Russia are no longer the 
only players that can lead cooperative 
projects. There are now numerous actors with 
varying degrees of capabilities allowing them 
to lead cooperative ventures as well. There is a 
mushrooming 
of bilateral and 
multilateral 
cooperation…. 
 
The patterns of relations in space are 
fundamentally changing. There is now a 
variety of cooperation possibilities leading to 
new relations evolving beyond the traditional 
“North-North” cooperation and the unilateral 
“North-South” axes of cooperation of the first 
space phase. The new axes of “South-South” 
cooperation has been growing in recent years 
in many fields, such as in energy, and space is 
no exception as they are now more countries 
from the South with mature technical 
capabilities that are using space to reach out to 
new partners. This leads to the development of 
new networks of cooperation as there are 
cooperation possibilities with new hubs and 
centers of gravity 
appearing in Asia 
and centered on 
China and India. 
New axes of 
cooperation are 
arising; some are 
deepening, while 
others are 
weakening.15 The 
multiplication of 
space actors and 
the new relations among institutional entities 
are leading to the emergence of a new space 
order that was unforeseeable twenty years ago. 
…being involved 
in space affairs is 
increasingly being 
seen… as a 
necessary 
element to being, 
at a minimum, a 
regional or 
continental power. 
 
In the current phase of space activities, there is 
also a growing diversity in the types of actors 
involved in space affairs that influences the 
overall space context. The involvement of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
 
15Ibid. 
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other non-state actors, like private enterprises, 
are leading to a multiplicity of actors and 
stakeholders in the space environment. 
Dozens of companies offer services in open 
global markets and states can now meet much 
of their need for space benefits in the market 
place due to the wide array of 
communications, navigation, reconnaissance, 
weather satellite, and launch services 
commercially available. Commercial 
technology and know-how transfers have 
made possible the global distribution of space 
technologies. The declining price, widening 
availability of satellite construction, and space 
launch capabilities allow an ever growing 
number of states to establish a presence in 
space. While to date only a few states have 
mastered the full range of space capabilities, 
the proliferation of space products and 
services are allowing states, and non-state 
actors, to benefit from the advantages 
provided by space activities without 
developing, launching, and operating 
indigenous space systems. Private companies 
of traditional space powers are the main 
drivers in this process. Also, new and 
emerging actors, as they climb the global 
“space hierarchy,” are providing new sources 
of technologies and fostering the proliferation 
of space technologies worldwide. 
 
While the internationalization of space is not 
entirely new, it is now taking place at a much 
faster pace. The space system is now more 
open and dynamic than during the Cold War. 
Space is spreading more widely, including to 
developing countries, and involves more than 
simply purchasing technologies. This trend is 
likely to progress even more rapidly over the 
coming years. This means that a country does 
not have to be a technologically advanced 
country to acquire space capabilities and this 
makes all countries potential space players. 
The asymmetric advantage the superpowers 
once enjoyed because of their space prowess 
is eroding because many countries can now, 
by partnering with other states or commercial 
entities, receive certain kinds of space support. 
 
The space context is evolving towards a new 
space order where space activities are 
becoming more widespread. However, space 
activities are prioritized differently depending 
on the country, and consequently the 
objectives of space programs differ 
accordingly. A growing number of states are 
using space programs for political and 
symbolic objectives, such as demonstrating 
and increasing national pride and to achieve 
national independence, regional influence, and 
technological maturity.16 In the current space 
phase, being involved in space affairs is 
increasingly being seen, even by newcomers 
to the space arena, as a necessary element to 
being, at a minimum, a regional or continental 
power. For world powers, space is 
increasingly perceived as an indispensable 
element of national power. The importance of 
being involved in space affairs is growing in 
the unfolding new space order, and no country 
can now be regarded as a world power, or 
remain one, unless it possess cutting-edge and 
diversified space capabilities. 
 
 
The Growing Importance 
of Space Power 
 
In recent years, with the aforementioned 
evolution of the geopolitical context, 
traditional bases of national power have been 
fundamentally transformed. Military and 
economic metrics are no longer the sole 
indicators of national power.17 Other variables 
are increasingly important, such as S&T 
prowess, and in the 21st Century the overall 
political, economic, and technological 
                                                 
16Bertrand de Montluc, “The New International Political and 
Strategic Context for Space Policies,” Space Policy 25 
(2009): 20-28 
17Herein, national power is defined as the capacity of a 
country to pursue strategic goals through purposeful action. 
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leadership of a country must be shown in 
many areas, space being one of them. 
 
Having now passed its 50th anniversary, the 
Space Age has attained a great degree of 
maturity.18 Space activities are indispensable 
tools for modern society that have proliferated 
globally. When a state seeks to garner more 
power, it is increasingly being involved in 
space affairs as this is a symbol of technology 
progress. The range and pervasiveness of 
activities in space resulted in these activities 
becoming tied, over the years, to national 
power. Space activities represent a definitive 
measuring device for the relative status of 
countries and an indicator of a state’s weight 
and influence on the global scene.  
 
Concomitantly, the proliferation of space 
capabilities in recent years has not elevated 
every country into the spacefaring category. 
Only a certain number of attributes confer this 
status: access to space and the ability to 
pursue activities autonomously. Nonetheless, 
a sound understanding of the nature and 
exploitation of space power is necessary 
because it has consequences and profound 
implications, both domestically and 
internationally, and gives additional overall 
national power to a state as space provides for 
soft power projection.19 
 
The body of space power literature lacks a 
single comprehensive theory that thoughtfully 
defines, explains, and predicts the nature, 
significance, and functioning of space 
                                                 
18Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
d, sea, and 
ir. 
                                                
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
19Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
power.20 According to Colin Gray, “space 
power suffers from an unusual malady: an 
acute shortage of space-focused strategic 
theory and the lack of 
a binding organizing 
concept to aid 
understanding of what 
it is all about.”21 
Nevertheless, there is 
no void of space 
power theory. There 
are numerous 
proposed space power 
theories, but none has 
achieved consensus in 
the space community; 
more than five 
decades since the first 
steps into space, there is no definitive work on 
space theory comparable to the writings of 
Clausewitz, Mahan, and Mitchell among 
others in their respective fields.22 Space power 
still lacks a holistic approach and its elements 
remain disjointed and embryonic in 
comparison to other domains of lan
Space power 
is not simply 
satellites and 
access to 
space; it is 
anything and 
everything a 
country can 
achieve 
through 
space.
a
 
One of the most pervasive elements 
confronting the space community is the lack 
of common vocabulary. The need for a solid 
definitional construct is of pivotal importance 
to develop a better understanding of the 
practice of space power, including its potential 
and its implications. While different 
definitions emphasize different aspects, no 
definition covers all aspects of the actors, 
capabilities, functions, and purposes of space 
 
20Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
21Colin Gray, “The Influence of Space Power Upon History,” 
Comparative Strategy 15 (1996): 293-308. 
22Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
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power. The most common definition is one 
from the work of Lupton. He defines space 
power as the “the ability of a nation to exploit 
the space environment in pursuit of national 
goals and purposes, and includes the entire 
stronautical capabilities of the nation.”23 
  as 
 well as political leverage it 
as garnered.”24 
                                                
a
 
Yet this definition does not capture some 
important realities of the emerging space 
order. Space power can
the “total strength and 
ability of a state to 
conduct and influence 
activities to, in, 
through, and from 
space to achieve its 
goals and objectives 
(security, economic, 
and political) to affect 
desired outcomes in 
the presence of other 
actors on the world stage, and if necessary, to 
change the behavior of others by exploiting 
space systems and associated ground 
infrastructure as
be defined herein
h
 
This definition is inclusive of the essential 
elements for any definition of space power. It 
focuses on states as the main space actors, on 
national objectives, the use of space as a 
medium distinct from other media, and the use 
of capabilities that are required by the space 
medium. Space power is about the 
exploitation of the space environment, and the 
purpose of that exploitation is to achieve some 
national objectives or purposes. It is the ability 
to use space to get desired outcomes by 
influencing the environment and the behavior 
 
l objectives through the use 
f space affairs.25 
rything a country 
an achieve through space.26 
                                                
23David Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine 
(Air University Press, 1988). 
24Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
of others. In other words, space power is the 
pursuit of nationa
o
 
Space power has the potential to provide 
significant contributions to the political and 
strategic objectives of governments that 
undertake space activities. It can, for instance, 
support a country’s overall national power and 
international standing. Space power alone, 
however, cannot ensure the attainment of 
terrestrial political objectives; it must be 
combined with other power elements. 
Nonetheless, space power is a major element 
of national power, and it is becoming a 
strategic concern for many countries. Space 
power is not simply satellites and access to 
space; it is anything and eve
…as long as
there is not 
major con
the most 
important
of space 
power is 
 
flict, 
 form 
non-
military. 
c
 
The foundations of space power range from 
obvious hardware elements (e.g., launch sites; 
launch vehicles, telemetry, tracking, and 
communications sites; on-orbit satellites; and 
other spacecraft), to socioeconomic elements 
(e.g., human capital), and to political and 
regulatory elements (e.g., number of seats in 
international organizations and other relevant 
bodies).27 Spacefaring countries possess 
inherent attributes of space power. Any state’s 
approach to space power depends on its 
perception of the strategic environment and its 
position relative to other space actors, and the 
inherent value of space power depends on 
what it allows you to do. Moreover, a 
spacefaring country can be a major actor in 
domains linked with space activities (e.g., 
 
25Ibid. 
26Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
27Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
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technical and scientific activities), but this 
does not necessarily imply that this actor 
possesses the complete spectrum of space 
activities or that this actor can exercise space 
ower to its maximum.28 
ngible and intangible space power benefits. 
 standing in the global “space 
ierarchy.” 
 (2) economic; 
) military; and (4) cultural.30 
space capabilities illustrating an assertive 
                                                
p
 
Not all states have developed similar space 
capabilities (space is also spiky) and there 
exist gradations of advantage. It is necessary 
that a country fully demonstrate “political 
will” and develop the attendant national policy 
and strategy to exploit the elements of space 
power. Space policies and programs when 
well conceived, linked, and executed provide 
ta
 
There are different elements in the space 
power continuum with a complex interaction 
between civilian, economic, and military 
programs and assets, as well as soft, 
economic, and hard powers.29 Space power is 
multidimensional and demarcated by 
scientific, political, economic, and geopolitical 
dimensions. Exercising space power conveys 
a variety of benefits to space actors, such as 
national and international prestige, military 
advantage, economic competitiveness, and 
scientific and technical prowess. It also 
demonstrates the willingness of a state to 
increase its
h
 
Using the traditional four effects of national 
power, the impacts of space power can be 
categorized as: (1) diplomatic;
(3
 
1. Space power is a means of impressing the 
world through the possession of elaborate 
                                                 
28Ibid. 
29Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
30Ibid. 
global position that allows influence in the 
international context. 
2. Space power allows for the development 
of a highly skilled technological workforce 
and a dynamic industrial base that are both 
critical for a country’s economic 
competitiveness. 
3. Space power can be used as a pressure 
point to support political decisions since it 
can be an element to dissuade targeted 
players of hostile actions and can also be 
used to apply force. 
4. Space power can help to promote 
awareness of a common identity among 
citizens and demonstrate increased 
confidence in future capabilities. 
 
There is no general hierarchy of these 
attributes since they do not exist in isolation 
from one another and various traits are tied 
together.31 Space power leverages different 
elements and is a foundation for a state’s total 
power capability and, by its very nature, 
enables the exercise of influence over a broad 
spectrum of areas. The relative value of space 
power depends on how much an actor uses 
them and for what. Space power can be 
applied in different ways. It can provide direct 
benefits to the owner of space assets, but it 
can also be used to encourage and reward 
others, dissuade targeted players, and 
ultimately, it can be used to apply force. All of 
these demonstrate the flexibility and 
versatility of space power.32 
 
While the arguments over possible theories of 
space power continue, space power is being 
exercised by all spacefaring countries, 
purposefully or not. Today, space power is 
inseparable from all other forms of power due 
 
31Ibid. 
32Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
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to the ubiquitous and pervasive nature of 
space activities. There are, however, only a 
few historical examples of the utilization of 
space power to date. This short history of 
space exploitation limits the evidentiary base 
from which cogent conclusions can be drawn. 
For example, only since the first U.S.-led Gulf 
War are there examples of the utilization of 
space power to support hard power (e.g., crisis 
in Yugoslavia, and the current conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan). Despite this limited set of 
historical evidence, space power is an 
important reality. Also, as long as there is not 
major conflict, the most important form of 
space power is non-military. For space power, 
soft power and economic power are just as 
important as hard power. Space power has 
profound implications both domestically and 
around the world in terms of the credibility of 
a country’s capabilities, and it provides both 
symbolic and political advantages that are 
beyond quantifiable material benefits. 
 
 
Space Power 
and International Relations 
 
The competition for status and global 
influence in many different domains remains a 
key feature of today’s multipolar and 
heterogeneous international scene. With the 
recognition in recent decades of the increasing 
role played by S&T for innovation and 
economic development, more dedicated 
policies are implemented throughout the world 
to reinforce, protect, and enhance national 
technological capabilities. Governments from 
all over the world recognize the importance of 
S&T as a critical element contributing towards 
the development and implementation of strong 
economic, political, national, security, and 
social future of any country. They also 
recognize that S&T can provide external 
advantages at the international level as S&T 
prowess contributes to diplomatic leadership, 
creates respect in the international community, 
and raises the attractiveness of a country for 
partnerships. 
 
Governments initiate or participate in 
international S&T cooperative ventures for a 
number of scientific or technological reasons 
that have been well documented. International 
S&T agreements are also used by policy-
makers to serve foreign policy purposes; the 
signing of an international S&T agreement 
between governments or international 
organizations can indicate a willingness to 
improve relations among countries, leading to 
broader cooperation. S&T activities are often 
used to establish a network of international 
partnerships to attract other countries in 
someone’s sphere of influence or reinforce 
existing relations as there are diplomatic gains 
to be made through partnerships. Many 
countries are using S&T as a political tool to 
reach non-traditional partners to build trusting 
relationships across political borders as 
international cooperation in S&T allows 
countries to engage in a public diplomacy of 
deeds/actions and not just words. 
 
S&T diplomacy – defined here as scientific 
and technological cooperation and 
engagement with the explicit intent of 
building positive relationships with foreign 
governments – has played an important, often 
underappreciated, role in the foreign policy of 
world powers over the past fifty years. 
International cooperation in S&T has been 
growing steadily since World War II and can 
now be considered the biggest contemporary 
axis of civilian governmental cooperation.33 
Eugene Skolnikoff notes that these two 
systems, foreign policy and S&T, operate in 
an international environment that is 
increasingly overlapping and this aspect of the 
relationship continues to converge in recent 
                                                 
33Nicolas Peter, “Towards the Emergence of EU Space 
Diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107. 
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years.34 Increasingly, foreign policy contains 
issues with a scientific component and science 
grows more international in space.35 Large-
scale space projects are emblematic domains 
in which S&T is mobilized to serve foreign 
policy. 
 
While S&T cooperation developed, until 
recently, largely independently of formal 
foreign policy objectives, for space this is a 
different. Space activities, since the beginning 
of the Space Age, are a tool for foreign policy 
used to directly 
achieve diplomatic 
objectives and to 
gather information 
on geopolitical 
events of concern 
(e.g., monitoring a 
crisis). There is also 
an element of soft 
power to reach out 
to partners and to 
impress others.36 With the exception of 
scientific research or technology development 
missions, activities in space are no longer an 
end in-and-of-themselves, but a means for 
accomplishing other national objectives.37 
 
The role of “space in foreign policy” and of 
“foreign policy in space” is intricate. Space 
assets are not only the eyes and ears of 
governments and allow monitoring events 
around the world, but they also allow 
                                                 
34Eugene Skolnikoff, The Elusive Transformation: Science, 
Technology and the Evolution of International Politics 
(Princeton University Press, 1994). 
35Caroline Wagner, “The Elusive Partnership: Science and 
Foreign Policy,” Science and Public Policy 29 (2002): 409-
417. 
36Space assets have the potential to affect the behavior of an 
international actor by prestige projection, technology 
partnerships, access to space services, industry services, 
information exchange, and legal development among other 
factors. 
37While space agencies are not responsible for making foreign 
policy, they play an important role in foreign policy’s 
execution through international engagement. 
governments to influence outcomes. Space 
activities enable states to wield other 
instruments of national power with greater 
precision, timeliness, and effectiveness. Space 
activities blur the lines between domestic and 
international affairs due to their very 
international nature and due to the fact that 
domestic policies impact the global scene. 
Space affairs are an extension of the terrestrial 
political environment. 
 
From a political point of view, space is rich 
with complex political and strategic 
relationships. Space affairs are an instrument 
of superpower status since the launch of 
Sputnik in 1957, and space power during the 
Cold War was a key aspect of the international 
system where countries jockeyed for position 
and global influence. Space power enhanced, 
for example, the Soviet Union’s prestige by 
being first to launch an artificial satellite or 
the prestige of the United States by being the 
first to land humans on the Moon. Those 
achievements suggested that success in space 
were the luxuries of an advanced state – the 
product of the intellectual, engineering, and 
manufacturing elite of the country – and they 
became landmarks in the Cold War race for 
prestige and power demonstration. 
Space assets 
are not only the 
eyes & ears of 
governments…
they also allow 
governments to 
influence 
outcomes. 
 
Space put forward a new criterion to 
determine the global hierarchy along with 
nuclear power status. Space affairs, from the 
dawn of the Space Age, represent a measure 
of national prestige and are an indicator of a 
county’s influence on the global scene. The 
spread of space capabilities and the rise of 
new spacefaring countries are now factors 
woven into existing patterns of international 
affairs. Geography is one of the bedrocks of 
international politics, like the board of a chess 
game. Space is bringing a novel redistribution 
of power, which reduces the importance of 
proximity and endows non-state actors with 
high levels of power. It is hard to imagine a 
strategic actor performing well in the 21st 
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Century without being engaged in space and 
understanding and taking into account space 
power. At the same time, the utilization of the 
space environment presents new 
vulnerabilities, as well as the opportunities 
discussed herein, for actors on the 
international scene. 
 
Given the growing diversity and heterogeneity 
of the international system, one of the 
currencies of international relations is 
legitimacy in the eyes of both governments 
and citizens across the world. In this context, 
emblematic and ambitious space activities are 
an indispensable tool as it projects a high level 
of S&T capabilities and prowess used to 
demonstrate national power at home and 
abroad. With the on-going internationalization 
and globalization of space affairs, no country 
will be regarded as a world power, or remain a 
world power, unless it possesses cutting-edge 
and diversified space capabilities. 
 
Space affairs are a currency to judge the 
standing of a state vis-à-vis neighbors and 
peers, and this is expected to remain so for the 
foreseeable future. Consequently, the ability to 
exercise space power will grow in importance. 
Space power alone cannot, however, ensure 
the attainment of political objectives. In 
conjunction with other forms of conventional 
power, space power can be of strategic value 
and benefit. Space power is a significant 
dimension of power 
in international 
relations and it is an 
important reality. 
Exercising space 
power on the 
international scene 
gives the ability to 
build international consensus by bringing 
recognition, by primacy and authority, on the 
part of other members of the international 
space community. 
Europe in the Unfolding 
New Space Order 
 
There is a wide range of reasons why 
governments engage in space activities. The 
basic justifications are different among 
countries at different times. For instance, the 
“space race” between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union was mainly driven by the willingness to 
demonstrate technological capability for 
national security reasons and to promote 
national prestige. In contrast to the two 
superpowers’ space activities, European space 
activities were initially driven by scientific 
common endeavors and motives. 
 
In Europe, space was originally dealt with by 
individual countries. But as early as 1959, the 
results of Europe’s nuclear research facility 
(The European Organization for Nuclear 
Research, know as CERN) introduced a new 
model for space activities in Europe.38 
Subsequent discussions among European 
stakeholders led to the creation of the 
European Launcher Development 
Organization (ELDO) in 1964, the European 
Space Research Organization (ESRO) in 
1964, and the European Space Agency (ESA) 
in 1975 by combining the two aforementioned 
organizations. Since then, ESA is the 
intergovernmental agency responsible for 
coordinating the collective, multinational 
European space program.39 
 
Space is 
bringing a 
novel 
redistribution 
of power... 
ESA’s contribution to the development of a 
collective European space capability is 
fundamental. The European space sector is 
now entering a new institutional evolution 
with the emergence of the European Union 
                                                 
38Kazuto Suzuki, Policy Logics and Institutions of European 
Space Collaboration (Ashgate Publishing, 2003). 
39There are several other organizations with limited 
responsibilities for specific collective activity, including, for 
example, the European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat) for operational 
meteorology. 
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(EU) as a space actor.40 The EU realized in the 
1990s that space can provide support for a 
host of its activities, and that space activities 
serve policy objectives and deliver substantial 
strategic, social, economic, and commercial 
benefits to the EU, its member states, and its 
citizens.41 European space activities are 
mainly conducted within a framework of 
collaborative space endeavors, as well as in 
the context of national space programs serving 
particular political, economic, and security 
purposes. 
 
There is a complex intertwining of national 
interests together with a growing 
consciousness of the need for greater 
cooperation at a continental level. The 
European space landscape is split into three 
distinct levels: (1) the overall European level 
with the EU; (2) intergovernmental 
organizations, like ESA and the European 
Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (Eumetsat); and (3) 
national space agencies. The recent entry 
(December 2009) 
into force of the 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union 
(TFEU), known as 
the Lisbon Treaty, 
enshrines space 
policy as an EU 
“shared policy.” It gives a clear mandate to the 
European Commission to exercise its right of 
reinforcing the momentum of the European 
Space Policy embodied in Space Council 
                                                 
                                                
40Nicolas Peter, “Towards the Emergence of EU Space 
Diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107. 
41In the late 1990s, the EU started its first two major space 
programs: the global navigation satellite system, Galileo, and 
the Earth observation system for Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES). These two flagship 
programs are the cornerstones of the current EU space 
activities. 
resolutions and endorsed by the European 
Parliament. 
 
For Europe as a whole, independent access to 
space, space applications for the benefit of 
citizens and governments, and space science 
are the traditional reasons for engaging in 
space activities. But as the EU has become 
aware of the importance of space activities for 
achieving a wide range of policy objectives, 
and as the international political significance 
of space has grown, space is now taking a 
high profile in the Union’s dialogues with 
major partners.42 The international dimension 
of civilian space activities is increasingly 
becoming a major element of the EU’s 
relations with third parties both to reinforce 
existing relations and to establish new 
partnerships through its programs that include: 
Galileo and Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES); the 
Framework Program (FP); and space 
dialogues with the United States and Russia 
and other international fora (e.g., International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities). 
The space context in which Europe will 
continue to operate is likely to evolve because 
of the emergence of new space actors being 
both users and sources of space technology. 
This does not necessarily posit a threat to 
Europe, but it needs to be reckoned with for 
the specific purpose of managing change in a 
balanced and effective way. 
The rise of 
new space 
actors is 
reshaping the 
space 
landscape. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, under the 
influence of the overall process of 
globalization, sources and distributions of 
power are being transformed in a profound 
way, and multipolarity is expected to grow in 
the future making the space context even more 
heterogeneous. Consequently, the relative 
power of various emerging space actors will 
grow as these actors influence other countries. 
 
42Nicolas Peter, “Towards the Emergence of EU Space 
Diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107. 
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This evolution will not radically alter the 
space context as did China and India recently. 
Emerging space actors will, however, have 
higher degrees of freedom to shape their space 
ties, rather than working only with the current 
spacefaring countries. New networks will 
form among states to pursue convergent goals 
and interests, and in some cases the nucleus 
will not be the traditional space powers. 
Emerging space powers will also seek greater 
leeway and autonomy to exert regional 
influence. Space has always included both 
competition and cooperation among states. 
This will not change and certain areas will not 
remain conducive to international cooperation. 
But an increasingly multipolar space order 
suggests a greater number of actors with 
whom Europe and others will have to contend 
with. Consequently, traditional spacefaring 
countries will probably find it much harder to 
set the space agenda and shape outcomes to 
their desired preferences. 
 
The new space order is becoming genuinely 
global and multipolar with growing strength in 
emerging economies and a growing 
specialization in various parts of the world 
leading to greater overall system complexity. 
Legitimacy is expected to remain in the 
foreseeable future the hard currency of 
international space relations, possibly the most 
important asset to ensure long-term success of 
specific initiatives. Needless to say, unilateral 
action will always be an option for 
spacefarers, notably in the context of national 
objectives. Yet spacefaring countries do not, 
by and large, work in isolation. But the search 
for agreement in defining the international 
space agenda might prove more complicated, 
and thus, in the new space order, partnerships 
and cooperation will become more important 
in confronting many of the challenges of the 
international system. International leadership 
and cooperation will be necessary to face 
global challenges (e.g., climate change and to 
engage in long-term exploration of the solar 
system), and consequently, space power is 
essential for Europe now and in the future. 
 
The rise of new space actors is reshaping the 
space landscape. The U.S., Russia, and 
Europe’s preeminence cannot be taken for 
granted. The center-of-gravity for space 
activities is already starting to shift from West 
and East to the South, and the expected rise of 
new space actors will inevitably challenge 
Europe’s position in the global “space 
hierarchy.” Those global developments will 
entail fundamental changes to the distribution 
of resources and influence with the emergence 
of new players forging closer ties at the 
regional level, leading to a shift of power and 
influence. The role and position of Europe in 
this emergent space context will evolve. 
Europe will still have a great impact on space 
affairs, but it might have less power in such a 
multipolar space context than it has enjoyed in 
the last decades. 
 
There is nothing preordained in the future 
shape of the space context and in Europe’s 
place therein. It is a matter of political 
decision, drawing on Europe’s comparative 
strengths and ambitions, and the ability to 
nurture and use space power more efficiently. 
A scenario of relative decline in the global 
“space hierarchy” will lead Europe to lose its 
flexibility in choosing between cooperative 
options and autonomy for cooperation, as well 
as remain the preferred option for partnerships 
among other states. Today, given the 
benchmark of Europe’s S&T prowess, Europe 
continues to be viewed as the space partner of 
choice by existing and emerging space 
powers, as well as by new entrants in the 
space sector. For this to persist, 
multilateralism for Europe may prove as much 
a necessity as a choice. Working with partners 
needs, nonetheless, to be turned more 
explicitly and consistently into a vehicle for 
achieving effective multilateral solutions for 
giving Europe more visibility and clout. 
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The management of international cooperation 
must change as the geography of space 
develops new peaks around the globe; if 
Europe is not positioned to exploit potential 
links with emerging space actors, it will face 
significant opportunity costs. But to enable 
Europe to best exploit its partnerships and 
opportunities, a better realization of the 
benefits of space power and clear policy 
commitments will be needed to be able to 
shape the directions of those partnerships in 
the directions of its own preferences. 
 
 
Space Power and Europe 
 
Europe is now the second largest civilian 
power in space in terms of its consolidated 
budget. Collectively, it maintains launcher, 
satellite manufacturing, and research facilities 
in the whole spectrum of space activities 
except for human spaceflight. The 
combination of European capabilities coming 
from different European actors – European 
members states, ESA, and the EU – provide 
Europe with the status of a major space 
actor.43 Europe possesses collectively critical 
technical assets (e.g., independent launch site, 
versatile launch vehicle fleet, diversified 
spacecraft, solid industry, and dynamic 
universities) and non-technical assets, such as 
high visibility in international organizations, 
like in the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), 
International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), and United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament (CD), which are all necessary 
elements to exercise space power.44 
                                                 
                                                
43Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
44Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe, in the Need for a 
Conceptual Framework,” paper presented at the 59th 
International Astronautical Congress, Glasgow, Scotland, 29 
September - 3 October 2008. 
European space programs are successful to 
date and European citizens embraced space-
based services and support into many aspects 
of their everyday lives. Europe has achieved a 
number of impressive results (e.g., world class 
launch services and telecommunications 
industry, and numerous scientific 
achievements, such as the farthest landing on 
an object in our Solar System). Space is now 
enabling many activities of the European 
economy and is a critical building block of 
Europe’s information infrastructure. It could 
therefore be concluded that because of this 
relevance and the pervasiveness of space 
activities a clear understanding of space power 
exists in Europe. 
 
They are enormous shortcomings in Europe’s 
ability to understand, develop, and exercise 
space power.45 There is no mention of space 
power in policy or strategy documents. A 
sound understanding of the nature and 
exploitation of space power is, however, 
critical for Europe in the unfolding new space 
order as Europe’s technical lead could be 
rendered less important, even where it does 
not shrink, and because of the expected 
dilution of its voice in international fora due to 
the changing space context. If Europe wishes 
to retain its space power now and in the 
future, it must better protect its interests in 
space. 
 
Europe currently enjoys a leading position in 
the global “space hierarchy,” but this might 
not last, and Europe’s ability to exercise space 
power could decrease over time. To maintain 
a leading space role and to be able to exercise 
space power, Europe must foster more 
“political will” and develop associated 
policies and strategies. This further needs to 
be complemented by a series of programmatic 
elements facilitating policy implementation. 
Access to space, a competitive industrial and 
 
45Ibid. 
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space services base, global navigation satellite 
systems (GNSS), space exploration, utilitarian 
space activities, space science, Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA), and Space 
Traffic Management (STM) are important 
building-blocks covering the whole spectrum 
of space activities as underlined in the 
European Space Policy that will allow to 
improve Europe’s ability to translate its space 
clout into greater global influence.46 These 
programmatic elements in combination 
provide Europe with greater diplomatic, 
economic, military, and cultural tools that 
enable Europe to face the challenges presented 
by the evolving new space order. 
 
So far in Europe, space activities are justified 
from the point of view of their use for 
scientific research, technological advance, and 
economic gains. The time is ripe for a change 
in the thinking on space and Europe needs to 
become more aware of the political 
dimensions of the use of space. Decisions 
should not be based only on costs and benefits 
in financial, technological, and economic 
dimensions, but should also include the 
political dimension of space, including space 
power. Space power is also an increasingly 
important component to Europe’s national 
powers, but often unnoticed. While the uses of 
space assets as military enablers are 
recognized in Europe, relatively no attention is 
given on how space assets can be used as 
elements of foreign policy and as tools of 
diplomacy. 
 
European space assets are underestimated and 
untapped for diplomatic use, and space power 
in Europe is often an underappreciated factor. 
Europe needs to better appreciate how its 
space assets and activities can be used to 
directly support its diplomatic goals. Space 
affairs should be better used by policy-makers 
in Europe to achieve greater diplomatic 
                                                 
                                                
46Ibid. 
advantage, particularly as a projection of soft 
power. Exercising space power could, for 
instance, allow Europe to influence the 
drafting of international regulations, and take 
the lead in strategic areas, such as 
environmental research and space exploration; 
it could affect as well 
the development of 
global standards and 
norms.47 A formalized 
utilization of space 
power could also allow 
Europe to remain a 
center-of-gravity in 
international relations 
by attracting the best 
partners to cooperate not only in space, but in 
other domains, therefore increasing the 
capabilities and possibilities of European 
projects. 
Space affairs 
are a highly 
symbolic 
representation 
of power and 
… national 
standing… 
 
Space will play a growing role in determining 
influence, prosperity, technological 
achievements, and security in the global 
environment of the 21st Century. If Europe 
does not contribute significantly to space, it 
abdicates a role as a major actor in world 
politics. Influence on the future of space, such 
as in the area of space governance, will be 
wielded only by those who have real space 
assets and ambitions. The challenge of space 
can be met only with a common European 
effort. Space affairs should also be raised to 
the highest political level in Europe – heads of 
State and Government – to initiate major 
breakthroughs. 
 
Quantitative and qualitative jumps in 
European space efforts are required to respond 
to the challenges outlined herein and harness 
the benefits that lie ahead. Exercising greater 
 
47Nicolas Peter, “Space Power and Europe in the 21st 
Century,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives 21, 
May 2009, http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/ 
Perspectives/espi%20perspectives%2021%20.pdf (accessed 
January 2010). 
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space power allows Europe to protect its own 
interests and strengths, while meeting the 
challenges of the multipolar space order 
currently emerging. Europe’s presence in 
space should translate into comparable 
influence, which has not always been the case. 
Europe has thus to realize that space power 
can provide support for a host of its activities 
and is a tool to serve its interests, including in 
the domain of foreign policy and soft power 
projection. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The unprecedented changes in the last decades 
have made the world an integrated and 
complex system in which space is an integral 
element. From its inception during the Cold 
War, space activities are driven by 
opportunities to serve national interests in the 
global context. With the changing geopolitics 
of space and the unfolding new space order, 
linked in particular to the internationalization 
and globalization of space activities, it is 
perceived that capacity in space technology 
has faded as a geopolitical factor as well as an 
element of national power, especially as space 
systems are more common and widespread. 
 
Nonetheless, competencies in space activities 
are not becoming irrelevant to a country’s 
international political position. On the 
contrary, almost all developed countries, and 
an increasing number of developing countries, 
feel it necessary to participate in space 
activities and develop for economic, military, 
or prestige reasons independent space 
capabilities. Space assets can help to directly 
achieve national objectives, and because of the 
close relationship between space assets and 
national power many states seek to improve 
and advance their space capabilities. 
 
In this context, Europe should avoid being 
surpassed in the emerging new space order by 
making use of space activities to maintain, and 
even advance, its position in the global “space 
hierarchy.” Europe should not create the 
impression that it is only a follower and lose 
its credibility as a reliable partner in space. 
Space affairs are a highly symbolic 
representation of power and will undoubtedly 
continue to be a persuasive method of 
demonstrating national power to the rest of the 
world. 
 
The emerging space order will help to 
determine the structures and functions of the 
international system in the next decades. 
Space power will thus be key and it is very 
important that this is understood, so that it 
may be taken advantage of in the most 
desirable and feasible way. The broader 
geopolitical implications of the space domain 
are directly dependent on how effective can 
space power be in the “means-ends” world of 
international relations. Europe needs to realize 
and develop its space 
power potential 
because what is at 
stake is the future 
agenda-setting power 
of Europe in the 
overall international 
system beyond space 
affairs, its ability to 
shape the priorities 
and timing of events, 
and its ability to 
attract the best 
partners to be able to fully benefit from 
opportunities wherever these support 
European space objectives and wider 
European policy goals. 
Europe 
currently 
enjoys a 
leading 
position in the 
global “space 
hierarchy” but 
this might not 
last… 
 
European governments must accept the fact 
that Europe’s future role and influence in 
world politics and in global markets may 
largely depend on Europe’s capacity and 
willingness to use space to develop the 
necessary technology and to build the required 
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industrial infrastructure. Europe cannot afford 
to remain vague about its objectives in the 
new space order. A strategic reflection on the 
values, interests, and goals of Europe’s space 
power in the context of its relations with other 
countries is needed. 
 
There are many impediments the European 
space community must overcome to create an 
environment where space power is valued, 
accepted, and institutionalized. In particular, 
European space stakeholders have not, up-to-
now, addressed the task of developing an 
integrated strategy for harnessing the benefits 
of space power on the international scene. The 
nexus between common values and common 
interest must be better articulated and in 
Europe they are all too often disjointed. In 
order for space power to reach its full 
potential in Europe and provide greater 
benefits, space must be recognized as a 
domain with direct and indirect implications 
for Europe, particularly at the foreign policy 
level, which is in a strategic sense no different 
from land, sea, and air mediums. 

                                                 
 
Europe and Security Issues in Space: 
The Institutional Setting 
 
Frans von der Dunk 
Professor of Space Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
 
In the current timeframe, the relevance of 
discussions on the existing use of space for 
national security purposes and the potential of 
it to be used for non-peaceful purposes are 
clearly increasing.1 As a consequence, it 
becomes more important to address the role of 
Europe as a geopolitical, albeit far from 
monolithic, entity in this context. 
 
From this perspective, the present paper 
analyzes some of the fundamental institutional 
parameters shaping the European presence in 
the space security domain, focusing on the 
two key players in space, which are truly 
European, the European Space Agency (ESA) 
and the European Union (EU).2 Interestingly, 
the starting point for both entities was that the 
security domain was a “no-go” area, a starting 
point that only over the last two decades has 
begun to erode. That is why, in addition the 
Western European Union (WEU), Europe has 
a certain role in this context, precisely from 
 
                                                
1Note that the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter, Outer Space 
Treaty or OST) only requires states to refrain from orbiting or 
otherwise placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, as 
well as to undertake activities in exploring and using outer 
space “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.” 
The phrase of “peaceful purposes” is only applied explicitly 
to the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
2ESA was established by means of the Convention for the 
Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter, ESA 
Convention); and the EU, as an overarching institutional 
structure encompassing in particular the European 
Community, was established by the Treaty on European 
Union. 
the security perspective rather than from the 
space perspective.3 
 
Even the European Community, as the most 
tightly developed “pillar” of the EU, could not 
be considered a supranational entity let alone a 
federal state. In all cases therefore, the 
individual member states of those 
organizations are still relevant as players in 
their own right. These states continue to be 
essential to determining the shape of European 
actions and approaches in the field of space 
issues, and this is even truer for the security 
domain. 
 
The resulting complicated institutional 
landscape represents the backdrop against 
which, as well as a set of crucial parameters 
within which, European policies in the area of 
space are developed. This applies to the space 
security domain, whether one takes a broad 
approach as with Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) and the handling of space debris, or a 
more limited one, focusing on international 
terrorism or the handling of export controls 
over dual-use sensitive goods.4 
 
3The Western European Union was established by means of 
the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self-Defense, Brussels, entered into force 25 
August 1948. 
4See Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” to 
United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control 
of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies,” 
Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110. 
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The European Space Agency 
 
The starting point for understanding the 
present and potential role of ESA in the wider 
context of European space security 
discussions is provided by the general 
institutional structure of the Agency. ESA, 
headquartered in Paris, France, but with 
additional establishments in a handful of other 
European countries, currently counts eighteen 
member states.5 Thus, it clearly constitutes an 
intergovernmental organization in the classical 
public international legal sense of the word. 
 
Given the complexities of European 
integration, ESA has, as of yet, no formal 
relationship with the EU beyond a number of 
cooperative agreements, of which the 
Framework Agreement is the most generic 
and broad one.6 The Framework Agreement 
does establish a joint EU-ESA Space Council, 
but this Council’s competences remain 
confined to “the coordination and facilitation 
of cooperative activities” under the 
Agreement, and thus present a forum for 
consultation and coordination of joint 
activities, not a means to impose such joint 
activities upon one or the other party.7 From 
the same perspective, the joint EU-ESA 
European Space Policy of April 2007 is a 
                                                 
                                                
5The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. In addition, non-European Canada is a long-
standing cooperating partner under a special agreement, 
whereas Hungary, Romania, and Poland qualify as European 
Cooperating States under another special agreement. 
6Framework Agreement Between the European Community 
and the European Space Agency (hereafter Framework 
Agreement), entered into force 28 May 2004. See further 
Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,” 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005): 342-344. 
7Article 8(1), Framework Agreement. See also Article 2(1), 
providing for cooperation to take place “with due regard to 
their respective tasks and responsibilities;” Article 4(1), 
calling for “compliance with its own prerogatives, legal 
instruments, and procedures” of each party; and Article 5, 
detailing the way joint initiatives could be undertaken. 
political commitment to develop a coordinated 
policy, not for establishing legal obligations 
between the two parties regarding cooperation 
activities, either in general or in particular, and 
the high-level space policy group plays its role 
in exactly that context. 
 
The Framework Agreement increased 
coordination and cooperation in policy matters 
and may well lead to the establishment of 
proper legal commitments of one party to the 
other, and/or official resignation of certain 
legal competences in deference to the other’s 
competences at some point in the future. 
Presently, however, ESA is neither an agency 
of the EU nor legally subject to the extended 
legal regime developed on the basis of the 
European Community (EC) Treaty – and it 
does not even count the same European states 
as members – e.g., ESA member states 
Norway and Switzerland are not members of 
the EU and eleven EU member states as of yet 
are not member states of ESA. 
 
ESA has two main organs. First, there is the 
Council, consisting of representatives of the 
sovereign member states, often at Ministerial 
level, and acting as the supreme body of the 
organization. The Council is tasked to lead: 
the annual work plans of the Agency; the 
annual general budget of the Agency; each 
program budget; the financial regulations and 
all other financial arrangements of the 
Agency; decisions on the admission of new 
member states; and all other measures 
necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose of 
the Agency within the framework of the ESA 
Convention.8 In other words, the Council, and 
thereby ESA, has not, at the highest level, the 
formal competence to draft space policies – it 
is only charged with “elaborating and 
implementing a long-term European space 
policy” by means of the exercise amongst 
 
8See Article XI(5), ESA Convention. 
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others of such competencies as enumerated 
above.9 
 
Second, the ESA Director General (DG) 
together with other ESA staff does not 
constitute a policy-making organ formally 
speaking. The DG is tasked to manage the 
Agency and execute any such programs “in 
accordance with the directives issued by the 
Council” as well as being entitled to submit 
proposals for future programs and projects.10 
As to that latter competence, the actual impact 
the DG may have on the formulation of 
programs and projects, and perhaps informally 
and/or indirectly of policies, depends upon a 
number of interlocking factors of a non-legal 
nature. Yet that impact would be subject to 
confirmation and a form of high-level control 
by the Council as enshrined in the latter’s 
competencies and thus by ESA member states 
jointly. 
 
ESA’s general aims and purposes are 
summarized by the ESA Convention “to 
provide for and to promote, for exclusively 
peaceful purposes, cooperation among 
European States in space research and 
technology and their space applications, with a 
view to their being used for scientific purposes 
and for operational space applications 
systems.”11 For good reason, ESA has often 
been described as a vehicle for member states 
to both serve their individual space policy 
needs, where applicable, and try and establish 
a European space policy. Formally speaking, 
as discussed, the Council in using its 
competencies decides more on programs and 
projects, even if at a high-level, and thus gives 
substance and shape to policies largely 
emanating at the member state level. 
 
                                                 
                                                
9Ibid., Article II(a). 
10See Ibid., Article XII(1.b). 
11Ibid., Article II. 
The key to further understanding the proper 
role of ESA in the shaping of European 
policies and regulations relevant to space 
security therefore lies in the way in which 
ESA space programs are developed. Program 
development, generally speaking, can be one 
of three kinds. 
 
Firstly, there are the “mandatory activities,” in 
which all ESA member states are obligated to 
participate in. To approve a relevant proposal, 
to undertake an ESA program, and to establish 
it as a mandatory activity, a simple majority of 
the member states is required. However, the 
level of resources to be made available for that 
program requires unanimity, which allows 
individual states to exert considerable power 
on the overall process of making a program 
happen or not.12 
 
Mandatory activities concern the execution of 
basic activities, such as education, 
documentation, studies of future projects, 
research work, and scientific programs 
including satellites and other space systems. 
To the extent follow-up activities on the 
ground are concerned, ESA should “collect 
relevant information and disseminate it to 
Member States, draw attention to gaps and 
duplication, and provide advice and assistance 
for the harmonization of international and 
national programs.”13 Further to the 
mandatory character of the participation of all 
member states in these scientific, non-space 
activities, the financing of such activities once 
properly agreed is taking place through a pre-
determined scale of respective contributions.14 
 
 
12See Ibid., Article XI(5.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii). 
13Ibid., Article V(1.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii). See 
further Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: 
Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors, 
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the 
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189, 223-235. 
14See Ibid., Article XIII(1). 
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Secondly, ESA member states may agree on 
“optional activities” – again by a simple 
majority.15 The optional character then 
manifests itself by way of an opt-out clause, as 
it is provided that “all Member States 
participate apart from those that formally 
declare themselves not interested in 
participating therein.”16 This results in the 
clear possibility for a member state, if it 
considers it not to be in its own interests, 
including security interests, to abstain from 
participation in ESA optional activities. 
 
Optional activities also result in a different 
schedule for financing. Whereas the formula 
here is an opt-out from the standard rule of 
financing in proportion to the average national 
income over the most recent three years for 
mandatory programs,17 in actual practice 
things turn out to work differently. Normally, 
individual member state contributions are 
decided from the ground up, i.e., each state 
promises as following from its own particular 
measure of interests in such activities to 
contribute a certain percentage to the proposed 
budget of a certain program. Once the 
proposed optional program reaches a certain 
threshold in terms of promised financing it is 
formally accepted as an ESA optional 
program. 
 
Optional activities concern in particular the 
space programs, as opposed to preparation for 
them and their after-mission interpretation and 
usage: “the design, development, construction, 
launching, placing in orbit, and control of 
satellites and other space systems; and the 
design, development, construction, and 
operation of launch facilities and space 
transport systems.”18 Over the years, in 
                                                 
 
                                                
15See Ibid., Article XI(5.c), sub-paragraph (i). 
16Ibid, Article V(1). 
17See Ibid., Article XIII(2). 
18Ibid., Article V(1.b). See further Kevin Madders, A New 
Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space 
Field of Its Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from its 
monetary terms, programs with an optional 
character have made up 80% to 85% of the 
activities developed by ESA itself, as opposed 
to 15% to 20% being mandatory in nature.19 
 
Many of the details of how programs are 
developed and executed follow from what is 
labeled “the industrial policy which the 
Agency is to elaborate and apply” as part of 
the broader aims and objectives under Article 
II of the ESA Convention, and Annex V, 
which elaborates that generic industrial 
policy.20 
 
These cornerstones of ESA industrial policy 
are implemented by means of the 
“geographical distribution” approach, to 
“ensure that all Member States participate in 
an equitable manner, having regard to their 
financial contribution.”21 The result of that 
approach, further elaborated in Annex V to the 
ESA Convention, is often labeled “fair 
return,” “industrial return,” or “juste retour.” 
Under juste retour, each member state should 
roughly see its investment in a particular 
program “returned” in the form of contracts 
for its space industry, preferably for the very 
program at issue, in the alternative as 
compensated by contracts in other programs.22 
 
 
 
Beginnings up to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 189-195, 235. 
19See Kevin Madders cited above, 189. 
20Ibid., Article VII(1). 
21Ibid., Article VII(1.c).  
22See Ibid., Articles II, IV, and Annex V. While the ideal 
“overall return coefficient” [Article IV(3)] implies that every 
Euro contributed by a member state should be matched 
exactly by a Euro’s worth of contract value for a company 
from that member state under a contract by the Agency, there 
are a number of complicated arrangements in place to allow 
for considerable flexibility. See further Madders, 384-8. 
Moreover, due to pressure from the EU in recent years, which 
views this system with some suspicion, as it may easily have 
anti-competitive effects within the European market, the 
general application of the concept has become more relaxed 
still. 
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The dichotomy between mandatory and 
optional activities has, throughout the decades 
of ESA operations, been shown to work as a 
remarkably pragmatic and workable 
compromise. It allows at the same time 
respect for the need for states to maintain their 
sovereign independence in choosing to 
contribute to and participate in actual space 
programs – on an á la carte-basis as it were – 
and serving the need for some coherence in 
ESA programs, in order for ESA to provide 
any added value in terms of real cooperation 
and an efficient pooling of resources. 
 
The ESA Convention mentions a third 
category of activities, one not as such 
conjured up by or within the framework of the 
Agency itself, but undertaken upon the 
specific request of third parties, namely 
“operational activities.”23 As a consequence, 
these activities are not financed by the normal 
budget of ESA, but paid for, in principle on a 
full-cost, not-for-profit basis,24 by the state, 
organization, or entity requesting such 
services.25 
                                                 
                                                
23See Ibid., Article V(2). 
24Such a monetary reimbursement could of course be 
(partially or completely) waived to the extent ESA considers 
other interests to merit the provision of such service without 
(full) reimbursement, and/or ESA considers itself de facto 
reimbursed by in-kind compensation. For example in the 
context of the International Space Station (ISS), it is common 
practice that the partners exchange services and goods as 
much as possible on a closed-purse, no-exchange-of-funds 
basis. See Article 15(5), Agreement among the Government of 
Canada, Governments of Member States of the European 
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of 
the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United 
States of America concerning Cooperation on the Civil 
International Space Station, Washington, entered into force 
27 March 2001. 
25In the past, ESA has provided such services for individual 
states, other international organizations, such as the European 
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
(EUMETSAT), established by the Convention for the 
Establishment of a European Organization for the 
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites entered into force 19 
June 1986, as amended 14 July 1994, and entered into force 
27 July 1994, and private companies, such as Arianespace. 
ESA Involvement 
in Space Security Issues 
 
While as of yet not addressing to any specific 
extent the actual or possible role of ESA in 
shaping European space security issues, in 
general terms, the possibility to become so 
involved at various levels depends on the 
interest of individual ESA member states. In 
particular, the major investors in ESA and 
ESA programs – France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain – need to possess 
the political will and wherewithal in having 
ESA become so involved. 
 
Article II of the ESA Convention underscores 
this point, stressing that ESA activities should 
be for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” To 
start with, the general discussion during the 
Cold War on the precise meaning of “peaceful 
purposes” is important to consider as this 
phrase was – with the same addition of 
“exclusively” – found in the outer space 
treaties.26 Here, European states were inclined 
to occupy the middle ground between the 
liberal United States (U.S.) interpretation that 
peaceful purposes included military purposes 
as long as of a defensive nature and the stricter 
Soviet interpretation that any military use of 
outer space was prohibited under that concept. 
 
The word “exclusively” constitutes an 
interesting addition here; prima facie it 
suggests that without that addition ESA would 
also be entitled to act not for peaceful 
purposes. If that were to be true, however, the 
phrase “peaceful purposes” without that 
addition would be devoid of any meaning – 
essentially stating that ESA would be entitled 
to conduct activities for peaceful purposes 
whilst leaving it open to also conduct non-
 
26See Article IV, Outer Space Treaty, also Article XI referring 
to “peaceful exploration and use;” and Article 3(1), 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement), 
entered into force 11 July 1984. 
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peaceful activities, since the addition of 
“exclusive” would be considered necessary to 
close the door on the latter option. 
 
In other words: the addition of “exclusively” 
does not effectively add anything to the legal 
obligation, and should rather be understood as 
a politically-driven confirmation of an 
obligation already existing as regard to 
“peaceful obligations,” to make sure no 
misunderstanding would arise on the scope of 
ESA’s activities. ESA did not wish to 
antagonize the U.S. by contradicting its liberal 
interpretation, yet at the same time was not 
willing to allow any uncertainty regarding the 
legal inability of ESA to get involved in 
military and security-related space projects. 
Copying the adverb “exclusively” from the 
space treaties and inserting it in the ESA 
Convention precisely achieved both results 
simultaneously. 
 
Following the Framework Agreement, even as 
this agreement did not refer in any manner to 
space activities with a security, defense, 
and/or military component, ESA has gradually 
adopted a more liberal interpretation.27 At 
least the word “security” is no longer taboo 
now: an ESA Security Agreement, ESA 
Security regulations, and an ESA Security 
office were established, as was an ESA 
security classification system with an “ESA 
Secret” label where handling of relevant 
classified information was moved from the 
member states to ESA itself. 
                                                
 
But as ESA re-interpreted “peaceful purposes” 
in 2003 to mean it could unambiguously be 
involved in military and defense related 
security activities, the aforementioned 
institutional structure remains in operation. 
ESA programs could only become a reality 
 
27See European Space Agency Council, “Position Paper on 
ESA and the Defense Sector,” ESA/C 153 (1 December 
2003): 7-8. 
following a majority vote by the member 
states in the ESA Council on the program plus 
unanimity on the financing, and this would 
ensure that no ESA project would see the light 
of day unless member states were satisfied it 
would not unduly interfere with their 
sovereign security concerns, including 
compliance with their own understanding of 
“peaceful purposes.” Only with the projects of 
Galileo and Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES) to be 
discussed below, that started to change 
fundamentally, due as well to the role of the 
EU with these projects – and then still only so 
far as those member states allowed. 
 
Further to that, ESA from the beginning could 
not completely escape from the inevitable 
relationship between space activities and the 
issue of security. Satellite-based Earth 
observation can without difficulty encompass 
“spying,” the difference between launching a 
missile and launching a payload is often 
negligible from the technical perspective and 
the high-technology character and global 
scope of much of human spaceflight 
endeavors inevitably causes it to have 
important security angles. As such, the ESA 
framework has had to deal with security-
sensitive aspects of its “exclusively peaceful” 
mandate. 
 
For example, in deviation from the normal 
requirement to exchange data on programs, 
until the aforementioned recent establishment 
of an ESA Secret label, ESA member states 
were not required “to communicate any 
information obtained outside the Agency” if 
such communication would present a threat to 
its national security, would be inconsistent 
with its agreements with third parties, such as 
non-ESA partners in space cooperation 
ventures, or would be inconsistent with the 
terms and conditions under which it had 
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obtained the information at issue in the first 
place.28 
 
Along similar lines, a fundamental 
technology-transfer control limitation was 
built into the ESA Convention. If technology 
or products developed in the context of ESA 
activities are to be transferred to non-ESA 
member states, a special authorization regime 
to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of 
member states in the ESA Council is required, 
ensuring that such authorization will not be 
lightly provided.29 
 
In more general terms, not only the 
implementation of new programs, but also the 
admission of new member states to the 
Agency requires a unanimous vote in favor by 
the incumbent member states in the ESA 
Council.30 This is a common provision in the 
charters of intergovernmental organizations, 
but in the present context it serves to 
scrutinize any potential new member from the 
perspective of security risks, since once such a 
state becomes a member it would be entitled 
to the default paradigm of free flow and 
exchange of relevant information on ESA 
programs, technology, and products.31 For 
similar reasons, unanimity in the ESA Council 
is required before ESA may cooperate and 
conclude relevant agreements with other 
intergovernmental organizations, non-EU 
governments, and other non-ESA member 
state institutions.32 
 
A final example of ESA’s involvement in 
security issues concerns the development of 
the Ariane launcher. The single-most security-
sensitive space sector is the production and 
operation of launch vehicles, in view of the 
                                                 
                                                
28Article III(1), ESA Convention. 
29See Ibid., Article XI(5.j). 
30See Ibid., Articles XI(5.k), XXII. 
31See Ibid., Article III in extenso. 
32See Ibid., Article XIV(1). 
very thin lines among a vehicle for launching, 
an explosive payload against a terrestrial 
target, and a vehicle for delivering a peaceful 
payload in orbit. Not accidentally, this area 
was the first to be subject to international, 
albeit largely voluntary, arrangements – the 
Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR)33 – to try and curb the proliferation 
of relevant technologies outside the circle of 
former Western allies. 
 
As long as the Ariane launcher development 
project was an (optional) ESA program, the 
exclusively peaceful requirement of Article II 
of the ESA Convention precluded any Ariane 
vehicle being used for military or other 
security-related missions, under the European 
interpretation discussed before. Once the 
Ariane vehicle, however, had achieved 
operational status, i.e., could start to be used 
for regular flights on a commercial basis, ESA 
had to outsource operational and marketing 
activities, as ESA was also limited by its 
Convention to research and development 
(R&D), even if those terms were sometimes 
stretched considerably.34 
 
In the case of Ariane, a separate private and 
commercial entity was established in 1980 
called Arianespace.35 Arianespace is a French 
company with international shareholding as 
well as ties with ESA and the ESA member 
states, but nevertheless operating on its own 
behalf in the emerging global commercial 
 
33Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and 
Technology Related to Missiles (hereafter MTCR), done 16 
April 1987. Also, See Elisabeth S. Waldrop, “Integration of 
Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National 
Security Implications,” Air Force Law Review 55 (2004): 
189-90; and Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” 
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the 
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space 
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009). All current 18 ESA 
member states are among the 34 state parties of the MTCR. 
34Article II, ESA Convention. 
35Statuts de la Société Arianespace (Arianespace Statute), 26 
March 1980. 
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launch services market. Its operations, 
however, from the international space law 
perspective, remained under control of the 
ESA member states, by way of a complicated 
international legal structure with three 
documents at the core: the Arianespace 
Declaration,36 the Arianespace Convention,37 
and the Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG) 
Agreement.38 Under the first two documents, 
Arianespace is obliged to operate strictly for 
peaceful purposes.39 
 
Yet as a private French company, Arianespace 
remained under French governmental control. 
For example, prior to the MTCR, for the 
purpose of adhering to the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls 
(CoCom) rules,40 i.e., the North Atlantic 
                                                 
                                                
36Declaration by Certain European Governments Relating to 
the Ariane Launcher Production Phase (hereafter 
Arianespace Declaration), entered into force 15 October 1981, 
renewal as of 4 October 1990, entered into force 21 May 
1992. 
37Convention between the European Space Agency and 
Arianespace (hereafter Arianespace Convention), signed 24 
September 1992. 
38Agreement between the French government and the 
European Space Agency with respect to the Centre Spatial 
Guyanais (CSG) (hereinafter CSG Agreement). See excerpts 
of French version in ESA Bulletin 80 (November 1994): 67. 
39See Articles I.1.2(a), I.1.6(a), Arianespace Declaration, 
ESA/C(80)8, 11 January 1980; Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, 
Arianespace Convention, ESA/C(80)WP/8, rev.4, 18 
November 1980; further see John Kriger, Arturo Russo, and 
Lorenza Sebesta, A History of the European Space Agency 
1958-1987: Volume II: The Story of ESA, 1973 to 1987, ESA 
History Study Reports, SP-1235 (ESA Publications, 2000); 
and Gabriel Lafferranderie and Harry Tuinder, “The Role of 
ESA in the Evolution of Space Law,” Journal of Space Law 
22 (1994): 103. 
40CoCom was established in 1949 as a joint organization of 
the member states of NATO, Japan, and Australia, to prevent 
the sale of weapons and technology to the Soviet Union and 
its communist allies. CoCom was disbanded in 1994, 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
concurring de facto end of the Cold War, which inter alia 
resulted in the opening up in principle of Russian and Eastern 
European markets. See Michael Lipson, “The Reincarnation 
of CoCom: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls,” The 
Non-Proliferation Review 6 (1999): 33-51. 
Treaty Organization (NATO) regime41 for 
controlling security-sensitive exports, 
Arianespace fell under French governmental 
control. 
 
Thus, even the areas where the exclusively 
peaceful mandate for ESA could not as such 
avoid a possible entanglement in security or 
military issues, control mechanisms and 
procedures were in place. These mechanisms 
and procedures ensure that the potential 
threats to the security of individual member 
states emanating from such entanglement 
continue to be addressed without substantially 
infringing their sovereignty. 
 
 
The European Union 
 
The involvement in space and space policy 
issues, including space security, of the EU, as 
the successor at a political, if not completely 
at the legal level, of the European Community, 
stems from a completely different background 
compared to that of ESA. The Community, 
then Union became involved in European 
space activities and related policy issues 
primarily as a regulator, and has only recently 
become a player in its own right, even a 
policy-maker – but this remains a secondary 
role. 
 
In spite of efforts to arrive at a European space 
policy,42 driven by the European 
Commission’s perception that space is a key 
sector to the future of Europe, in this area (as 
 
41NATO was established by the North Atlantic Treaty, 
entered into force 24 August 1949. 
42See White paper: Space: a new European frontier for an 
expanding Union – An action plan for implementing the 
European Space policy, COM(2003) 673 final, of 11 
November 2003; Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament – European Space 
Policy – Preliminary Elements, COM(2005) 208 final, of 23 
May 2005. See further Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter 
for Europe in Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 
I: 54 (2005): 340. 
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in many others) the ultimate prerogative of 
giving substantial shape to space policies by 
implementing actual programs and projects 
rests with the individual, sovereign member 
states. As referred to earlier, a joint Space 
Policy has been accepted recently, in 2007. 
 
This is clearly only a first step for the EU, 
whereas the second, more important step of 
being in charge of implementing such a space 
policy, of being able to force unwilling or 
conflicting national authorities in terms of 
their own space policies, and of developing its 
own space projects on its own behalf, is only 
beginning to be undertaken with Galileo. 
Currently, the first contracts for building of 
the Galileo satellites and deployment of the 
system have been signed. 
 
A distinct and partly supranational legal order 
has by now emerged, where in many instances 
the EU can in law override the interests, 
policies, and even legislation of individual 
member states, yet in the last resort all that is 
still based on a number of treaties between 
sovereign states. Together these treaties form 
a body of primary EU law, inter alia creating 
the main Union organs, officially referred to 
as: the Council (of Ministers),43 the European 
Commission,44 the European Parliament,45 the 
European Court of Justice,46 and most recently 
augmented by a European Council comprised 
of heads of state and government entitled to 
develop policies – but based on consensus, 
and without being formally entitled to guide 
                                                 
                                                
43See Articles 227-243, Treaty Establishing the European 
Community as Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (hereafter Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union), entered into force 1 December 2009. 
44See Articles 244-250, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
45See Ibid., Articles 223-234. 
46See Ibid., Articles 251-281: meanwhile renamed Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
follow-on legislative measures.47 The treaties 
also provided these organs with extensive 
legal competences, which they then used to 
jointly extend the scope of EU law immensely 
– by drafting and enunciating what is 
commonly called “secondary EU law.” 
 
Secondary EU law is composed of 
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions.48 
Regulations are essentially laws on a 
European level: they are phrased in general 
terms and apply comprehensively, at least as 
far as indicated or expressly provided for by 
the Regulations themselves. The same 
qualification as law applies to Directives to 
some extent, namely as far as the required end 
result is concerned: each state is free, 
however, to reach that end result in whatever 
way it sees fit, prior to a given deadline. 
Finally, Decisions also provide binding law, 
but only upon those entities to which they are 
explicitly or implicitly directed. In each case, 
they would override, wherever applicable, 
national law or regulation to the contrary. 
 
At the same time, they are strictly legal 
instruments, designed and only to be used to 
implement and enforce higher-level policies, 
policy interests, and approaches as agreed by 
the EU with the Council, representing the 
interests of the individual member states, 
generally in a key role, not to develop and 
determine them. Not even the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the successor of the ill-fated effort to 
achieve a Constitution for Europe,49 which 
had been hailed as the first document 
providing the EU with formal competence in 
matters of space and space activities, was to 
fundamentally change this situation. In 
consequence, the Union still pools together the 
 
47Ibid., Articles 235-236: see Articles 13(1), 15, Treaty on 
European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
48See Ibid., Article 288. 
49Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Rome, done 
29 October 2004 and not entered into force. 
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regulatory efforts of the member states for 
specific purposes indicated in the relevant 
treaties and essentially limited to those – even 
as it established its own distinct legal order; a 
sui generis-construction, which may be 
referred to as a supranational “half-way 
house” between an international organization 
and a federation-like structure. At present, 
twenty-seven European states50 have thus 
subjected themselves to a very extensive set of 
rights and obligations towards each other in 
the framework of the EU. As pointed out, this 
concerned a group of European states different 
from those interested in space and investing 
therein to become member of ESA. 
 
The European legal framework was initially 
built through signature and ratification of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
Treaty,51 the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC) or Euratom Treaty,52 and 
the European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty53 all in the 1950s, as duly amended by 
subsequent treaties in later years. Such treaties 
included, in addition to the various accession 
treaties allowing for new member states to 
join the EC, then Union, the Single European 
Act of 1986,54 the Treaty on European Union 
of 1992,55 the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997,56 
                                                 
                                                
50The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
51Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, entered into force 23 July 1952. 
52Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, entered into force 1 January 1958. 
53Treaty of Rome, or Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (hereafter EEC Treaty), entered into 
force 1 January 1958. 
54Single European Act, entered into force 1 July 1987. One 
major result of the Single European Act was the integration of 
the main institutions of the Communities concerned, in 
particular the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers. 
55Treaty on European Union, entered into force 1 November 
1993. 
the Treaty of Nice of 2001,57 and the Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2007. Of these, as we shall see for 
our space related topic, the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon are 
the most important. 
 
 
The European Union Legal Framework, 
Economic Activities, and Outer Space 
 
The essential elements of the Union’s legal 
order referred to above present the EU with its 
own measure of competencies and jurisdiction 
– over a wide range of economic or economy-
related activities. Depending upon certain 
circumstances and legal preconditions, they 
can be directly applied not only to the member 
states themselves, but also to private persons 
and entities resorting under the domestic 
jurisdictions of these member states. In 
addition, in a number of cases the rights and 
obligations directly applicable to individual 
citizens and legal entities can also be claimed 
directly by those entities. Bypassing domestic 
jurisdictions of member states, the Court of 
Justice can be called upon in a number of 
instances by those concerned to judge upon 
the legality of EU as well as national actions. 
The existence of this body central to the EU 
legal order represents an essential measure of 
supranational adjudication. 
 
As such, to what extent do the Union and its 
legal framework affect the space sector? 
Special as space is and distinct from and 
outside specific member state involvement, 
how would or could the EU expand such 
 
 
56Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities 
and Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam), 
entered into force 1 May 1999. 
57Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, 
the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and 
Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Nice), entered into 
force 1 February 2003. 
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impact to the extent considered necessary for 
the European greater common good? 
 
The answers to these questions lie in 
understanding how the aforementioned 
competencies and jurisdictions are applied to 
concrete issues – the application has to be 
made by explicit primary EU law, secondary 
EU law (much more common), or from EU 
law no other conclusion can be drawn other 
than such applicability was implied. This is 
captured by the notion of “subsidiarity,”58 
which means that unless the competence to 
legislate on a certain issue has unequivocally, 
even if only implicitly, been transferred to the 
Union’s organs the relevant power should still 
be deemed to rest with the national 
governmental authorities. If doubt arises 
whether an issue could be regulated more 
effectively and logically at the European level 
or at the national level, the presumption under 
subsidiarity is that the national level should 
prevail. 
 
In practice, only to the extent that space-
related activities are unequivocally covered by 
provisions in primary or secondary EU law, 
can any competence to legislate with respect 
to them be exercised by EU organs. Space 
activities, however, only constitute one among 
many topics from the Union’s perspective. 
Hence, they were hardly mentioned explicitly 
in primary EU law and not in any appreciable 
detail in secondary law. As we shall see, space 
has only recently achieved some presence and 
prominence in that context.59 Concomitantly, 
                                                 
 
t national 
gislation.64 
                                                
58Articles 5(1) and 5(3), Treaty on European Union as 
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. The latter thus extended the 
scope of application of the subsidiarity principle from the 
Community’s actions (where it applied since 1993 under 
Article 5, EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty on European 
Union) to all actions taken in the name of the Union. 
59For an excellent recent account of EU involvement in 
European space activities, see Imgard Marboe, “National 
Space Legislation: The European Perspective,” Nationales 
Weltraumrecht – National Space Law (2008), 31-46; Further, 
see Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: 
EU competencies and jurisdiction have been 
generally acknowledged in the economic 
domain, applying to all economic activities 
proper, i.e., without overriding public 
interests, such as those relating to military, 
social, or cultural issues being behind those 
economic activities. Consequently, space 
activities do at least fall within the EU legal 
order to the extent that they may be 
considered economic activities. 
 
From such a perspective, the general 
application of EU law to economic activities is 
the main instrument for Union involvement in 
the space sector so far. Here, the central and 
most comprehensive aim of EU economic 
integration is the creation and maintenance of 
a common market.60 Effectively, the Internal 
Market, being one side of the common market, 
was established as of 1993 following the entry 
into force of the Treaty on European Union.61 
This regime, in turn, is based upon several 
freedoms: the freedoms of movement of 
goods, persons, services, and capital;62 an anti-
trust regime combating anti-competitive 
behavior of governments (state aid) and 
companies (collusive conduct and abuses of 
dominant positions) alike;63 and 
harmonization of relevan
le
 
Turning back to space activities from the 
perspective of how policies take shape within 
the EU, the Union’s organs, in particular the 
Commission, have over time obtained some 
freedom to draft, or at least prepare, European 
 
 
Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors, 
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the 
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 566-584. 
60See Articles 3, 4(2.a), Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
61Articles 13-19, Single European Act. 
62See Articles 28-37, 45-66, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
63See Ibid., Articles 101-109. 
64See Ibid., Articles 114-118. 
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policies, through such varying non-binding 
instruments as Resolutions, White Papers, and 
Green Papers.65 Yet, even with the 2007 EU-
ESA Space Policy the boundaries of that 
freedom are always those provided by the 
body of EU law, and the political will of the 
totality of EU member states to use their 
prerogatives, in particular through the 
Council, to allow any such policy initiative, to 
condition or control it, or even to obstruct it. 
Certainly, once a policy initiative is translated 
into new EU law, the Council of Ministers in 
its interplay with the Commission, the 
European Parliament, and the Court of Justice 
are able to control such a process to a large 
xtent.66 
 
European Union Involvement 
in Security Issues 
                                                
e
 
 
It should not be a surprise that as a 
consequence of the above discussion, at least 
until as recently as two decades ago, the 
European organs were given very little room 
to address military, defense, and security 
issues, whether specifically in terms of space 
or more generally speaking. Although the EC, 
then Union, as indicated originated in a 
 
t has changed to some extent, as we 
all see. 
European organ has cons
                                                
65The earliest such document relevant for space activities was 
“Towards Europe-wide systems and services” – Green Paper 
on a common approach in the field of satellite 
communications in the European Community, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(90) 490 final, 
of 20 November 1990. For further discussion of the 
development of an EU-driven space policy, see Gunther 
Verheugen, “Europe’s space plans and opportunities for 
cooperation,” Space Policy 21 (2005), 93-95; Thomas Reuter, 
“The Framework Agreement between the European Space 
Agency and the European Community: A Significant Step 
Forward?,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 53 (2004), 
56-65; Kevin Madders and Walter Thiebaut, “Carpe diem: 
Europe must make a genuine space policy now,” Space Policy 
23 (2007): 7-12; and Nicolas Peter, “The EU’s emergent 
space diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107. 
66See Articles 293-294, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, providing the basis for the complicated 
decision-making processes formally applicable to the 
development of EC law. 
completely different context and for rather 
different purposes than ESA, essentially the 
same limitations to EC/EU action in the field 
of security followed from the established aims 
of its activities and institutional structure. As 
to the former, the aims of the EC were 
summed up exhaustively in the 
aforementioned Article 2 of the EC Treaty, 
which throughout history has been updated to 
take into account new developments requiring 
a European-level competence – and so far had 
always excluded a reference to military, 
defense, and security issues. The only 
conclusion can be that this domain as a 
generic area has not yet been included within 
the EU competence.67 Only with the Treaty of 
Lisbon tha
sh
 
Even though the European Commission as a 
truly European organ has in principle the right 
to initiate policy and legislative developments, 
and the European Parliament as another truly 
iderable competence 
in both as well, at 
the end of the day 
this supranational 
competence only 
extends precisely to 
those domains 
falling within the 
EU sphere as 
determined, until 
very recently, by 
Article 2 of the EC 
Treaty. Extending 
the scope of that 
sphere in any 
formal sense 
requires the consent 
of the Council of Ministers representing the 
Coo
mili
take
still prefe
themse
security. 
peration on 
tary and 
security 
issues…does 
 place, but 
ultimately, 
Europe states 
rred to 
rely on 
lves for 
national 
 
67Note that the aforementioned subsidiarity principle 
specifically calls for either explicit or implicit (but then from 
a logical perspective irrefutable) transfer of competence to the 
EC/EU level, as argued on the basis of subsidiarity before 
such competence may be assumed. 
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member states, or in cases of fundamental 
enlargement of EU competence even new 
eaties. 
 rely on themselves for 
ational security. 
ace, and essentially by sheer 
ilitary force. 
inevitably 
uched upon the security domain. 
 
into the Space Security Arena 
 Criminal Matters (PJCCM) 
spectively).68 
Articles 10A through 28 of the Treaty on 
                                                
tr
 
From the perspective of security issues, the 
point of departure for European entities was 
the fundamental lack of reference to 
competencies in that area until fairly recently. 
Security being so closely related to questions 
of state sovereignty, the fact remains that in 
the last resort the sheer survival of the state as 
a relevant entity is at stake, and in spite of the 
long history of political, economic, social, and 
cultural integration since the Second World 
War European member states have not been 
willing to subject themselves in any 
fundamental sense to a supranational entity. 
Cooperation on military and security issues, 
and the conduct of joint military exercises 
does take place, but ultimately, Europe states 
still preferred to
n
 
Over the last two decades, however, partly as 
a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the 
demise of the Soviet Union, and the 
fundamental reshaping of the geopolitical 
landscape, the perspective on European 
security started to change. The undeniable 
success of the EU in economic terms –500 
million inhabitants constituting the largest 
single economic block in the world – 
strengthened European self-consciousness 
about a major role for Europe also in the 
geopolitical arena. At the same time, the lack 
of political and security-related coherence has 
become painfully clear, in particular in the 
context of the demise of Yugoslavia and the 
ensuing civil wars, where only NATO and the 
U.S. turned out to be able to restore some 
measure of pe
m
 
The ambitions of the EC thus started to 
address the involvement of Europe in such 
security domains, and it started to move 
carefully into that direction, and as it turned 
out in some respects taking ESA along to the 
extent these ambitions involved, or were 
focusing on, outer space and space activities. 
Essentially, the EC took a three-pronged, 
staged approach: firstly, by transforming itself 
formally into a EU; secondly, by starting to 
address in earnest the issue of international 
trade in security-sensitive goods and 
technology; and thirdly, by undertaking space 
projects jointly with ESA that 
to
 
European Union Entrance 
 
The renaming of the Community as the Union 
in-and-of-itself was an expression of the 
ambition of the member states, and of the 
European institutions, most prominently the 
Commission, to broaden European integration 
beyond the more economically-oriented 
domains. More to the point, the Treaty on 
European Union effectively did extend the 
scope of European integration as it had arisen 
on the basis of the three treaties of the 1950s, 
re-christening the EEC Treaty as the EC 
Treaty, and by adding two more “pillars” of 
the EU to the three Communities that had 
been merged into one Community (those 
pillars of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in
re
 
Of course, it is the CFSP pillar, which 
concerns us here, established by means of 
 
68The first pillar was now that of the European Community, 
based not only the EC Treaty (Title II, Treaty on European 
Union), but also on the ECSC and EAEC Treaties (Titles III, 
resp. IV, Treaty on European Union). For the second, CFSP 
pillar, see Title V, Treaty on European Union; for the third, 
PJCCM pillar (originally labeled Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA)), see Title VI, Treaty on European Union. 
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European Union.69 This is where, with the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European 
Union in 1993, for the first time as far as the 
EC/EU framework was concerned, issues of 
security – the use of the words “defense” and 
“military” were still judiciously avoided – 
could be addressed. At least the word 
“security” is prominently present in the text 
now. 
 
The CFSP, however, is a straightforward 
intergovernmental construction and operates 
completely outside 
the established legal 
structure of the 
Union with its 
supranational 
features. There is at 
best a marginal role 
for the European 
Commission in its 
context as supposed 
guardian of the 
overarching 
European interest. 
For example, the 
Commission “may 
refer to the Council 
any question relating to the common foreign 
and security policy and may submit proposals 
to the Council” as well as request the 
convening of an extraordinary Council 
meeting.70 As a consequence of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the role of the Commission to “give 
its opinion particularly on whether the 
enhanced cooperation proposed [by EU 
member states] is consistent with Union 
policies”71 may have been relocated to the 
                                                                                                 
69Note that the Treaty of Lisbon amended also the Treaty on 
European Union, so that in the consolidated version of the 
latter as per 1 December 2009, Title V now comprises 
Articles 21-46. 
70Article 30(1), see also (2), Treaty on European Union as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
71Article 27c, Treaty on European Union, as inserted by the 
Treaty of Nice. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union; it was not changed fundamentally.72 
Yet in principle, “Decisions under this Title 
shall be taken by the Council acting 
unanimously” and there is no formal 
entitlement for the Commission to anything 
other than being kept informed and allowed to 
offer its opinion.73 
 
As a result, there also was no role for the 
elaborate legislative, adjudicative, and 
enforcement jurisdiction of the European 
Parliament or the Court of Justice, which was 
developed in the context of the EC Treaty. 
The European Parliament, for instance, can 
make itself heard on similar terms as the 
Commission, but does not have any formal 
say in the outcome of whatever legally 
binding decisions would result from the 
deliberation process. Even post-Lisbon, the 
cooperation under the CFSP is essentially 
cooperation between the member states with 
the Commission in an unofficial mediating 
role except where the existing acquis 
communautaire (the total body of EU law 
accumulated thus far) is threatened. Those 
issues remain exclusively reserved for national 
governments to deal with as they see fit to the 
extent beyond having allowed for such 
concepts as the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), now Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and EU 
Battle Groups to be developed.74 
…gradually, the 
European 
institutions…as 
compared to the 
group of 
sovereign states 
making up EU 
membership, are 
involving 
themselves in 
issues of 
security… 
 
As referred to before, security at the European 
level has had distinct historical roots. To start, 
international cooperation in the areas of 
defense and security had always been dealt 
 
72See Article 329(2), Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
73Article 31(1), Treaty on European Union as Amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
74See Articles 326-334, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. For example, the CSDP is the domain of the 
Council of the European Union, representing the member 
states under the Lisbon Treaty, not the European Commission. 
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with in the context of NATO or the WEU. As 
a consequence of the shifting paradigms, the 
WEU is now being integrated into the EU 
structures as part of the intergovernmental 
CFSP. That integration turns out to be a slow 
process. It started in 1999 with a first level of 
integration of WEU functions into the EU 
framework, and has meanwhile led to the 
handing over of the WEU satellite center at 
Torrejon, Spain to become the EU Satellite 
Center, jointly with a European Institute of 
Security Studies in 2002. Yet these transfers 
have not been finalized – and some doubt 
whether such integration will be ever 
complete.75 The integration described here 
does not ipso facto subsume the WEU within 
the EU’s institutional structures. 
 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty on 
European Union referred to the role of the 
WEU in somewhat ambiguous terms. Security 
policies in the context of the CFSP pillar 
“shall not prevent the development of closer 
cooperation between two or more Member 
States on a bilateral level, in the framework of 
the Western European Union (WEU) and 
NATO, provided such cooperation does not 
run counter to or impede that provided for” 
through the CFSP.76 The clauses that have 
replaced this one as per the Treaty of Lisbon 
do not mention the WEU in any specific terms 
and as a consequence of dealing with 
essentially the same subject matter might be 
argued to have effectively emptied the WEU 
of all meaning. Yet any implementation 
thereof still hinges crucially on member state 
agreement to any substantive implementation 
of the common and foreign security policy in 
                                                 
                                                75See Ralph Folsom, Principles of European Union Law 
(2005), 25. Formally, the WEU still is its own 
intergovernmental self, though now essentially dormant; the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has not yet led to 
decisions to disband the WEU. 
76Article 17, Treaty on European Union as Amended by the 
Treaty of Nice. 
the specific military domain, the erstwhile 
main focus of the WEU.77 
 
In short, in this institutional domain of 
European involvement in space security, 
slowly but gradually, the European institutions 
properly speaking, as compared to the group 
of sovereign states making up EU 
membership, are involving themselves in 
issues of security in a broad sense. It seems 
inevitable that this process increasingly will 
also involve more clearly outlined military 
and defense issues. 
 
 
The European Union 
and the Trade Aspects of Security 
 
The second inroad the Union started to make 
into the realm of security concerns the risks 
inherent in today’s voluminous global trade 
relations. These risks deal with proliferation of 
security-sensitive dual-use goods, technology, 
and know-how to states or non-state entities 
that would result in harming European 
interests. 
 
In a sense, this was the most logical and 
obvious starting point for the 
Community/Union to get involved with the 
security domain, as international trade and the 
potentially trade-distorting impact thereof on 
the EC Internal Market had belonged to the 
EC’s competencies for a considerable time. 
And indeed, already long before the 
establishment of the EU and the CFSP pillar, 
the Community had drafted a first legislative 
document on export controls, the 1969 
Regulation 2603/69.78 
 
 
77See Articles 42 and forward, Treaty on European Union as 
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, inter alia also providing 
for an (in legal terms equally limited) role of the European 
Defense Agency. 
78Regulation of the Council establishing common rules for 
exports, (EEC) No. 2603/69, of 20 December 1969. 
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These developments were given a 
considerable boost by several developments in 
the 1990s. First, there was the aforementioned 
creation of the Union and the CFSP – leading 
to such further EC law as Regulation 
3381/9479 and Decision 94/942/CFSP80 
drafted under the Treaty on European Union, 
even as these documents were far from 
comprehensive in scope. Second, the changing 
geopolitical landscape caused the 
aforementioned CoCom/MTCR-regime81 to be 
widened in scope, most notably leading to the 
establishment of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement82 encompassing all dual-use 
sensitive technologies and related products 
and know-how in the mid-1990s. Third, the 
limited progress, as compared to the ambitions 
of the then-Commission, of development of 
European security policy, including but not 
limited to space, in terms of a European Space 
Strategy on the basis of the CFSP made the 
European institutions more aware of the 
limited areas where progress could more 
easily and readily be expected, namely 
international security and international trade. 
 
The result was of all this was Regulation 
1334/200083 providing a baseline framework 
for implementing in a binding European 
context the international obligations resulting 
                                                 
oods.85 
instruments of EC law,86 but still remains the 
79Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of dual-use goods, No. 3381/94/EC, of 19 
December 1994. 
80Council Decision on the joint action adopted by the Council 
of the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods, 
94/942/CFSP, of 19 December 1994. 
81Currently, 19 out of the 27 EU member states – Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are missing – are participating in the MTCR. 
82Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
(hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement), effective 12 July 1996. 
Currently, 26 out of the 27 EU member states – only Cyprus 
is missing – as well as all 18 ESA member states are 
participating in the Arrangement. 
83Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 
1334/2000/EC, of 22 June 2000. 
from the formally non-binding MTCR and 
Wassenaar regimes, while working towards a 
harmonization of the ways and means by 
which individual member states would 
implement and apply those international 
obligations and guidelines.84 As the 
Regulation itself phrases it: its aims are to 
develop an “effective common system of 
export controls on dual-use items [which] is 
necessary to ensure... the international 
commitments and responsibilities of the 
Member States, especially regarding non-
proliferation, and of the European Union,” 
through “a common control system and 
harmonized policies for enforcement and 
monitoring” as “a prerequisite for establishing 
the free movement of dual-use items inside the 
Community” – the most fundamental 
justification for EU institutions to address the 
issue of international trade in dual-use 
g
 
The Regulation itself has been amended on 
average almost once a year since by later 
                                                 
84An extended analysis of Regulation 1334/2000 and the 
framework built upon it can be found in Frans von der Dunk, 
“A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: 
European Law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-
hs (2), (3), Preamble, Regulation 1334/2000, 
 
Use Space Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110-124. 
85See Paragrap
and Article 1. 
86This concerns Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to intra-Community transfers 
and exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 
2889/2000/EC, of 22 December 2000; Council Regulation 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to the 
list of controlled dual-use items and technology when 
exported, No. 458/2001/EC, of 6 March 2001; Council 
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No. 
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC, 
of 20 November 2001; Council Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and 
technology, No. 880/2002/EC, of 27 May 2002; Council 
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 149/2003/EC, 
of 27 January 2003; Council Regulation amending and 
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a 
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key document in the present context. Its main 
body provides for the basic regime whereas 
the Annexes, through their regular updates, 
take account of new developments regarding 
the subject matter itself as following inter alia 
from the Wassenaar Arrangement updates. In 
particular, Annex I entitled “List of Dual-Use 
Items and Technology,” and thereby listing all 
items subject to the regime created by the 
Regulation, was amended time and again to 
keep track of ongoing technical, practical, and 
political developments.87 
 
Dual-use items as covered by the Regulation’s 
regime are broadly defined as all “items, 
including software and technology, which can 
be used for both civil and military purposes,”88 
whereas export comprises normal export of 
goods, but extends to “transmission of 
software or technology by electronic media, 
fax, or telephone to a destination outside the 
Community,”89 and “exporter” is equally 
broadly defined.90 Since such a definition of 
dual-use items clearly could encompass more 
or less all space technology, the broad sweep 
ratione materiae of the European regime in 
terms of space activities becomes clear 
immediately. 
 
                                                 
 
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use 
                                                
items and technology, No. 1504/2004/EC, of 19 July 2004; 
Council Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) 
No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 
394/2006/EC, of 27 February 2006; Council Regulation 
amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 
setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of 
dual-use items and technology, No. 1183/2007/EC, of 18 
September 2007; and Council Regulation amending and 
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a 
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use 
items and technology, No. 1167/2008/EC, of 24 October 
2008. 
87Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008; further see Article 3, 
Regulation 1334/2000. 
88Article 2(a), Regulation 1334/2000. 
89Ibid., Article 2(b), sub-paragraph (iii). 
90See Ibid., Article 2(c). 
Technology itself is also defined in such broad 
terms, albeit not in the main body of the 
Regulation itself, but by Annex I: “specific 
information necessary for the ‘development,’ 
‘production,’ or ‘use’ of goods” further 
elaborated in that “this information takes the 
form of ‘technical data’ or ‘technical 
assistance,’” whereby the latter “may take 
forms, such as instructions, skills, training, 
working knowledge, and consulting services 
and may involve the transfer of ‘technical 
data,’” and these may in turn “take forms, 
such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, 
formulae, tables, engineering designs and 
specifications, manuals and instructions 
written or recorded on other media, or devices, 
such as disk, tape, read-only memories.”91 
 
The core element of the regime developed on 
the basis of the Regulation concerns the 
authorization process and procedures, which 
remains a prerogative of the EU member 
states, but should conform to the parameters 
as provided by the Regulation’s regime. The 
point of departure, in any event, still is 
national authorization. 
 
Firstly, such an authorization is required for 
export of the dual-use items as defined and 
listed in Annex I.92 Secondly, the obligations 
of a prospective exporter are not limited to 
screening an exhaustive list and then abiding 
by its terms, as there are scenarios under 
which an exporter would be obliged to comply 
with the control and authorization mechanisms 
provided by the Regulation, also where the 
items concerned as such are not listed in 
Annex I.93 
 
 
91Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008. 
92See Article 3(1), Regulation 1334/2000; and introductory 
paragraph, Annex I – List of Dual-Use Items and Technology, 
Regulation 1167/2008. 
93The three scenarios concern: (1) potential involvement of 
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass 
destruction; (2) export to a state subject to an arms embargo 
imposed by the European Union, the Organization for 
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As national sovereignty of member states is 
still the baseline, the Regulation does not take 
away the possibility for a prospective exporter 
to be confronted with requirements for 
authorizations imposed by member states 
under national laws and regulations outside of 
the system of the Regulation properly 
speaking.94 In such cases, the Regulation only 
imposes upon the member state adopting or 
maintaining relevant legislation a duty to 
inform other member states as well as the 
Commission.95 
 
With regard to these national authorization 
regimes, the Regulation only further imposes 
the requirement that they should allow for 
three types of authorizations: individual, 
global, or general, with the latter being valid 
throughout the Community.96 While leaving 
the choice to the national member state 
authorities regarding which type of 
authorization to use in a certain case, a few 
specific limits are imposed by the Regulation 
in that regard.97 
 
Next to that, as the cornerstone of actual 
harmonization, the Regulation introduces the 
concept of the Community General Export 
Authorization (CGEA).98 The CGEA 
explicitly constitutes an exception to the 
sovereign discretion of member states as for 
all items not covered by it; any authorization 
                                                 
 
                                                
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the United 
Nations Security Council; and (3) export without national 
authorization or in violation of a national authorization; see 
Articles 3(2), 4(1), (2), (3), and (4), Regulation 1334/2000. 
94Article 4(5), Regulation 1334/2000. 
95See Ibid., Article 4(6). 
96See Ibid., Article 6(2). 
97See further Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” 
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the 
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space 
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 122-4. 
98See Article 6(1), Regulation 1334/2000. 
shall be granted – or refused – by the member 
state where the exporter is located.99 
 
The CGEA’s scope is essentially limited in 
three ways. One, ratione materiae only items 
as defined by Annex II – with the exception 
moreover of those mentioned in Part 2 thereof 
– require a CGEA as opposed to a national 
authorization, which still covers the bulk of 
items listed in Annex I.100 Two, however, 
ratione personae the CGEA covers such 
exports only to the extent the target 
destination is Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, or the U.S.101 
Three, further exceptions to applicability of 
the CGEA occur in more limited scenarios.102 
 
Thus, Regulation 1334/2000 in conjunction 
with follow-up Regulations created a complex 
interlocking system of European-wide and 
national authorizations. That system required 
European-wide authorizations instead of 
national ones in varying measures for the 
export of the items listed in a few interlocking 
Annexes to other EU member states, a limited 
set of close political allies of other states and 
destinations, otherwise leaving the individual 
sovereign discretion of the member states 
intact. 
 
Nevertheless, presenting a kind of European 
equivalent to U.S. export controls, the 
Regulation and the regime built upon it 
 
99Ibid., Article 6(2). 
100See Annex II, Regulation 1167/2008; Part 1 of Annex II 
simply provides in full “This export authorization covers the 
following items: All dual-use specified in any entry in Annex 
I of the present Regulation except those listed in Part 2 
below.” 
101See Ibid., Part 3. 
102See Ibid., Articles 1, 2, and 3, Annex II. These three 
scenarios concern: (1) (once again):  potential involvement of 
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass 
destruction; (2) (once again) export to a state subject to an 
arms embargo imposed by the European Union, the OSCE, or 
the United National Security Council; and (3) where the 
relevant items are to be exported to a destination within a 
customs free zone or free warehouse. 
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represents a careful, detailed, and politically 
noteworthy foray of the EU into the security 
domain, including space security in view of 
the inherent dual-use of most space activities, 
hardware, and technology. The establishment 
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 
2004103 may also turn out to contribute to 
further fundamental EU inroads in legal and 
political terms in the European security 
domain, albeit that Agency falls under the 
competencies specifically of the Council of 
the European Union, not of the Commission. 
 
As with the development of the CFSP pillar, 
this development took place without the 
involvement of ESA – although ESA’s role in 
the European space endeavour under the 
Regulation’s regime was recognized to the 
extent that export controls on launchers and 
launch-related items otherwise applicable 
would essentially be waived for items “that 
are transferred on the basis of orders pursuant 
to a contractual relationship placed by the 
European Space Agency (ESA) or that are 
transferred by ESA to accomplish its official 
tasks” or “that are transferred to a State-
controlled space launching site in the territory 
of a Member State, unless that Member State 
controls such transfers within the terms of this 
Regulation” – noting here that European 
launches usually take place from Kourou, 
French Guyana, which is French territory.104 
 
 
European Union - European Space 
Agency Cooperation 
 
The most recent angle from which the EU, this 
time in close cooperation with ESA, was 
venturing into the space domain, was the 
                                                 
                                                
103See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 
on the establishment of the European Defense Agency; also, 
see Article 42(3), Treaty on European Union as Amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
104Part I, Annex IV, Regulation 1167/2008, sub-paragraph (1) 
resp. (4). 
development of two European “flagship 
projects,” Galileo and GMES. Both concerned 
major programs aiming at launching and 
operating a system of satellites as the core part 
of an infrastructure to be used for practical 
downstream terrestrial applications. It may be 
added that perhaps soon a third project is to 
follow, i.e., the joint development of European 
SSA capabilities, which will also have a 
substantial, and probably even more profound 
impact on security issues in space for Europe. 
 
Galileo, initiated by the European 
Commission, is the second-generation, 
European-owned and European-operated 
global satellite navigation system currently 
being developed to be operational by 2013.105 
Its key features, as compared with the 
currently operational satellite navigation 
systems, the U.S. Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and the Russian GLONASS (Global 
Navigation Satellite System), have been listed 
as being an internationally-operated system 
controlled by civilians and providing for 27, 
plus three spare, satellites in medium Earth 
orbits (MEO). The satellite signals should be 
augmented world-wide and should be 
 
105Council Resolution on the European Contribution to the 
Development of a Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS), of 19 December 1994; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation 
Network: including A European Strategy for Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), COM(1998) 29 final, 
of 21 January 1998; Galileo – Involving Europe in a New 
Generation of Satellite Navigation Services, of 10 February 
1999, COM(1999) 54 final; Council Resolution on the 
involvement of Europe in a new generation of satellite 
navigation services – Galileo-Definition phase, of 19 July 
1999; Commission Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council – On GALILEO, of 22 November 
2000, COM(2000) 750 final; Council Regulation setting up 
the Galileo Joint Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 
2002; Council Regulation on the establishment of structures 
for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation 
programs, No. 1321/2004/EC, of 12 July 2004; and 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the further implementation of the European satellite 
navigation programs (EGNOS and Galileo); No. 
683/2008/EC, of 9 July 2008. 
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available in principle for usage by many 
transport as well as non-transport applications. 
These satellites should furthermore provide, 
apart from an Open Service similar to GPS 
and GLONASS Open Services, three types of 
enhanced services, for which users one way or 
another would have to pay, of which the 
Public Regulated Service (PRS) is of 
importance for the current discussion, plus 
search and rescue services additional to the 
existing COSPAS-SARSAT Program 
[International Satellite System for Search and 
Rescue].106 
 
Galileo has undergone various delays and a 
number of changes of direction over the last 
years, most notably discarding for the time 
being the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
approach in financing, building, and operating 
the system. The EU Council of Ministers by 
means of a Resolution of 8 June 2007 
unequivocally concludes in this regard “that 
the current concession negotiations have failed 
and should be ended.”107 However, the 
Resolution, as well as ensuing political 
discussions within Europe at the highest level, 
left little doubt that the European stakeholders 
are determined to make Galileo happen and to 
replace the private investments that are now 
no longer expected with public investments 
one way or another; indeed, public investment 
has been achieved through the transfer of 
unused Common Agricultural Funds.108 The 
most recent result of that determination so far 
                                                                                                 
106The COSPAS-SARSAT currently is a four-state satellite 
system available to aircraft, ships, other vehicles, and persons 
in distress for the purpose of sending emergency signals and 
alerting rescue services; see International COSPAS-SARSAT 
Program Agreement, entered into force on 30 August 1988. 
107Item 2, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th Transport, 
Telecommunications, and Energy Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007. 
108Items 4-7, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007; respectively Council of the 
European Union, 2828th Council Meeting, Economic, and 
Financial Affairs, Brussels, 13 November 2007, 14534/07 
(Presse 251), at 18. 
has been Regulation 683/2008 on the further 
implementation of EGNOS (the regional 
forerunner to Galileo currently operational) 
and Galileo itself. By now, two test satellites 
are operational: the GIOVE-A, built by Surrey 
Satellite Technology, launched December 
2005, and the GIOVE-B, built by Galileo 
Industries and launched April 2008.109 
 
From several perspectives, including the 
geopolitical one, Galileo is a major success 
already prior to its proper deployment. Ever 
since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
became the first non-European partner to join 
the project at the highest level,110 many such 
states have expressed their interest in doing so 
and some concluded similar agreements.111 
Though, with the transition from the Galileo 
Joint Undertaking (GJU) to the European 
GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite System] 
Supervisory Authority, as well as the funding 
problems, these cooperative developments 
have largely stalled, in the case of the PRC 
even leading to a severe curtailing of the 
actual level of cooperation.112 
 
Such involvement of non-EU, largely non-
European, countries had for the first time 
raised major issues related to European 
security issues, which the Commission had to 
cope with. Notably, the Cooperation 
Agreement with the PRC specifically did not 
 
109The first four in-orbit validation phase satellites for Galileo 
are planned for launch by November 2010. 
110By becoming a member of the Galileo Joint Undertaking 
(GJU), the precursor to the European GNSS Supervisory 
Authority (GSA); see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) – Galileo 
between the European Community and its Member States and 
the People’s Republic of China, of 30 October 2003; Doc. 
Council of the European Union, 13324/03. 
111For example; see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) between the European 
Community and its Member States and the State of Israel, of 2 
June 2005. 
112Space News 12 June 2006. 
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include access by the PRC to the PRS.113 The 
PRS is the Galileo-service most akin to the 
GPS Precise Positioning Signal. PRS will be 
encrypted and physically protected, and only 
accessible to a limited group of users – in 
principle all governmental organs, some 
hybrid service providers in areas key to 
modern society, and also in terms of security, 
such as energy and telecommunications 
networks. 
 
Also, the Agreement with the PRC touched 
upon the issue of export control of security-
sensitive space hardware and technology in 
the context of Galileo cooperation. It notably 
provided that “Exports by China to third 
countries of sensitive items related to the 
Galileo program will have to be submitted for 
prior authorization by the competent Galileo 
security authority, if the authority has 
recommended to the EU Member States that 
these items be subject to export 
authorization.”114 In any event, parties 
reserved the right to apply applicable laws and 
regulations in the context of EU-PRC 
cooperation on Galileo as a safety precaution 
in case key security issues would be perceived 
to be at stake.115 Regulation 683/2008, the 
currently ruling legal document on Galileo, 
provides on this issue that any additional 
contributions by member states, third states, or 
intergovernmental organizations can only be 
arranged subject to dedicated agreements, 
allowing a similar degree of control over 
security matters.116 
 
Being developed under EU leadership, with 
ESA as developer and procuring agency, the 
                                                 
                                                
113On the other hand, see Article 4(2), Cooperation 
Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) – Galileo between the European Community and its 
Member States and the People’s Republic of China. 
114Ibid., Article 8(4).  
115Ibid., Article 5(1). 
116See Articles 4(4), (5), and 6(3) and (4), Regulation 
683/2008. 
Regulation further outlines the envisaged 
approach to Galileo, including the system of 
governance that should apply to the 
operational phase. Important for our current 
topic is that the European GNSS Supervisory 
Authority, established by Regulation 
1321/2004, is to fulfill the key role inter alia 
in security accreditation and operation of the 
Galileo security center.117 In this respect, the 
Supervisory Authority will operate under the 
umbrella of the Commission, which takes it 
upon itself to “manage all questions relating to 
the security of the systems, duly taking into 
account the need for oversight and integration 
of security requirements in the overall 
programs.”118 
 
As already has become clear, and in spite of 
the civil governance structure to be developed 
for Galileo, security issues will have to be 
faced. Firstly, the possibility of potential 
adversary use of its signals would still have to 
be dealt with; someone has to take decisions, 
in the worst case, to effectively shut down 
parts of the system, when Galileo signals 
threaten to be used by states or non-state 
actors against the security interests of Europe 
and European states.119 
 
Secondly, as referred to before, the envisaged 
PRS, while painstakingly avoiding any 
reference to military or defense, was modeled 
in many respects on the GPS Precise 
Positioning Signal. Whilst the PRS is 
officially to be made accessible to all 
 
117See Article 16, Regulation 683/2008. 
118Ibid., Article 13(1). See further Article 13(2)-(5), as well as 
Article 14 on the general governance of Galileo for security 
purposes. 
119This was essentially taken care of by involving a “Galileo 
security center” in the overall governance scheme for the 
Galileo system, as well as specific security-related 
regulations; see 16th preamble paragraph, Articles 7, 13, 14, 
and 16, Regulation 683/2008; also see Council Joint Action 
on aspects of the operation of the European satellite radio-
navigation system affecting the security of the European 
Union, 2004/552/CFSP, of 12 July 2004. 
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governmental services, debate has already 
arisen about whether such governmental uses 
should not also include the use by the military 
of respective member states. To those familiar 
with Western political history over the last 
half century, it will come as no surprise that 
France is most adamant in seeing no obstacle 
to such use, whereas the United Kingdom, at 
least until recently, was most adamant in 
emphasizing that such military uses were 
never contemplated, and should not be 
contemplated, or at least be vigorously 
pursued, now. 
 
The other flagship project, GMES, is of more 
recent date, and consequently has not yet 
evolved to such an extent as Galileo, in 
particular, as relevant to the present 
discussion, in terms of an attendant legal and 
governance framework to handle to security 
aspects.120 At the same time, it now seems 
certain, with the launch of the Sentinel 1 
satellite for GMES scheduled for 2011 (the 
first Earth observation satellite for GMES) 
that it will actually precede an operational 
Galileo system to space. GMES is to become 
the pan-European contribution to the Global 
Earth Observation System of Systems 
(GEOSS), representing a global effort to 
enhance environmental protection with the 
help of satellite technology. 
 
Nonetheless, GMES represents the next step 
for space security issues in Europe since this 
project for the first time did prominently refer 
to the concept of security – interestingly, in 
the process extending its scope, as GMES was 
originally meant to stand for Global 
Monitoring for Environmental Security, 
                                                 
                                                
120See further Council Resolution on the launch of the initial 
period of global monitoring for environment and security 
(GMES), of 13 November 2001; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): 
Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008, COM(2004) 65 final, 
of 3 February 2004. 
before the latter part was changed to 
Environment and Security. Security as 
understood here gradually came to be 
interpreted beyond the concept of “civil 
security” so as to encompass more 
“traditional” military and defense issues of 
security.121 
 
GMES, being tasked to provide Europe with 
its own independent and comprehensive 
satellite Earth observation infrastructure for 
generation of data and information on a 
comprehensive range of subjects, will bring 
the inclusion of defense, security, and military 
matters into the broader civil European 
governance structures. Like Galileo, this 
impacts both the EU and ESA in terms of their 
traditional domain having explicitly excluded 
military, defense, and security issues. 
Establishment of a coherent SSA flagship 
project will no doubt move such developments 
one step further again. 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
 
The developments regarding the increasing 
involvement of the EU in the space security 
domain are converging with the latest 
European achievement, which is the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon as of 1 
December 2009. The increasing growth of the 
Union – adding twelve new member states in 
the time span of a mere three years (2004-
2007) – was calling for a further 
rationalization of the governance structure, 
where a Commission having at least one 
Commissioner of every member state and the 
possibilities for small numbers of member 
states to block legislative development in the 
Council were threatening to make further 
 
121See further on this Frans von der Dunk, “A European 
“Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law 
on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space 
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009). 
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progress of the Union as a whole increasingly 
difficult. Also, the calls for more involvement 
at a European level in global issues of 
sustainable development, poverty, climate 
change, and last, but not least, the new 
security issues and a consequent revival of 
ideas to extend the scope of supranational 
policy-making and law-making did not go 
unheard. 
 
As mentioned, the first effort after the Treaty 
of Nice of 2001 to take a step forward in 
European integration was the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe agreed 
upon in Rome in 2004 – but this effort failed. 
This was not in the least because the inclusion 
of the word “Constitution,” and its presumed 
corollaries of a “European anthem” and an 
official “European flag” as symbols of the 
perceived ambition to create a European 
“super-state” with certain democratic lacunae, 
triggered nationalist sentiments sufficiently to 
make the treaty fail in the referenda held in 
France and the Netherlands. An additional 
factor blocking the required EU-wide 
acceptance was the rather unwieldy and 
“juridical-technical” nature of the document 
that the combination of the various updating 
treaties with particular the original EC Treaty 
had become. 
 
While the Treaty of Lisbon, to many a scaled-
down and more realistic version of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, took 
close to two years between acceptance of the 
final text and entry into force,122 in the end it 
did succeed in becoming the key document 
                                                 
                                                
122The Treaty of Lisbon was voted down in Ireland by a 
referendum the first time around, and managed a favorable 
vote the second time only after considerable wheeling and 
dealing and a number of cosmetic changes; and even after the 
Treaty had passed that hurdle, in particular Poland and the 
Czech Republic were serious candidates to block the entry 
into force of the Treaty – acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
as of any other fundamental treaty in the EC and EU context, 
had to be unanimous as between the twenty-seven member 
states in order to lead to entry into force. 
underlying the European Union. Among many 
other things, it also tried to further enhance the 
position of Europe as an entity in its own right 
in space and security, and consequently the 
space security domain. 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon and Security 
 
As far as the security-side to the equation is 
concerned, at least the principle of “security” 
was partially transferred from the Treaty on 
European Union to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and 
included a reference to “defense” at the same 
time. The first treaty was the one document 
part of the Treaty of Lisbon where the EC 
legal order and the key roles of Commission, 
Parliament, and Court were not engaged; the 
other, effectively the old EC Treaty as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, was the 
second such document where EC law and 
Commission, Parliament, and Court 
competencies did apply. 
 
So, in matters of security, now “The Union 
shall have competence, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union, 
to define and implement a common foreign 
and security policy, including the progressive 
framing of a common defense policy.”123 
However, the actual implementation of such 
policies refers back to the Treaty on European 
Union, to wit its second pillar where the 
intergovernmental structures reside. Also, 
Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union makes reference to shared 
competence between the Union and EU 
member states in the “area of freedom, 
security, and justice.”124 Note, that “security” 
is inserted in the text between “freedom” and 
“justice,” whereby the term “security” may 
 
123Article 2(4), Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
124Ibid., Article 4(2.j). 
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arguably be somewhat confined to civil 
security. 
 
What the actual effect will be of this partial 
“transfer” of the security domain into the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, will depend on the future usage that 
the Union’s institutions may seek to make of 
these clauses. On one hand, the shared 
competence of Article 4(2) essentially means 
that “the member states can in principle only 
exercise their competences to the extent that 
the Union has not exercised its competence,125 
which in turn means the Union’s institutions 
can, following Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, adopt 
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. 
 
On the other hand, Article 2(4) ensures that 
any action of the Union in this domain will 
have to follow the rules of the Treaty on 
European Union in its version as consolidated 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. Here, the Union may 
now “define and pursue common policies and 
actions” among others to “safeguard its 
values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity; … preserve 
peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen 
international security in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act, and with the aims of the Charter of 
Paris, including those relating to external 
borders,” objects clearly at least potentially 
involving security, including military 
decisions.126 To what extent such policies and 
actions may comprise juridical or legislative 
action, and also to what extent such policies 
would essentially remain an empty shell 
                                                 
                                                125Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,” 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 347. 
126Article 21(2), Treaty on European Union as amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(hereafter Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union), Lisbon, entered into force 1 December 2009. 
without actual follow-on juridical or 
legislative action, may be disputed, but in 
principle these would not be subject to the 
democratic controls of the European 
Parliament, and therefore remain within the 
exclusive domain of democratic controls of 
relevant national parliaments, and by the same 
token would fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice. 
 
Furthermore, it is the European Council, a 
special version of the Council of Ministers 
comprising the Heads of State of the member 
states, hence still first and foremost 
representing their individual member states’ 
interests,127 which shall now, further to Article 
21 of the consolidated Treaty on European 
Union, identify the 
strategic interests and 
objectives of the 
Union and take 
relevant decisions by 
unanimity, inter alia 
in the area of 
common foreign and 
security policy.128 
The role of the 
Commission is 
limited to the right to 
propose external 
actions other than 
those for the area of 
common foreign and 
security policy, which is the domain of the 
occupant of the newly created High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, a special official which is, 
although Vice-President of the Commission, 
directly appointed by the European Council.129 
…at least the 
principle of 
“security” was 
partially 
transferred from 
the Treaty on 
European 
Union to the 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of 
the European 
Union…
 
 
127See further Articles 235-236, Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
128See Article 22(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
129See Ibid., Articles 18(1) and (2), and 22(2); further Article 
30. 
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Article 24(1) of the consolidated version of the 
Treaty on European Union echoes the 
aforementioned provision of Article 2(4) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, in allotting to the Union “all areas of 
foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security, including the progressive 
framing of a common defense policy.” This 
common foreign security policy, however, is 
subject to specific rules and procedures, 
requiring unanimous agreement by the 
European Council and alternatively the 
Council of Ministers, but “the adoption of 
legislative acts shall be excluded” and (with 
one exception not relevant here) “the Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to these 
provisions.”130 
 
In sum, in all of Title V of the consolidated 
version of the Treaty on European Union, 
entitled “General Provisions on the Union’s 
External Action and Specific Provisions on 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy” 
and comprising Articles 21 through 46, the 
Commission is referred to no more than eight 
times, in a manner that can be described as 
being on the fringe of the actual decision-
making processes. From the same perspective, 
the European Parliament is referred to a mere 
seven times, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union exactly once. By contrast, the 
European Council has been mentioned 19 
times, the Council of Ministers as such no less 
than 74 times, and the term “Member States” 
occurs 58 times in this Title. There is no better 
way to directly visualize the different roles of 
the first three, the “truly European 
institutions,” as compared with the latter two 
institutions where the individual member 
states’ interests are most prominently 
defended, in the context of security under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
                                                 
                                                
130Ibid., Article 24(1). See further Articles 28 and 31. 
It remains to be seen how the political 
landscape, both within the European Union 
itself and from a more geopolitical 
perspective, will evolve and whether this 
might, under certain circumstances, allow for 
an increasingly larger role for the EU 
institutions in security issues. 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon and Space 
 
In regard to outer space, the Treaty of Lisbon 
was hoped for to present at least a courageous 
step forward. When its failed predecessor, the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
was being negotiated and drafted, it had 
included two novel provisions offering a key 
to considerably enlarging Europe’s role in 
space. 
 
Firstly, that Treaty provided in Article I-14 
that “In the areas of research, technological 
development, and space, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities, in 
particular to define and implement programs; 
however, the exercise of that competence shall 
not result in Member States being prevented 
from exercising theirs.”131 This clause was 
part of the Article providing for the scope of 
shared competence between the Union and its 
member states, but the last part has led 
commentators to conclude that this was not so 
much a normal shared competence, but rather 
a “parallel competence.”132 In other words, 
individual member states would retain 
sovereign discretion to draft and implement 
their own national policies and legislation in 
this area. 
 
131Article I-14(3), Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. 
132Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter for Europe in 
Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 
346-347. 
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Secondly, specifically on space it was 
provided: 
 
1. To promote scientific and technical 
progress, industrial competitiveness, 
and the implementation of its 
policies, the Union shall draw up a 
European space policy. To this end, it 
may promote joint initiatives, support 
research and technological 
development, and coordinate the 
efforts needed for the exploration and 
exploitation of space. 
2. To contribute to attaining the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1, 
European laws or framework laws 
shall establish the necessary 
measures, which may take the form 
of a European space program. 
3. The Union shall establish any 
appropriate relations with the 
European Space Agency.133 
 
By many, this was considered to represent the 
first true acceptance of a competence in space 
for the Union, even if only shared or parallel. 
This, however, overlooked the fact that 
already since 1994, with the adoption of the 
Satellite Directive,134 the Union had exercised 
a fundamental competence to regulate satellite 
communications as part of the broader 
telecommunications sector in the context of 
the European Internal Market. From that 
moment on, for example, the Commission had 
adopted more Regulations, Directives, and 
Decisions to deal with specific aspects of 
commercial satellite communications135 and 
                                                 
 
                                                
133Article III-254, Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. 
134Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC 
and Directive 90/388/EEC, in particular with regard to 
satellite communications, 94/46/EC, of 13 October 1994. 
135For example: Commission Directive amending Directive 
90/387/EEC with regard to personal and mobile 
communications, 96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996; Commission 
Directive amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the 
implementation of full competition in telecommunications 
markets, 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996; Decision of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a coordinated 
authorization approach in the field of satellite personal 
communications systems in the Community, No. 710/97/EC, 
had handed down Decisions enforcing the 
general competition regime in the sector.136 It 
also overlooked a similar regulatory 
involvement in the satellite navigation area, 
beginning with the Regulation setting up the 
Galileo Joint Undertaking in 2002.137 
 
More precisely, therefore, entry into force of 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe would have meant a first 
comprehensive competence in terms of scope, 
not being indirectly deduced from 
competencies in telecommunication and 
transport fields (e.g., note that Galileo was 
presented first and foremost as a tool for trans-
European transport networks, and still 
essentially resides with the Commission’s 
Directorate on Transport and Energy). This 
 
 
of 24 March 1997; Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a common framework for general 
authorizations and individual licenses in the field of 
telecommunications services, 97/13/EC, of 10 April 1997; 
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the selection and authorization of systems providing mobile 
satellite services (MSS); No. 626/2008/EC, of 30 June 2008. 
136For example: Commission Decision relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/34.768 – International 
Private Satellite Partners), No. 94/895/EC, of 15 December 
1994; Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be 
incompatible with the common market and the functioning of 
the EEA Agreement (IV/M.490 – Nordic Satellite 
Distribution), No. 96/177/EC, of 19 July 1995; Commission 
Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/35.518 – 
Iridium), No. 97/39/EC, of 18 December 1996; Commission 
Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 (IV/M.1564 – Astrolink), of 25 June 1999; 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be 
compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (IV/M.4465 - Thrane and 
Thrane/Nera), of 21 March 2007; Commission Decision 
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the EEA Agreement (COMP/M.4403 – 
Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio), of 
4 April 2007; Commission Decision declaring a concentration 
to be compatible with the common market according to 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (IV/M.4709 – Apax 
Partners/Telenor Satellite Services), of 20 August 2007, 
137Council Regulation setting up the Galileo Joint 
Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 2002. 
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was not generally considered to be subject to 
dispute, and even as the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe was running into 
trouble, this clause was expected to survive.138 
 
As it turned out, by way of an unpleasant 
surprise for the supporters of European space 
cooperation, the Treaty of Lisbon did take one 
fundamental step backwards here. The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union as 
per the Treaty of Lisbon in relevant part firstly 
faithfully copies Article I-14 of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe that 
was stated above.139 
 
Secondly, however, the Treaty now provides: 
 
1. To promote scientific and technical 
progress, industrial competitiveness, 
and the implementation of its 
policies, the Union shall draw up a 
European space policy. To this end, it 
may promote joint initiatives, support 
research and technological 
development, and coordinate the 
efforts needed for the exploration and 
exploitation of space.  
2. To contribute to attaining the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1, 
the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall establish the necessary 
measures, which may take the form 
of a European space program, 
excluding any harmonization of the 
laws and regulations of the Member 
States. 
3. The Union shall establish any 
appropriate relations with the 
European Space Agency. 
4. This Article shall be without 
prejudice to the other provisions of 
this Title. 140 
                                                 
                                                138Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter for Europe in 
Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 
346. 
139Article 4(3), Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
140Ibid., Article 189. 
Note that paragraphs 1 and 3 are identical to 
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article III-254 of the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
and that paragraph 4, though not present in the 
latter, does only confirm the default 
relationship. Thus, paragraph 2 is the key 
difference here. 
 
First, it replaces the reference to European 
laws and framework laws (the new names 
proposed by the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe for Regulations and 
Directives) with a more complicated formula, 
which in essence still refers to EC secondary 
law.141 Second, a clause is now added 
excluding from any such EU competence the 
possibility to use Regulations, Directives, or 
Decisions for the purpose of harmonizing laws 
and regulations of EU member states. 
Consequently, the EU competence on space is 
now limited to adopting secondary EU law 
that either (1) establishes a space project or 
space program and presumably takes care of 
its financing through EU budgets, or (2) 
applies the freedoms of movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital as well as the 
competition regime to the space sector, as the 
remaining key pillars of the Internal Market 
not covered by the last clause of paragraph 2. 
 
With regard to the latter, moreover, with the 
exception of areas of satellite 
telecommunications and satellite navigation 
where the leadership role of the Commission 
and also in the legislative domain is generally 
accepted and already has led to secondary EU 
law being adopted, actual adoption of 
Regulations, Directives, or Decisions may run 
into problems. Any existence of member state 
regulation on any such topic – as part of the 
exercise of member state competence, left 
 
141The “ordinary legislative procedure” referred to here is 
described as “the joint adoption by the European Parliament 
and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a 
proposal from the Commission.” See Ibid., Article 289(1) and 
Article 294. 
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unhampered under Article 4(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union – 
might be expected either to exclude ipso facto 
a right for the EU institutions to adopt 
secondary EU law, or lead to sufficient 
opposition in the Council to preclude such 
adoption in practice. 
 
Still, the combined force of existing 
competencies in the satellite communication 
and satellite navigation fields, the clauses of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, and the subsidiarity principle vis-à-vis 
the inherently global domain of outer space 
may well lead to increasing activity of the EU 
institutions in the space domain. Once the 
Council would be convinced that it is in the 
overarching interest to do so, the framework 
briefly outlined above certainly would allow 
this to happen. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
From the above analyses of the often 
painstaking and complicated processes of 
European integration, it may be concluded that 
the involvement of key intergovernmental 
entities in Europe, including the European 
Union and ESA, in space security is rapidly 
evolving at least on a political and visibility 
level, even as such involvement is crucially 
shaped by the institutional structures and the 
roles of the member states in delineating 
relevant competencies. The outside reality that 
space activities are almost always inherently 
security-sensitive or even simply developed 
from security needs has caught up with the 
principled prohibition in the relevant 
documents (for the European Union at least 
until the Treaty on European Union) to 
become fundamentally involved in security 
issues. The European flagship projects, 
Galileo and GMES, may be seen as clear 
indicators that indeed a gradual acceptance of 
the inevitability of involvement of the Union 
and the Agency into the field of space security 
has started to occur. 
 
This process so far has been largely an 
indirect one, bringing many factors together – 
the increasing entanglement, even 
convergence, of ESA and the EU, the gradual 
swallowing of the WEU by the latter (where 
perhaps that process is most advanced with 
respect to the space part of the WEU), the 
double perspective of security and space from 
which the Union is addressing space security, 
the joint development of the flagship projects, 
the specific focus on international trade in and 
exports of security-sensitive technology, and 
trying to cope with potential Internal Market-
distorting consequences of national licensing 
regimes on export control. The process is 
further driven by the political will of the 
Union to be in Europe’s driver’s seat with 
regard to global developments, such as 
concerning the Wassenaar Arrangement and 
the MTCR, but also Space Situational 
Awareness and other space security-related 
issues. 
 
The failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe and the successful Treaty of 
Lisbon from that perspective together 
represented the extent to which the EU and its 
leading institutions, first of all the 
Commission, were able to move along that 
path so far, and establish a first measure of 
legislative and regulatory coherence on the 
European front. The results, as analyzed, are 
rather mixed and certainly do not overcome 
many of the complications, sometimes 
perhaps even inconsistencies, arising as a 
result from the manifold angles from which 
issues of space security are addressed in 
Europe. 
 
For example, in spite of the increasing 
cooperation of the Union and ESA in matters 
of space policy, and now even projects, a full-
fledged integration of ESA into the Union 
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does not seem to be plausible for now. Issues, 
such as the conflicting approach to the 
financing of space industry in the context of 
European space projects, with ESA largely 
still forced to adhere to the “fair return” 
concept and the Union insisting on open and 
competitive procurement, will therefore 
continue to require ad-hoc solutions, as was 
achieved for example for Galileo. In that 
sense, institutionally speaking, Europe has not 
yet moved fundamentally beyond the 
Framework Agreement. This is not to 
diminish the value and importance of what has 
been achieved. 
 
To paraphrase the most famous quote in space 
history, it may not be the giant leap hoped for, 
but it is a small step forward opening up the 
prospect of more steps in the same direction. 
Security is also high on the agenda in Europe, 
space is increasingly playing an indispensable 
role in that context, and the flagship projects 
may well turn out to prove that the best way to 
deal with these issues would be by allowing 
more space for integrated decision-making at 
a European level, in which case both the 
European Union and ESA will be 
indispensable players – or at the very least 
indispensable vehicles for the sovereign 
member states to ensure their individual 
interests would not unduly obstruct the 
overarching European interests in security, 
space, and in space security. 
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The United States (U.S.) is opening a new 
dialogue with China on cooperation in space 
that includes human space flight. The 
announcement appeared in the Joint Statement 
issued by U.S. President Obama and Chinese 
President Hu in Beijing, China on 17 
November 2009. The two leaders also agreed 
“the two countries have common interests in 
promoting the peaceful use of outer space and 
agree to take steps to enhance security in outer 
space.”1 These are significant shifts in U.S. 
civilian and military space policy. The U.S. 
ended cooperation in space with China more 
than a decade ago2 and consistently refused to 
discuss Chinese concerns about security in 
outer space. 
 
In January 1999, a Select Committee of the 
U.S. House of Representatives chaired by 
Representative Christopher Cox issued its 
Report on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The report 
claimed “The PRC (China) has stolen or 
otherwise illegally obtained U.S. missile and 
space technology that improves the PRC’s 
military and intelligence capabilities.”3 The 
 
 
                                                
1The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China 
Joint Statement,” 17 November 2009, Beijing, China, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-
statement (accessed November2009). 
2Primarily consisting of U.S. government permission to allow 
commercial space activities, such as satellite launch services, 
consulting and satellite and component purchases. 
3Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Report on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial 
Concerns with the People’s Republic of China Volume III, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1999.  
Cox Commission concluded many of the 
alleged illegal transfers of American space 
technology occurred in the wake of “the 
Reagan administration’s decision to permit 
satellite launches in the PRC” and that the 
factors that led to the Reagan decision, which 
was left unaltered by subsequent 
administrations, were “no longer applicable.”4 
The U.S. Congress and the Executive branch 
responded by enacting highly restrictive 
export control laws and regulations that ended 
U.S. - China cooperation in commercial 
satellite launches and prevented cooperation in 
civilian space exploration.5 
 
Just a few months later, in March 1999, the 
Chinese government refused to support a 
program of work at the United Nations (UN) 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) because it 
did not include negotiations on the Prevention 
of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).6 
The United States repeatedly opposed opening 
such a discussion, insisting on many occasions 
during the last ten years “there is no arms race 
in outer space” and therefore no need to 
 
 
p. xii, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851 
(accessed January 2010). 
4Ibid. p. xxiv. 
5Joan Johnson-Freese, “Becoming Chinese: Or, How U.S. 
Satellite Export Policy Threatens National Security,” Space 
Times, January/February 2001. Also, see Joan Johnson-
Freese, “Alice in Licenseland: U.S. Satellite Export Controls 
Since 1990,” Space Policy 16: 3 (2000). 
6Statement by H. E. Mr. Li Changhe, Ambassador for 
Disarmament Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, 27 May 
1999, Geneva, Switzerland, http://www.nti.org/db/china/ 
engdocs/lichangh_0599.htm (accessed December 2009). 
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discuss space security issues in the CD.7 In 
June 2009, the U.S. and China agreed to form 
an ad-hoc committee in the CD to discuss 
PAROS. The change in the U.S. position on 
space in the CD is consistent with the 
agreement in the U.S. - China Joint Statement 
to “take steps” on space security. 
 
These shifts in U.S. civilian and military space 
policy towards China are supported by the 
head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General 
Kevin Chilton. Just before President Obama’s 
trip to China, the general told reporters that 
China was “on a fast track to improving 
capabilities,” that space was “a competitive 
domain” and that the United States needed “a 
forum that provides an open dialogue between 
our nations.”8 General Chilton hopes the new 
dialogue with China will help the United 
States “understand exactly what China’s 
intentions are.”9 The chief coordinator of U.S. 
military activities in space admitted “where 
they are heading is one of the things that a lot 
of people would like to understand better.”10 
 
General Chilton’s open-minded approach to 
Chinese intentions is at odds with many U.S. 
analysts of China’s space programs, who 
claim to know that Chinese investments in 
space, including the large sums spent on their 
human space flight program, are guided by 
military objectives. The head of U.S. Strategic 
                                                 
                                                
7The most notable among these was the statement of the 
Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference 
on Disarmament on 13 June 2006, which states: “The Cold 
War is over, Mr. President, and there is no arms race in outer 
space. Thus there is no – repeat, no – problem in outer space 
for arms control to solve.” The statement was delivered by 
John Mohanco, then the Deputy Director of the U.S. State 
Department’s Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security 
Affairs, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/ 
speeches06/13JuneUS.pdf (accessed December 2009). 
8Phil Stewart, “U.S. Eyes Intent of China’s Space Programs,” 
Reuters 3 November 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/scienceNews/idUSTRE5A25XG20091103 (accessed 
December 2009). 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
Command is likely aware of the limited value 
of many existing U.S. assessments of Chinese 
intentions in space, which often lack 
credibility because they are based on 
questionable information from a small set of 
poorly evaluated Chinese sources.11 The 
unwarranted concern generated by U.S. 
analysts over the comments of Chinese 
General Xu Qiliang on 1 November 2009 is a 
good example. Xu was discussing general 
trends in the development of military space 
technology in the context of comments on the 
60th anniversary of the People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force (PLAF). American press 
accounts, took highly edited fragments of 
Xu’s full remarks out of context, making it 
appear the head of the Chinese Air Force said 
war in space was inevitable, which he did 
not.12 
 
The new willingness to talk about cooperation 
in space is a welcome sign that both the U.S. 
and China recognize the undesirable 
consequences of maintaining the post-Cox 
Commission status-quo. If the bilateral 
dialogue on space is to succeed, both sides 
need to be prepared to manage the inevitable 
 
11Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in 
Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of Concerned 
Scientists, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 9 June 2009, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security
/international_information/us_china_relations/anti-satellite-
asat.html (accessed December 2009). 
12Analysts are made to appear to sanction the inaccurate 
interpretation that Xu’s remarks exposed hitherto 
unpublicized Chinese plans for space warfare. See Colin 
Clark, “China Declares Space War Inevitable,” 
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009 /11/04/china -declares-space-
war-inevitable (accessed December 2009). The original story 
clearly indicates Xu was referring to longstanding public 
Chinese discussions of trends in the militarization of outer 
space, not plans for space war or space weaponization. See 
“China’s PLA Eyes Future in Space, Air: Air Force 
Commander,” Xinhua General News Service, Beijing, China, 
1 November 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2009-
11/02/content_4099975.htm (accessed December 2009). An 
extended Chinese language account of the full press 
conference from which the quotes in the prior source are 
derived is available at http://news.mod.gov.cn/ 
headlines/2009-11/01/content_4099571.htm. 
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difficulties and frustrations of continued 
miscommunication and misunderstanding. For 
example, the United States and China began a 
similar dialogue on nuclear weapons nearly 
twenty years ago, but the participants still 
argue over the meaning of basic concepts, like 
deterrence.13 China’s nuclear weapons experts 
have an institutionalized aversion to the use of 
the Chinese word for deterrence “weishe.” 
Elder Chinese leaders do not want them to use 
deterrence to describe the purpose of Chinese 
nuclear weapons because they associate the 
concept with the “nuclear blackmail” they 
believe China experienced at the hands of the 
Americans in the 1950s.14 Today, younger 
                                                 
 
                                                
13The Committee on the U.S. - Chinese Glossary of Nuclear 
Security Terms, composed of members of the U.S. National 
Academy of Science Committee on International Security and 
Arms Control (CISAC) Policy and the Chinese Scientists 
Group on Arms Control (CSGAC) negotiated for months over 
the inclusion of the term “limited deterrence” in their English-
Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary. The aim 
of the glossary is to “reduce the likelihood of 
misunderstanding, and to remove barriers to progress in 
exchanges and diplomatic, cooperative and other activities 
where unambiguous understanding is essential.” CISAC and 
CSGAC have been meeting for almost twenty years. In the 
end, the two sides agreed to disagree, saying it was “a term 
used by some scholars to describe a form of deterrence. 
However, there is no consensus on the definition.” This may 
seem a small matter, but some of the scholars they refer to in 
the definition argue that China is in the process of changing 
its nuclear posture from a “minimal” to a “limited” deterrent. 
This change could have grave implications for U.S. 
perceptions of Chinese intentions regarding the alert status 
and possible use of their nuclear weapons. Committee on the 
U.S. - Chinese Glossary of Nuclear Security Terms, National 
Research Council, “English-Chinese, Chinese-English 
Nuclear Security Glossary,” The National Academies Press, 
Washington, D.C., 2008, http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php? 
record_id=12186 (accessed January 2010). 
14This was the unanimous response from a panel of eight 
leading Chinese experts on nuclear strategy: Duan Zhanyuan, 
Second Artillery of the People’s Liberation Army; Fan Jishe, 
China Academy of Social Sciences; Guo Xiaobing, China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations; Hu Yumin, 
China Institute of International and Strategic Studies; Li Bin, 
Tsinghua University; Sun Xiangli, China Academy of 
Engineering Physics; Teng Jianqun, China Institute of 
Intemational Studies; and Yang Mingjie, China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations. These experts were 
responding to a question on the Chinese aversion to the term 
“deterrence” from James Acton at a workshop sponsored by 
Chinese analysts are beginning to use the 
word “deterrence” the same way their 
American counterparts do. Ironically, this 
accommodation to the American nuclear 
vernacular is producing more confusion. Some 
American analysts, mistakenly according to 
the Chinese, are interpreting changes in their 
use of terminology as a sign China is changing 
its nuclear posture.15 
 
The American side should prepare for the 
upcoming dialogue with China on space by 
learning more about the history of the Chinese 
space program. Familiarity with the choices 
China made in the past, as well as how and 
why those choices were made, should help the 
American participants be more effective in 
meeting whatever objectives they set for the 
talks. The best way to determine where China 
might be heading is to understand more about 
where they have been. 
 
 
The 1980s: The Formative Decade for 
Contemporary Chinese Space Policy 
 
China’s contemporary space capabilities, 
including the anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor 
tested in January 2007 and their human space 
flight program, were made possible by a 1986 
leadership decision to make an initial 10 
billion Chinese Yuan (or Renminbi, RMB) 
investment in seven key areas of advanced 
technology, including aerospace.16 This 
 
 
 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and 
Tsinghua University held at Tsinghua University. 
15A description of the ongoing debate among scholars can be 
found in Stephanie Legge, “Going Beyond the Stir: The 
Strategic Realities of China's No-First-Use Policy,” NTI Issue 
Brief, December, 2005, http://www.nti.org/e_research 
/e3_70.html (accessed December 2009). Legge notes the 
origins of the linguistic roots of the suspected Chinese posture 
change in Alastair Iain Johnson, “China's New Old Thinking: 
The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security 
20: 3 (1995-1996). 
16Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, “A Place for One’s 
Mat,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, 
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decision was a direct result of a personal 
appeal to Deng Xiaoping by Chinese scientists 
who were closely associated with China’s 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
programs.17 That appeal was contained in a 
letter written in response to U.S. President 
Ronald Reagan’s 23 March 1983 speech 
announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI).18 
 
Influential Chinese defense community 
scientists were not writing to Deng because of 
a concern about the possibility of a future 
military conflict with the United States. The 
contents of their letter and the state of U.S. - 
China relations at the time it was written make 
this clear. The United States and China were 
cooperating in efforts to contain the Soviet 
Union, and the United States was providing 
intelligence, technology and training to the 
Chinese military. President Reagan received a 
warm welcome in what he described as the 
“so-called Communist China” during his visit 
in April 1984. Reagan proclaimed, “My visit 
to China has convinced me that our future is 
bright,” and “America is on the edge of a new 
era of peace, prosperity and commerce.”19 
While the two nations were not allies, U.S. 
and Chinese mutual threat perceptions were 
low. The year the letter was sent to Deng 
Xiaoping Time magazine made him their 
                                                 
 
                                                
Massachusetts, 2009, pp.23-24, http://www.amacad.org/ 
publications/spaceChina.aspx (accessed December 2009). 
17The scientists were Wang Daheng, Chen Fangyun, Wang 
Ganchang and Yang Jiachi. An excellent English language 
summary of their contributions to China’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile programs is contained in Evan A. 
Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security 
and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the 
Information Age (Stanford University Press, 2003): 154–157. 
18Xiaohua Fan, The Inside Story of Chinese Space Policy-
Making (China Literature and History Publishing House, 
2005): 262 - 269. 
19Robert A. Jemian, Laurence I. Barrett and Evan 
Thomas,“An Opening to the Middile Kingdon,” Time 14 May 
1984, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,955255, 00.html (accessed November 2009). 
“Man of the Year.” Time noted “his 
continuing reform of China and Marxism 
holds more promise for changing the course of 
history than anything else that occurred during 
1985.”20 
 
The Chinese scientists who persuaded Deng 
Xiaoping to commit a large block of the 
nation’s limited technical and fiscal resources 
to an ambitious space program believed that 
SDI was “not just a military program, but a 
far-reaching political striving to preserve 
American superiority.”21 The military 
implications of SDI were not the “real 
objective” behind a program they saw as an 
effort to “push forward new advanced 
technologies and national economic 
development.”22 The Chinese leadership, 
attentive to the concerns of their scientific 
advisers, wanted to ensure China kept pace in 
the international competition for technological 
and economic power. Military space 
capability was a secondary concern. This was 
reflected in the “Outline for National High 
Technology Planning” that codified the 
scientists concerns into national policy.23 The 
 
20George J. Church, “Deng Xiaoping,” Time 6 January 1986, 
http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive
/stories/1985.html (accessed November 2009). It was the 
second time Deng received high praise from Time, which 
named him “Man-of-the-Year” in 1978 for “leading one-
quarter of mankind quickstep out of dogmatic isolation into 
the late 20th Century and the life of the rest of the planet.” 
From the Time archive, “Person of the Year,” Time 1 
January1979, http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/ 
personoftheyear /archive/stories/1978.html (accessed 
December 2009). 
21Xiaohua Fan, The Inside Story of Chinese Space Policy-
Making (China Literature and History Publishing House, 
2005): 262-269. Two of the four authors of the letter detail 
their political, economic and technological motivations for 
investments in space in an article entitled: “The Science of 
Technology and Our National Aerospace Technology 
Development,” Journal of the Chinese Academy of Science 4 
(1986), shortly after they transmitted their letter to Deng 
Xiaoping. The article can be found in Yang Jiachi, The 
Selected Works of Yang Jiachi (China Astronautic Publishing 
House, 2006): 102-109. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
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Outline placed a priority on civilian and dual-
use applications: a priority that continues to 
guide Chinese high technology investments, 
including aerospace investments, according to 
language in the current Chinese national 
plan.24 
 
During Reagan’s visit, Deng expressed 
frustration that the U.S. was unwilling to 
provide China with access to space 
technology.25 Six year’s earlier, U.S. 
President Carter’s National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, brought what he 
described as “the most high powered 
science/technology delegation ever sent by the 
United States to a foreign country” when he 
visited China in 1978 for negotiations leading 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations.26 
NASA Administrator at that time, Robert 
Frosch, was a member of that delegation. 
Deng Xiaoping took the occasion to ask the 
United States for help developing China’s first 
communication satellite. Their own effort had 
stalled and Deng wanted to jump start a long 
distance education effort designed to address 
the catastrophic damage to Chinese secondary 
and higher education caused by the Cultural 
Revolution of 1966-1976.27 
 
The Carter administration was willing to sell 
China a satellite, but China wanted help 
overcoming the specific technical difficulties 
inhibiting progress on their existing 
communications satellite program. It had been 
a top Chinese national technology policy 
                                                 
                                                
24An English Language copy of the complete document is 
available on-line at http://www.cstec.org/uploads/files/ 
National%20Outline%20for%20Medium%20and%20Long%
20Term%20S&T%20Development.doc (accessed December 
2009). 
25Jeff Gerth and Eric Schmidt, “The Technology Trade: A 
Special Report; Chinese Said to Reap Gains In U.S. Export 
Policy Shift,” New York Times 19 October 1998. 
26Richard Masden, China and the American Dream: A Moral 
Inquiry (University of California Press, 1995): 134. 
27Xiaohua Fan,. The Inside Story of Chinese Space Policy-
Making (China Literature and History Publishing House, 
2005): 199-201. 
priority since September of 1977.28 The 
willingness of the Carter administration to 
provide technological assistance to China was 
encouraging and the immediate need pressing, 
so Deng took the extraordinary step of making 
a direct personal appeal to the United States 
against the wishes of his scientific advisers. 
They wanted to do it on their own. Fortunately 
for them, the negotiations broke down. 
Afterward, Deng and China’s aerospace 
leaders came to believe that China could not 
rely on the U.S. for meaningful assistance in 
developing their own space technology. They 
went ahead with the communication satellite 
on their own. There were repeated setbacks 
and delays, but these proved to be invaluable 
learning experiences.29 China eventually 
succeeded in placing their first 
communications satellite into space on 16 
April 1984, ten days before Reagan arrived in 
China.30 Deng may have been expressing 
frustration when he chided Reagan for not 
providing more access to American space 
technology, but he may also have been trying 
to let him know China could succeed without 
it. 
 
China’s disappointment in American 
reluctance to share advanced space technology 
has a historical precedent in the Soviet 
Union’s hesitant assistance to China’s nuclear 
 
28Chinese General Zhang Aiping, the Director of the 
Committee on Science, Technology for National Defense 
(CSTND) first expressed his intention to make it a priority 
during a meeting of the Chinese Academy of Space 
Technology (CAST) in June 1975. Jisheng Li, Far Road to 
Heaven: Record of Rocket and Satellite Launches (Central 
Party School of the Chinese Communist Party Publishing 
House, 2005): 151. 
29Carter’s NASA Administrator Robert Frosch felt that the 
lesser risk was in helping China with their own 
communications satellite, since that would probably mean 
they learned less than if they did it themselves. Moreover, in 
his view there were no great secrets in the comsat 
(commercial satellite) business that cooperation would risk 
compromising. Personal communication with the author. 
30Xiaohua Fan,. The Inside Story of Chinese Space Policy-
Making (China Literature and History Publishing House, 
2005): 224-232. 
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and ballistic missile programs– assistance 
abruptly canceled shortly after it began. 
Chinese leaders call attention to this precedent 
when they compare the human spaceflight 
program to their earlier effort to develop 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.31 
Although in practice human spaceflight has 
shown little military value, the common 
denominator between the two programs 
(nuclear weapons/ballistic missiles and 
spaceflight) is that in both instances the 
Chinese were forced to master the 
technologies on their own, or at least without 
substantial foreign assistance. The comparison 
is meant to be an object lesson for the Chinese 
in the continuing importance of indigenous 
technological development, even in this era of 
globalization and interdependence. This 
understanding of the importance the current 
leadership attaches to their space program is 
consistent with the concerns expressed in the 
past by the letter-writing Chinese scientists 
who got it started. Those scientists understood 
how technologically deficient China was in 
comparison to the world’s most 
                                                 
                                                
31Many American observers see the connection in military 
terms and describe the Chinese human spaceflight program as 
a “military run” program. One example, among scores of 
others, was an editorial published in The Dallas Morning 
News shortly after China put their first person in space. The 
editorial was accompanied by a picture of military officers 
surrounding the Shenzhou V space capsule. Standing at the 
front of the capsule were Chinese astronaut Colonel Yang 
Liwei and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, both dressed in 
their military uniforms. The editorial notes: “It is important to 
observe that Beijing’s space program is not run by the 
Chinese equivalent of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, but by the People’s Liberation Army. 
Following the taikonaut’s return to Earth, the countr’s science 
and technology minister called the event a “glorious 
achievement” as significant as China’s explosion of its first 
atomic and hydrogen bombs. The comparison is telling.” See 
“Red Star Rising: Space Venture Makes China a True 
Competitor,” Dallas Morning News 17 October 2003. A 
similar assessment of the military character of China’s human 
spaceflight program appeared on the eve of U.S. President 
Obama’s visit to China: See Gordon Chang, “The Space Race 
Begins. Should the U.S. and China Cooperate,” Forbes.com, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009 /11/05/space-arms-race-china-
united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html 
(accessed December 2009). 
technologically advanced nation, the United 
States., which they imagined was about to 
invest hundreds of billions of dollars in a new 
generation of space-related technologies. 
 
At the same time, China made a diplomatic 
push for international restrictions on the 
military use of space technology. In March 
1985, Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi 
delivered China’s first official position paper 
on the peaceful use of outer space to the CD. 
It stated “China fully subscribes to the 
objective of the non-militarization of outer 
space and the exclusive use of outer space for 
peaceful purposes.” Non-militarization was 
understood to mean “both space weapons with 
actual lethal or destructive power and military 
satellites of all types from limited and 
prohibited.” China was willing to postpone 
discussions on a ban on all military uses in 
lieu of an immediate effort to ban the 
“development, testing, production, 
deployment and use of any space weapons” 
including “all devices or installations either 
space, land, sea, or atmosphere-based, which 
are designed to attack or damage spacecraft in 
outer space, or disrupt their normal 
functioning or change their orbits.”32 
 
Had the United States, China and the other 
members of the CD negotiated such a 
prohibition, the research and development 
(R&D) effort that produced the ASAT 
interceptor China tested in January of 2007, 
and other suspected Chinese counter space 
technologies, would have been legally 
proscribed. In the absence of an agreement, 
Chinese concerns about ASAT weapons 
gradually evolved from observations and 
analysis of foreign ASAT systems to 
 
32See China’s Basic Position on the Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space Conference on Disarmament, CD/579, 
19 March 1985 in Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of 
Reprisal: China’s search for Security in a Nuclear Age (The 
MIT Press, 2007): 209-210. 
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diplomatic efforts to restrain them, and 
eventually to R&D programs of their own. 
 
China had been watching the development of 
U.S. and Soviet ASAT systems since the early 
1970s.33 By the end of the decade, they noted 
then that while the Soviet Union seemed to be 
farther ahead in ASAT technology, U.S. R&D 
on missile defense had also produced 
capabilities that could be used to “track, 
approach, discriminate and destroy” 
satellites.34 These early observations led 
China’s defense aerospace experts to 
anticipate, several years before Reagan’s SDI 
speech, “technological breakthroughs… in 
infrared sensing, adaptive optics, lasers, 
precision guidance, micro-computing, 
aerospace, particle beam and other weapons 
that will lead to a fundamental change in 
strategic defenses.”35 China’s scientists also 
predicted these technological changes would 
“undermine arms control efforts between the 
United States and Soviet Union that restrict 
the development of missile defense and ASAT 
systems.”36 This early connection between 
missile defense and ASAT technology is a 
persistent theme in Chinese discussions about 
the two technologies that continues today. The 
ASAT interceptor China tested in 2007 uses 
the same basic technologies as those used in 
U.S. missile defense interceptors. China 
appears to have begun the R&D program that 
                                                 
                                                
33Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in 
Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 9 June 2009, http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/international_informat
ion/us_china_relations/anti-satellite-asat.html (accessed 
December 2009). 
34Ji Shipan and Li Minghu, “Kongjian Zhanzheng yu Jiguang 
Wuqi: Dandao Daodan Fangyu de Fazhan Qushi” (Space 
Warfare and Laser Weapons: Trends in the Development of 
Missile Defense),” Xiandai Fangyu Jishu (Modern Defense 
Technology) 3 (1979): 1-31. 
35Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
produced their ASAT interceptor in the mid-
1980s.37 
 
By the end of the1980s, China had committed 
to a long-term R&D effort that would 
eventually lead to the acquisition of the 
civilian and military space capabilities they 
are bringing on-line today. China expressed 
“strong interest” in international negotiations 
to control the military use of space 
technology, including all types of ASAT 
weapons, but also set about developing the 
same military space capabilities they sought to 
have controlled.38 When China made these 
commitments, neither the technologies nor the 
negotiations to control them appear to have 
been specifically intended to resolve concerns 
about a possible military conflict with United 
States. For understandable reasons, many 
Americans do not see it that way today. 
 
 
Historical Perspective 
on American Perceptions 
of Chinese Intentions in Space 
 
American perceptions of Chinese intentions in 
space have a history of their own that is 
disconnected from the history of China’s 
space programs. When Ronald Reagan agreed 
to allow China to launch U.S. commercial 
communications satellites in September of 
1988, U.S. threat perceptions of China were 
even lower than they had been when he visited 
China four years earlier. Time magazine made 
fun of a Chinese military “whose power and 
prestige have been diminished by Chinese 
leaders determined to de-emphasize military 
 
37Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Understanding 
China’s Antisatellite Test,” The Nonproliferation Review 15: 
2 (2008). 
38The Chinese wanted to ban all military uses of space. This 
was a much stronger arms control measure than what China 
and Russia are currently proposing. Links to the UN 
documents on the current Chinese-Russian proposal can be 
found on-line at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/ 
paros/osdocuments.html. 
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might in favor of agricultural and industrial 
reform.”39 The U.S. security concern at the 
time was Chinese missile sales. Reagan 
administration officials, including Defense 
Secretary Frank Carlucci, were “fully 
satisfied” their discussions with Deng 
Xiaoping had resolved those concerns. 
Sanctions imposed in the wake of missile sales 
to Iran were lifted, and the U.S. continued to 
provide assistance and equipment to the 
Chinese military.40 
 
Less than a year later American threat 
perceptions changed dramatically after the 
Chinese military used lethal force to repress 
anti-government demonstrations throughout 
China in June of 1989. What is known in the 
United States as the “Tiananmen Massacre” 
was a massive 
nationwide military 
campaign to put 
down protests in 
major cities 
throughout China. 
Televised images of 
the violence in 
Beijing on the 
evening of June 3 
and the early 
morning of June 4 
horrified the 
American public. CNN reporter Mike Chinoy, 
who was responsible for getting those images 
out of China, later called it the defining 
moment in American perceptions of China.41 
                                                 
 
                                                
39Michael S. Serrill, Sandra Burton and Jaime A. FlorCruz, 
“China Sprucing Up the Troops.” Time 11 July 1988, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,967873,0
0.html (accessed 29 November 2009). 
40See Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. and China Mark 10 Years of 
Ties,” New York Times 16 December 1988; “China Assures 
Carlucci On Mideast Arms Sales; Peking Seen Curbing 
Missile Supply Role,” New York Times 8 September 1988; 
and “U.S. to Lift Sanctions Against Beijing; Chinese Agree to 
Accept Peace Corps,” New York Times, 10 March 1988. 
41Mike Chinoy, “Speech Before the Los Angeles World 
Affairs Council,” 18 April 1997, http://www.lawac.org/ 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was instantly 
transformed from Time magazine’s reform-
minded “Man-of-the-Year” into the “Butcher 
of Beijing.” In the next few years, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union left China as the only major nation 
ruled by a communist party. Over the next 
decade, Americans developed “a picture of 
China solely as a country of brutal dictators, 
beleaguered dissidents and corrupt deal-
makers intent on using its economic clout and 
its military might to dominate its neighbors 
and challenge the United States for regional 
supremacy.”42 
 
Changing American perceptions of China did 
not bring a halt to U.S. commercial satellite 
launches from China until 1998. Initially this 
may have been due to the temporary shortage 
of U.S. launch capacity created by the loss of 
the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986. Later in 
the next decade, the Clinton administration 
continued to permit the launches because it 
believed the policy encouraged China to keep 
the promise not to sell missile technology it 
made just before President Reagan authorized 
them.43 Republican opponents on Congress, 
however, began to define Chinese space 
programs as a grave threat to U.S. national 
security and charged President Clinton “sold 
to a Chinese Military Intelligence front the 
technology that defense experts argued would 
give Beijing the capacity to blind our spy 
satellites and launch a sneak attack.”44 
The best way to 
determine 
where China 
may be 
heading is to 
understand 
more about 
where they 
have been. 
 
 
speech/pre%20sept%2004%20speeches/chinoy.html 
(accessed November 2009). 
42Ibid. 
43Jeff Gerth and David Sanger, “How Chinese Won Rights to 
Launch Satellites for U.S,” New York Times 17 May 1998, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/17/us/how-chinese-won-
rights-to-launch-satellites-for-
us.html?scp=2&sq=Rubin&st=nyt&pagewanted=all (accessed 
November 2009). 
44William Safire, “Essay; U.S. Security for Sale,” New York 
Times 18 May 1998, http://www.nytimes.com 
/1998/05/18/opinion/essay-us-security-for-sale.html?scp=5 
&sq=China&st=nyt (accessed November 2009). 
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This claim was made in May 1998, when 
China had 14 satellites in orbit including ten 
communication satellites, mostly of foreign 
manufacture, that were used primarily for 
television, phone and fax services. China also 
had one weather satellite and one scientific 
satellite.45 Also, China’s space investments, 
and the Chinese military’s space work force, 
were developing the human spaceflight 
program, which had yet to launch the first 
experimental capsule and would not put an 
astronaut into space for another five years.  
Even though China had mastered the use of 
recoverable reconnaissance satellites and was 
developing experimental positioning 
satellites,46 they had no demonstrated counter 
space capabilities. Yet the “Space Pearl 
Harbor” narrative quickly emerged as the 
consensus interpretation of Chinese intentions 
among U.S. analysts. In January 2001, the 
supposed Chinese threat was highlighted in 
the Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. 
National Security Space Management and 
Organization– a Congressional commission 
chaired by Donald Rumsfeld until President-
elect George W. Bush nominated him to serve 
as Secretary of Defense. The Space 
Commission report claimed: “China’s military 
is developing methods and strategies for 
                                                 
                                                
45The communications satellites were: Apstar 1, 3 and 4 (APT 
Satellite); Asiasat 1, 2, 3S, and Asiasat G (Asia Satellite 
Telecom); Dongfanghong 3R (China Telecom Satellite 
Broadcasting); Sinosat-1 (Sino Satellite Communications); 
and the Chinastar-1 (Zhongwei 1) built by Lockheed, owned 
and operated by China Satellite Communications. The 
weather satellite was the Feng Yun 2B (China National Space 
Administration), and the scientific sateliite was the Shijian 4 
(CAST). See Aviation Week & Space Technology 148: 2 
(1998): 141-147; and Aviation Week & Space Technology 
154: 3 (2001): 167-176. Also, see the Union of Concerned 
Scientist Satellite Database, which is available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security
/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html 
(accessed January 2010). 
46This includes the FSW recoverable satellite program which 
was used for a variety of experiments as well as photo 
reconnaissance, the Ziyuan imaging satellites developed in 
cooperation with Brazil and the Beidou positioning satellites. 
defeating the U.S. military in a high-tech and 
space-based future war.”47 
 
Prominent American analysts of China’s 
military modernization program believed 
these methods and strategies were inspired by 
concerns within the Chinese military about the 
American use of space technology in the 1991 
Gulf War.48 One of the most frequently was 
Mark Stokes, whose 1999 U.S. Army War 
College publication on Chinese strategic 
modernization was cited frequently by 
American analysts. Stokes called the supposed 
Chinese preoccupation with military space 
technology “China’s Gulf War Syndrome.” 
He described it “a rude awakening for the 
 
47Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security 
Space Management and Organization, 11 January 2001,  
p. xiv and p. 22, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/ 
report.htm (accessed January 2010). 
48The claim appears in many American analyses. Some of the 
more prominent are James A. Lewis, China as a Military 
Space Competitor, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, August 2004, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ 
040801_china_space_competitor.pdf (accessed January2010); 
Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi and 
Angela Deters, China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic 
Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons, Center for Non-proliferation 
Studies, July 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm 
(accessed January 2010); David O. Meteyer, The Art of 
Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space 
Weapons, INSS Occasional Paper 60, USAF Institute for 
National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, August 
2005; Mark A. Stokes, “Space, Theater Missiles, and 
Electronic Warfare: Emerging Force Multiplier for the PLA 
Aerospace Campaign, “presented at Chinese Military Affairs: 
A Conference on the State of the Field, 26-27 October 2000, 
Fort McNair, Washington DC, Aerospace I Panel; and Mary 
C. FitzGerald, “China’s Evolving Military Juggernaut,” in 
China’s New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and 
Military Power in the Next Half-Century, Hudson Institute, 
2005. The assertion was also a focal point of a review of 
China’s space program presented by Dean Cheng of the 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) at the Henry L. Stimson 
Center on 3 March 2005. A somewhat less definitive 
agreement with this consensus appears in Joan Johnson-
Freese, “Strategic Communication with China: What Message 
about Space?” China Security 2 (2006): 51, 
http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf#search='
Strategic%20Communication%20with%20China:%20Space 
(accessed January 2010). 
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CMC [China’s Central Military Commission] 
and the military-industrial complex.”49 
 
However, the history of China’s space 
program reviewed earlier in this paper 
demonstrates that Stokes was mistaken. There 
is ample documentary evidence that the 
defense scientists who ran China’s “military 
industrial complex” anticipated the military 
applications of space technology the U.S. 
demonstrated in the Gulf War more than a 
decade before that war started.50 They 
petitioned the Chinese government for the 
funding to develop their own military space 
capabilities five years before it started. And at 
the time these senior figures in China’s 
“military industrial complex” wrote their 
petition to the most influential military 
decision-maker in the CMC, Deng Xiaoping, 
the U.S. was assisting the development of 
Chinese military capabilities. Mutual threat 
perceptions were low and the probability of a 
U.S. - China military conflict was remote. 
 
The mistake Stokes makes in interpreting 
Chinese thinking about space is revealing, and 
it is one that is repeated by American analysts 
who cite Chinese publications without 
considering their historical, institutional and 
social context. The claim that China was 
acquiring the capability to launch a “Space 
Pearl Harbor” is based on American 
interpretations of the selected quotations of 
Chinese military personalities culled from 
Chinese military publications and press 
interviews. The quotations used to 
demonstrate Chinese intent that appear in the 
                                                 
                                                
49Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: 
Implications for the United States, Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, September 1999, p. 12. 
50Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in 
Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 9 June 2009, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_ 
weapons_and_global_security/international_information/us_c
hina_relations/anti-satellite-asat.html (accessed December 
2009). This study is based on over 1,500 source articles over a 
four-decade period. 
Space Commission Report, in the Stokes’ 
study and in many other U.S. analyses of 
China’s space programs are not from the 
scientists who work in the aerospace 
community and advise the senior leadership of 
the Chinese “military-industrial complex.” 
The quotations are from a very different set of 
Chinese authors writing for publications with 
a different purpose and a different audience. 
 
The Gulf War was a global media 
phenomenon that carried the now iconic 
televised images of “smart bombs” to 
hundreds of million of Chinese viewers for 
whom television itself was advanced 
technology. In the wake of this media event, a 
new and very different group of Chinese 
authors began writing about military space 
technology for a new audience. The authors 
were not aerospace 
experts or strategists 
writing for Chinese 
leaders, but non-
experts writing for 
average Chinese 
readers who were, 
like many others all 
over the world, 
rudely awakened by 
the images of modern 
warfare they saw on 
television. Their articles were part of a 
political campaign meant to reassure both 
soldiers and officers that the Chinese 
leadership was aware of the changing nature 
of modern military technology and would take 
steps to prepare the PLA to respond to these 
developments, but without saying in a detailed 
or authoritative way how it would respond.51 
American analysts were confusing Chinese 
military space policy with Chinese military 
propaganda. This confusion is still a problem 
today. 
…China made 
a diplomatic 
push for 
international 
restrictions on 
the military use 
of space 
technology. 
 
51Ibid. 
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Lesson for Policy Makers: 
Let the Scientists Do the Talking 
 
The dialogue on cooperation and the peaceful 
use of outer space President Obama and 
President Hu agreed to begin in their Joint 
Statement of November 17, 2009 will not last 
for long if both sides continue to be suspicious 
of the other’s intentions. Before the dialogue 
begins in earnest, and 
before any agreement 
on cooperation is 
signed, both sides 
should take steps to 
correct past mistakes. 
 
Chinese military 
propaganda on space 
may not be an 
indication of the 
intentions driving 
Chinese space policy, 
but it is a cause for concern. Repeated 
unsettling statements from military officers 
published in Chinese newspapers, magazines 
and journals have the same effect on U.S. 
policy-makers as the rhetoric from the U.S. 
Air Force about “space dominance” has on 
Chinese policymakers. Because Chinese 
leaders are unwilling to censure their military 
propagandists and American leaders cannot 
prevent U.S. space hawks from advocating 
visions of space dominance to Congress, 
policy-makers in both nations find it difficult 
to navigate the maze of heated rhetoric that 
drives their respective domestic debates over 
the merits of cooperation and negotiation. 
 
Mutual reassurances of peaceful intentions 
issued regularly by the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry and the U.S. Department of State are 
routinely dismissed by both governments as 
the wishful thinking or disingenuous decorum 
of diplomats. In the United States, this 
perception was strongly reinforced by the 
Foreign Ministry’s apparent lack of 
knowledge about the Chinese ASAT test in 
2007, which some ministry functionaries 
originally dismissed as U.S. government 
slander.52 The U.S. State Department 
enforcement of discriminatory U.S. legal 
restrictions on space cooperation with China is 
interpreted by many Chinese space scientists 
and engineers as a sign of persistent U.S. 
hostility towards China’s efforts to join the 
international community of spacefaring 
nations.53 This explains, in their view, why 
China is not treated on an equal basis with 
other less-developed Asian space programs, 
specifically those of Japan, India, Malaysia 
and South Korea, which all have cooperative 
relationships with NASA. 
China had 
been watching 
the 
development 
of the U.S. and 
Soviet ASAT 
system since 
the early 
1970s. 
 
A look back at the record of Chinese decisions 
about space suggests that neither the PLA nor 
the Foreign Ministry has played a decisive 
role in the formation and direction of Chinese 
space policy. The limited historical materials 
available on Chinese space policy, from the 
decision to launch China’s first satellite in the 
early days of the People’s Republic to current 
Chinese plans to build their own space station, 
suggest that China’s scientists guided Chinese 
space policy and convinced the Chinese 
political leadership to make the investments 
necessary to carry it out. Since this is the 
audience most likely to influence Chinese 
policymakers, a dialogue on cooperation and 
negotiations on space between U.S. and 
Chinese scientists is more likely to produce 
credible, productive and sustainable outcomes 
than a dialogue between military officers or 
diplomats. This is also what we have observed 
in the bilateral dialogue on nuclear weapons 
policy. 
                                                 
52David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Tries to Interpret 
China’s Silence Over Test,” New York Times 22 January 
2007. 
53Interviews with Chinese space scientists and engineers 
conducted by author in China during the course of managing 
the China Project of the Union of Concerned Scientists 
between 2002 and 2009. 
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The publications of both militaries suggest 
they will have difficulty discussing space with 
the nation they believe to be their most likely 
adversary in a future military conflict. This is 
especially true of Chinese military 
publications because of their propaganda 
function. Military to military exchanges 
should begin with less controversial and less 
technologically complex problems. Adding 
space to that agenda is more likely than not to 
derail it. Diplomats will be inclined to see 
discussions on space as a vehicle for 
addressing other problems in the bilateral 
relationship, or to hold the discussions hostage 
to those problems if they become worse. The 
Clinton Administration’s use of licensing 
procedures for sensitive space technology as a 
bargaining chip in a diplomatic effort to 
constrain Chinese missile sales is an 
instructive example of how this common 
diplomatic practice can go awry. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The history of American perceptions of China 
suggests that U.S. Congressional concerns 
about technology transfer will continue to be 
the most volatile and disruptive factor in U.S. 
- Chinese relations in space. The new dialogue 
on cooperation will be more likely to produce 
sustainable programs if it is conducted by 
individuals who can apply their scientific 
competencies to the problem of preventing the 
exchange of technologies the United States 
wants to protect and the Chinese want to 
acquire. Given the substantial gap in their 
respective national capabilities, many 
cooperative space endeavors, including human 
spaceflight, are likely to result in transfers of 
technology and expertise from the United 
States to China. Having scientists organize 
and conduct the discussions could help both 
parties identify and assess the relative costs 
and benefits of specific technology transfers 
early in the process. This could help avoid 
inappropriate expectations that could provoke 
Congressional opposition and undermine 
progress. 
 
The history of China’s space programs 
suggests that a U.S. - China dialogue on the 
peaceful uses of outer space is more likely to 
diminish mutual threat perceptions if scientists 
are at the table. Contemporary Chinese space 
policy is the product of a reaction to a U.S. 
plan for national missile defenses that Chinese 
scientists misread as a new Apollo program. 
The objective of their subsequent investments 
in space was to keep China from falling too 
far behind the pace of the global space 
technology leader, primarily because of the 
imagined economic consequences. If the 
science delegation Zbigniew Brezinski 
brought to China in 1978 had been charged 
with beginning a long-term scientific dialogue 
about space technology with their Chinese 
counterparts, it is possible the four anxious 
scientists who wrote to Deng Xiaoping would 
have been better informed about the politics of 
missile defense in the United States. They 
might have been able 
to see that SDI was 
more science fiction 
than science. They 
might have been able 
to predict that it 
would be 
immediately scaled 
back and eventually 
terminated. 
 
Had there been an 
on-going relationship 
between Chinese and 
American scientists 
in 1983, the history 
of China’s space 
program, as well American perceptions of 
Chinese intentions in space, might have taken 
a radically different course in a healthier 
direction. In planning a new relationship with 
Contemporary 
Chinese space 
policy is the 
product of a 
reaction to a 
U.S. plan for 
national missile 
defenses that 
Chinese 
scientists 
misread as a 
new Apollo 
program.
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China in space, this historical perspective 
suggests it would be in the best interest of the 
United States to consider the long term. The 
U.S. Congress and Executive should avoid 
making the dialogue on space a hostage of 
unrelated troublesome contentions in the 
bilateral relationship. They should use 
cooperation to build relationships between 
Chinese and American scientists and 
engineers who share an interest in the peaceful 
exploration and utilization of outer space. 
Once established, this cross-cultural 
community of space scientists and engineers 
could help reduce miscommunication and 
misunderstanding, especially during moments 
of crisis. Dialogue and cooperation may not 
produce a bilateral consensus on space 
security or space policy, but it can establish 
the reliable channels of communication to the 
Chinese aerospace community that General 
Chilton said the United States Government 
needs to better assess Chinese intentions in 
space. 
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Space Situational Awareness 
Workshop  
 
The goal of the Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) Workshop is to bring together 
stakeholders interested in space situational 
awareness. This includes practitioners, users 
of data, representatives of industry and the 
military, the scientific community, 
international organizations, and the satellite-
tracking community. These stakeholders 
discuss how needs are changing with SSA, 
what improvements in SSA capabilities can be 
achieved in the near-term to medium-term, 
and how various stakeholder communities 
might better interact to draw on each other’s 
strengths. 
 
The first workshop was held in 2006. It was 
co-sponsored by the World Security Institute’s 
Center for Defense Information. A workshop 
report can be found at: http://www.cdi.org/ 
PDFs/SSAConference_screen.pdf. 
 
The second workshop was hosted by Inmarsat 
in 2007 and was co-sponsored by the World 
Security Institute’s Center for Defense 
Information and the Secure World 
Foundation. A summary of the discussions 
that took place at the workshop held in 2007 
was published in Space and Defense 2: 1 
(2008). 
 
The third workshop was held in 2009. This 
workshop was hosted by Intelsat and was co-
sponsored by the World Security Institute’s 
Center for Defense Information, the Secure 
World Foundation, and the George C. 
Marshall Institute. A summary of the 2009 
workshop was published in Space and 
Defense 3: 2 (Winter 2009).  
Areas of focus at the 2009 workshop included: 
• National and international perspectives 
on SSA. 
• Challenges of the space environment. 
• Governance issues related to safe and 
responsible behavior in the space 
environment. 
• State of SSA data sharing and the U.S. 
Commercial and Foreign Entities 
(CFE) Program. 
• Concepts and capabilities for improved 
SSA data sharing. 
• New opportunities in SSA. 
 
 
Summer Space Seminar 
 
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies organizes the Summer Space Seminar 
to advance two principal goals: (1) to foster an 
education and interest in the interdisciplinary 
areas of space with the intent to develop space 
professionals; and (2) to develop a network of 
relations across civil, commercial, and 
military space professionals that will likely 
emerge from the participants. The first 
Summer Space Seminar was held in 2007. 
 
This seminar exposes participants to the 
breadth and depth of space activities in the 
civil, commercial, and military areas. The 
relationships among these areas are explored 
across a number of perspectives – participants 
are exposed to the technology and science of 
space activities, followed by discussions on 
the political, legal, economic, and social 
aspects that influence the development and 
application of the various civil, commercial, 
and military space activities. The emphasis is 
on exchanges among the participants. 
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The Summer Space Seminar is directed 
toward bringing together a broad group of 
future space professionals to lay a foundation 
for a future space policy community in the 
military, civilian government, and private 
sectors. Participants in the program include 
students from the U.S. Air Force Academy, 
U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military Academy, 
George Washington University, and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
The seminar serves as a useful forum for 
further professional development given that 
several of the participants worked, or are 
currently employed, as space professionals. 
During the seminar, a great deal of learning 
and socialization takes place among the 
participants to meet the goal to inform and to 
build connections between future space 
professionals. 
 
 
Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop 
 
In 2006, the Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies held its first Asia, Space, and 
Strategy Workshop. This effort brought 
together U.S., Canadian, and European experts 
and policy makers from the military, civilian 
government, universities, think-tanks, and 
private sectors to discuss the implications of 
current and future Chinese space policy and to 
investigate areas of possible Sino-U.S. 
cooperation in space. Beginning in 2007, an 
invitation was extended to include Chinese 
academics in the discussions. Chinese 
participation has increased each year since 
then, with four attendees from China at the 
2009 workshop in Vancouver, Canada. 
 
The fourth workshop of 2009 was broadened 
to include other space powers in the Asia-
Pacific region. For the first time in the 
workshop series, representatives from 
Australia and Japan took part. The workshop 
focused on common interests that spacefaring 
countries of the Pacific Basin have in the 
creation of a stable, predictable, and mutually 
beneficial environment in space. Workshop 
topics in 2009 ranged from: economic and 
political goals for the use of space; improving 
the safety and stability of the space 
environment; deterrence and defense 
concepts; and arms control and verification. A 
summary of the 2009 workshop was published 
in Space and Defense 3: 2 (Winter 2009). 
 
 
National Space Forum  
 
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies organized and held its fourth annual 
National Space Forum from 1-2 September 
2009 in Washington, DC. Panels at the Forum 
discussed security issues and space. 
 
Specific topics of discussion included: 
• An assessment of security challenges 
and threats in the space domain. 
• The role of space deterrence in 
national policy. 
• The potential for new approaches to 
arms control and verification. 
• The improvement of international 
cooperation with allies in Asia and 
Europe. 
• The role that China plays in space. 
• The implementation of national space 
policy in the Obama Administration. 
 
The Forum concluded with discussions on 
how to integrate often competing interests into 
a more cohesive policy and, more importantly, 
to improve the chances that such a policy can 
be effectively implemented. Forum panels 
represented a number of points of view from 
security, civil, and commercial space. 
Proceedings of the National Space Forum 
2009 were published in Space and Defense 3: 
2 (Winter 2009). 
 
Space and Defense, Winter 2010 119 
 
 
Transatlantic Space Cooperation 
Workshop  
 
In 2008, the Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies established the Transatlantic 
Space Cooperation Workshop. This workshop 
series brings together a community of scholars 
and experts from the United States and 
Europe, including the European Union (EU), 
European Space Agency (ESA), and NATO, 
to share lessons learned, debate, and network 
on joint priorities in civil, security, and 
commercial space. 
 
The first workshop was held in Brussels, 
Belgium in June 2008. Participants in this 
workshop examined U.S., European, and EU 
security space priorities and considered 
NATO’s space role. Discussions began with 
an opening panel where senior U.S., EU, and 
NATO officials briefed participants on current 
security space priorities before participants 
explored issues more in-depth. The goal of the 
workshop was to educate senior leadership 
from the U.S., EU, and NATO on 
philosophies and strategies for collective 
space security and deterrence in the 21st 
Century. The workshop was successful in 
initiating dialogue on harmonizing 
transatlantic security space strategies. 
 
The second workshop was held in Berlin, 
Germany during September 2009. The 2009 
workshop fostered dialogue regarding the 
potential for greater cooperation across the 
Atlantic to make the most efficient use of 
capabilities where possible across civil, 
security, and commercial space. A summary 
of the 2009 workshop was published in Space 
and Defense 3: 2 (Winter 2009).  
 
Issues discussed at the 2009 workshop 
included: 
• Developments over the past year in 
transatlantic space cooperation. 
• Joint priorities in protection of critical 
space infrastructure. 
• Transatlantic cooperation on Earth 
observations for security and stability. 
• Future avenues for advancing 
transatlantic cooperation. 
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• Use percent rather than % except in figures and tables. 
• For numbers, spell out numbers less than 10. 
• Make use of 21st style where appropriate. 
• Keep capitalization to a minimum. 
• Concise paragraphs and sentences are desirable. 
• Avoid a paper that is just descriptive; rather engage in analytical rigor 
and assessment. 
• Avoid policy recommendations in the analysis part of paper; leave 
this, if applicable, for a separate section at the end of the paper. 
• Define all new terms used in paper. 
• Avoid hyphenated words when possible. 
• Avoid the use of passive voice when possible. 
 
Footnotes 
 
Footnotes need to be numbered consecutively with a raised numeral in the 
text. Please make use of the Insert-Preference-Footnote function of Word. 
Please do not use endnote style or scientific notation. Footnotes should be 
in full bibliographic style with first name, last name format for authors. 
 
